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This study traces the root causes of terrorism in West Africa, focusing on Nigeria, Mali and 
Niger. This exploration is conducted within the framework of the relative deprivation and the 
greed and grievance theories. The relative deprivation theory is often used to analyse contexts 
of perceived inequality and injustice. It describes how individuals respond to their socio-
economic conditions. The greed and grievance theory argues that terrorist organisations may 
be motivated both by grievances and by economic incentives to wage war on the government.  
 
The study explores the concept of terrorism by using different definitions from various authors 
as well as its historical background and the types of terrorist organisations that exist. The study 
consulted the work of David Rapoport in shedding light on terrorism’s four waves.  Jeffrey 
Kaplan’s Fifth Wave of terrorism was explored to better understand what inspires 
contemporary terrorism.  
 
The study notes that radical Islam is on the increase in Africa despite the mounting evidence 
that the majority of African Muslims are moderates. The study explores the causes of terrorism 
in Nigeria, Mali, and Niger in separate case studies. It is during this analysis that the study 
explores, inter alia, the effects of the legacy of colonialism and finds that that Anglophone 
Nigeria has the same conditions that enable terrorism to flourish as those found in its 
Francophone neighbours of Mali and Niger. All three countries are characterised by weak states 
that fail to protect their sovereignty, experience high levels of corruption, and have failed to 
deliver basic services to their people. The study argues that the problems found in all three case 
studies are more internal (domestic) than external (international). From the three selected case 
studies, the study also notes that any form of instability can easily spill over to neighbouring 
countries resulting in displacement of millions of people. The study also explores the impact 
of the coronavirus pandemic on terrorism. It argues that terrorist have taken advantage of the 
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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION, BACKGROUND AND METHODOLOGY 
 
1.1 Introduction  
The African continent faces vast human and state security challenges, including the increasing 
presence of terrorist activity (Pujol-Mazzini, 2018). In North Africa, East Africa and Southern 
Africa,  Al Qaeda or its affiliates or offshoots having increased their terrorist activities since 
2008 when they bombed the United States (US) embassies in Kenya and Tanzania (Luengo-
Cabrera, 2019). Pujol-Mazzini (2018), contends that with many states failing to provide 
security for their citizens by failing to control their borders, terrorist activities are likely to 
continue growing in Africa, with West Africa, in particular, becoming a safe haven for 
terrorists. In 2018, the Global Terrorism Index reported that in West Africa  (a region consisting 
of Togo, Cameroon, Cabo Verde, Nigeria Chad, Benin, Mali, Côte d’Ivoire, Liberia, Gambia, 
Niger Mauritania, Guinea, Senegal, Equatorial Guinea, Burkina Faso Sierra Leone, Ghana 
Guinea-Bissau, and Cameroon), terrorist activities have notably affected Nigeria, Mali, Niger, 
Burkina Faso and the Sahel region (Amotoso & Fajimbola, 2017:84).  This study will use the 
terms ‘West Africa’ and ‘the Sahel’ interchangeably. In West Africa, terrorism has increasingly 
redefined the security and political undercurrents with the Nigerian terrorist group Boko Haram 
using guerrilla tactics on government infrastructure and innocent civilians in Nigeria, Niger, 
Mali, Chad and northern Cameroon.  
 
This study will analyse the root causes of terrorism in the specific West African countries of 
Nigeria, Mali and Niger. Nigeria lost about 35 000 lives to terrorist attacks between 2011 and 
2018. From 2016-2018, an estimated 736 terrorist-related deaths occurred in Niger. Mali  
experienced a fourfold increase in terrorist attacks between 2018 and 2019 (Global Terrorism 
Index, 2019). These three countries are rich in minerals with Nigeria also forming an important 
part of West Africa’s coastline (Falk, 2019:3). It can be argued that the availability of minerals 
in these countries has contributed to political, social and economic instability. Nigeria, Mali 
and Niger are neighbours and because they share borders, they also share common problems. 
A problem in one country can easily spiral into other countries, due in large part, to the vast 
amount of ungoverned land in the Sahel. While the time period of analysis for this study is 
1990 to the first half of 2020, reference has also been made to historical events in the case 
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studies under investigation since the contention is that the roots of terrorism have historical 
underpinnings. 
The concept of ‘terrorism’ will be defined more fully later in 1.3.1but, in short, it can be 
described as the threat or use of violent action, intended to intimidate the public or to influence 
government actions to promote or advance ideological, religious and political goals. Terrorist 
acts are intended to instil fear in the intended target, and violence is often used to realise 
political ends (Omotoso & Fajimbola, 2017: 84). Definitions of terrorism may vary in terms of 
perpetrator, victim and audience, but all definitions agree that terrorism makes use of violence 
to achieve social and political goals (Sandler & Arce, 2007:778).  Since the Cold War ended, 
the continent has continued to experience calamities in the form of widespread poverty, 
disease, armed conflict, political, social and economic instability. The situation is further 
exacerbated by the insurgence of terrorism with all regions in the continent directly and 
indirectly affected by terrorism. For example, terrorist activities can discourage foreign 
investment (Feldman, 2009:355). Many of these calamities are imposed on Africans through a 
historical context informed by a colonial legacy, whilst some of them are self-made. Some 
argue that terrorist organisations have taken advantage of weak state institutions that were 
inherited by Africans states after colonialists withdrew from the continent (Grieco, et al., 
2015:171). Colonialists grouped together and sometimes separated different ethnic groups 
when African states were created as was the case with the English colony, Nigeria and the 
French colonies of  Mali and Niger. These groups continue to compete for scarce resources 
which are unfairly distributed by post-colonial African states. For example, it is argued that the 
Nigerian state is used by the elite to serve their interests at the expense of the poor (Fonseca & 
Jerrems, 2012:5).  
 
In the 1990s, terrorism in Africa was limited and confined to the southern parts of the Sahara 
Desert and the Sahel (See Figure 1.1. below for a map of the Sahel)), however, terrorist groups 
like Al-Shabaab and Boko Haram (which have traditionally been limited to Nigeria and 
Somalia) have become increasingly transnational regional players and are now able to carry 










Figure 1.1 The Sahel  
 
 
Source: Office of the special envoy for the Sahel. United Nation Missions (2012).  
West Africa is home to Al-Qaeda, Boko Haram, Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) now 
often referred to as the Islamic State (IS) or Daesh and Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb 
(AQIM). These organisations follow both Salafism and Wahhabism ideologies. Salafism 
advocates for the return of the original teachings and practices to the way it was during the 
days of the prophet Mohammed and for the form of government to be an Islamic state built on 
the doctrines of Allah and Sharia law (Lekalake,  2018:58). Wahhabism legitimises the use of 
violent jihadism against those who are not Muslims and Muslims who do not live according to 
the Qur’an. These groups have carried out attacks in Nigeria, Cameroon, Chad, Niger, Burkina 
Faso, Mali, Senegal and Mauritania since 9/11. In West Africa, not only have terrorist groups 
been responsible for 56% of all deaths in the last decade and for displacing thousands of people, 
but they also threaten and undermine the legitimacy of the state. In Africa, the Sahel has long 
been the epicentre for jihadism with groups like Boko Haram, a group that is known to be 
inspired by radical Islamic ideology, taking advantage of the Sahel’s ungoverned space to 
14 
 
recruit, organise and hide. Radical Islam is inspired by Salafism and Wahhabism that seek to 
liberate Muslim lands from infidels and return the Islamic religion to its dominant position. 
Radical Islam advocates for the return of original teachings and practices of the prophet 
Mohammed. It seeks to destroy Western culture and expand Islam to all corners of  the world 
(Mohapatra, 2002:94). Radical Islamic ideology threatens peace and stability of the African 
continent and continues to thrive even though the majority of African Muslim states are 
peaceful (Antwi‐Boateng, 2017:255). IS has recently encroached into Southern Africa as they 
have carried out attacks in Mozambique in April 2020 (Rogg, 2020:55). Al-Qaeda, ISIS, Boko 
Haram and other extremist groups have in the past overpowered armies as they have conducted 
sophisticated attack since they have found the African continent to be a fertile ground for their 
operation (See Figure 1.2 for the areas in which terrorist groups operate in Africa).  
 
Figure 1.2: Areas where terrorist organisations operate in Africa  
 




1.2 Background of the study: focusing on colonialism and globalisation 
 
Colonialism and globalisation have played a role in enabling terrorism to flourish. It is 
important to note that contemporary problems facing the African continent did not just appear 
after independence and cannot all be blamed on post-independent African states. Colonialism 
in Africa ended more than 60 years ago for most states, but it left long-lasting footprints. The 
colonialism legacy continues to affect current generations of Africans and will affect future 
generations. The 1815 scramble for Africa resulted in colonising forces from Europe dividing 
Africa into territories and in some cases combining, or separating, different ethnic groups. The 
main objective of the colonialists was to extract primary natural resources from the African 
continent to feed European industrialising economies (Settles, 1996:7) 
 
Colonialists created weak state institutions of governance in their African colonies and in the 
process undermined and destroyed traditional African pre-colonial systems of governance. 
This would explain why post-colonial Africa has weak administrative tools and state 
institutions. For example, the British and French governments used the divide and rule policy 
to administer their territories. The British’s divide and rule policy will be unpacked in Chapter 
Four (Zeleza, 2017:2).  
 
Another aspect that must be considered is globalisation. Globalisation, increased cross-border 
trade and the easier flow of information globally have all made terrorism more prominent since 
the Cold War ended in 1989. Some suggest that the Cold War served as a mechanism of 
restraining terrorism as the US and the Soviet Union were able to influence their client states 
to keep their terrorist activities to a limited acceptable standard that would avert confrontation 
between the Soviets and the US (Burakovsky, 2013:10). During the Cold War, terrorist 
organisations targeted the military, businesses and influential people compared to 
contemporary terrorism where unarmed civilians have become the target. For example, terrorist 
groups like the Palestinian Freedom Fighters, the German Red Army and the Italian Red 
Brigades targeted the military and businesses during the Cold War (Stephen, 2017:483). 
  
The mechanism of restraining terrorist activities disappeared after the disintegration of the 
Soviet Union leaving existing and emerging terrorist organisations with greater autonomy 
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(Burakovsky, 2013:10). The emergence of religious fundamentalism among terrorist groups 
resulted in terrorist activities becoming deadlier. Contemporary terrorist organisations are more 
militant than before because there have been improvements in transportation and 
communication. (Alvi, 2019: 127). Terrorists have taken advantage of the internet to distribute 
propaganda and to recruit followers. Mobile phones have enabled terrorists to coordinate and 
organise attacks across the globe with relative ease. Terrorists have also gained media coverage 
due to increased international media since the Soviet Union collapsed (Hove, 2017:173). The 
watershed moment happened in September 11, 2001 (9/11), when four coordinated terrorist 
attacks by Al-Qaeda took place against the US. Two hijacked aircraft crashed into  the Twin 
Towers in the US and another crashed into the Pentagon. The fourth airplane crashed into a 
field in Pennsylvania In the modern history of terrorism, this terrorist act arguably the most 
destructive. The economic damages, causalities and outrage were unprecedented. 
Masterminded by Osama bin Laden, the Al-Qaeda leader, the attacks resulted in almost 3,000 
people being killed including the hijackers (Record, 2003:6). This calamity led the US 
administration, under the leadership of President George G W Bush, to declare a war on terror, 
pledging that the war on terror would not stop until each terrorist had been killed. However, 
some argue that the US and other states’ responses to 9/11 have actually fanned the flames of 
further terrorist activity. For example, Alvi (2019: 127), notes that the invasion of Iraq by the 
US and its Western allies in 2003 seems to have added fuel to the fire as the war deepened 
solidarity amongst terrorist organisations and helped to spread radical Islam (Alvi, 2019:127).  
  
Globally, the mental and physical well-being of people is threatened by terrorism. Uprisings, 
hostilities and armed conflicts involving terrorist groups have not only become more brutal but 
have become protracted especially towards civilians and mostly affecting children and woman. 
According to Bosah & al-Hassan (2018:284), over 300,000 children are involved in armed 
conflict and terrorist activities in Africa and the Middle East. Some are forced, coerced, 
abducted or drugged into participating in violence. Terrorism is on the rise in Africa and the 
facts are indisputable. According to Solomon (2018:302), since 2006, it is ironic that terrorism 
increased by more than 1000%, which has seen the lethality of individual attacks increasing 
given that those who have travelled or researched in Africa are surprised by how tolerant, 
distinctive and moderate, the type of Islam that is practised in the African continent is. This 
phenomenon has been referred to as ‘African Islam’ (Rosander & Westerlund, 1997:6). By 
African Islam, the researchers meant that the Islamic religion in Africa is flexible and 
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accommodative in the sense that it takes local considerations and African traditional practices 
into context. 
As this study has previously noted, it seeks to analyse the root causes of terrorism in Nigeria, 
Niger and Mali. It must be stated that while this study will obviously include a discussion on 
religion as an influencing factor in terrorist activity, given that religion informs the ideologies 
of Islamic terrorist groups (Wood, 2019: 18). Religion is not the sole factor under consideration 
as will be explained in the due course. Islam maintains a belief in one God. In other ways, it is 
monotheistic. Islam is the second biggest religion in the world after Christianity. Islam’s holy 
book is the Qur’an which was popularised by its last messenger of God, the Prophet 
Mohammad. The Islamic religion believes that there will be a judgement day which will lead 
to either hell or heaven. The Sunni and Shi’a are Islam’s’ main traditions with the Sufi, the 
Yazidi and Druze evolving from the two major religions. The disparity concerning Sunni and 
Shi’a Islam, surrounding the controversy on the Prophet Mohammed’s successor has brought 
about sectarianism and ideological strife over the ages. Islam, just like other religions is not 
immune to misinterpretation and distortion (Horn, 2018:11). 
1.3 Definitional and conceptual issues 
1.3.1 Terrorism  
The study has already defined terrorism briefly earlier in the introduction, but it will further  
expand on the concept of terrorism here below. It is important that this study defines the term 
within the framework of specific contexts and events in contemporary history. The focus of the 
study will be Al-Qaeda-affiliated or Al-Qaeda enthused groups that operate in West Africa, the 
recent influential Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and Boko Haram. The study will focus 
on post-Cold War contexts because terrorism that is when it exploded  and it helps to answer 
the posed research questions. As noted, before the study can begin to engage in analysing the 
causes of terrorism, it is paramount to define and address what terrorism is. Terrorism will be 
the overarching concept in this study (Alvi, 2019:112).   
 
The term ‘terrorism’ is not easy to define. It is often a normative and controversial concept, 
proving difficult to pin down in any definitive way. Academics from different fields have 
formulated over 260 different definitions over the years (Millington, 2018:1). In the past, the 
term has resonated with negative connotations, labelling actors as evil. Those who are labelled 
as terrorists are then denied political rationality and the state’s response to terrorist activities is 
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legitimised. The common definitions of terrorism have encountered many difficulties. Positive 
connotations such as national liberation movements, underground movements, commandos 
and guerrilla movements are often used to describe what others would label ‘terrorist’ activities 
(Sinnar, 2018:1334). For example, one of the Black September and Fatah leaders, Salah Khalaf 
is also known as Abu Iyad, strongly denied that his actions of killing Israeli athletes at the 
Munich Olympics in September 1972 were  terrorist acts. He claimed that he did not confuse 
terrorism and revolutionary violence. In this light, terrorism poses a challenge for the 
international order which is led by liberal democracy. Liberal democracies have an option of 
abiding by the rule of law or to pursue armed response and may end up violating the very 
principles that liberal democracy is built on (Crone & Harrow, 2011:525). 
  
The United Nations (UN), as well as other security, law enforcement and counter-terrorism 
organisations, have attempted to conventionally construct a common definition of terrorism. 
For example, the American Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), uses international and 
domestic terrorism contexts to explain terrorism. ‘International terrorism’ is carried out by 
groups or individuals who are associated with or inspired by foreign states or foreign terrorist 
organisations. ‘Domestic terrorism’ is terrorism that is meant to be purely domestic and its 
impacts are limited within one country, where the victims and perpetrators are ordinarily from 
the same country (Sinnar, 2018:1334).  For the UN, the following three elements need to be 
present to constitute terrorism: (1) a criminal act has to be perpetrated (such as kidnapping, 
rape, arson, murder and so on) or making such threats. (2) the intention to spread fear amongst 
the population or to coerce an international or national authority to take action. (3) when a 
transnational element is involved (Mutanda, 2017:21). The UN adopted a global 
counterterrorism  strategy consensus in September 2006 with four pillars which call for:  
(1) Combating and preventing terrorism 
(2) Strengthening the role of the UN and building state capacity 
(3) Ensuring adherence to the rule of law and protection of human rights  
(4) Countering the spread of terrorism by addressing the conducive conditions  
 
The document does not mention create, enforce or advocate military mechanisms to terrorism. 
In simple terms, the document emphasises law enforcement and preventative measures while 





Duyvesteyn (2006:140), argues that, in contemporary terms, it is generally agreed that 
terrorism is an act of violence which is aimed at civilians, has political motivations and 
objectives,  aimed at effecting political change. States can employ force for political ends. 
When states employ force in the international arena, it is considered as war. When the same 
force is applied domestically, it is labelled  as civil war, state terror, law enforcement and 
oppression. States can terrorise but they cannot be called terrorists by definition (Cronin, 
2003:33). 
 
Terrorist groups radicalise, mobilise and politicise their followers and potential followers by 
developing religious, secular ideologies and belief systems. Terrorist organisations like Al-
Qaeda, Al-Shabaab, Boko Haram, ISIS and other groups have carried out such activities. 
Moreover, terrorist organisations spread fear amongst the population by targeting civilians 
since they have no respect for the law of armed conflict. As seen throughout history, terrorism 
is a weapon that is used by the weak against the strong. It has manifested itself as a 
revolutionary strategy to overthrow governments, disrupt and influence political systems (Falk, 
2019:3). In the eyes of terrorists, those injured or killed during terrorist attacks are not fatalities, 
but somewhat constituents (civilians are used as components to achieve objectives) among 
whom terrorists hope to get a response such as fear, radicalisation, intimidation, overreaction 
and repulsion. 
  
According to Schwenkenbecher (2012:13), most scholars agree that terrorism is a more of a 
strategy than an ideology and is goal-oriented, rather than being arbitrary. Most terrorism 
definitions contain the following applications and characteristics: 
(1) Violence: In most definitions, the notion of violence refers to the menace of physical 
violence, physical violence directed at human beings but there is no consideration of 
structural violence against human beings. 
(2) Political orientation: Terrorism is different from other violent strategies because it is a 
political phenomenon. Its goals render terrorism political compared to other criminal 
strategies. Terrorism is employed in the name of faith because of the political dimension 
of religion (Horn, 2018:15). 
(3) Method, strategy, tactics: As the study has mentioned above that many scholars refer 
to terrorism as a tactic or a strategy, a method and a means to an end, instead of an 
ideology like fascism and communism. This means that terrorism is goal-oriented as 
opposed to arbitrary and random. 
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(4)  Fear and terror: Terrorism makes use of fear and terror to achieve its objectives 
(Schwenkenbecher, 2012:14). 
As noted, while the purpose of this study is not to undertake a deep level analysis of religion, 
which would be unfeasible given its many complexities, it is nevertheless important to discuss 
religion and its connection to ideology in order to better understand the foundations of 
terrorism. In this light, this study will explore the Islamist ideology to better understand how it 
became tied to terrorism.    
1.1.3 The Islamist ideology 
 
Although religious terrorism can be found in most cultures and faiths, this section is exclusively 
devoted to Islamic terrorism and political Islam. In the current age, Islamic terrorism and 
political Islam have been on the rise, more than Christian and Jewish fundamentalism. The 20th 
and 21st centuries have witnessed an increase in terrorist acts with many people being killed in 
the name of Islam compared to previous centuries; the notable attack being the 9/11 attacks, 
where many people were killed compared to the thirty-year-old Northern Ireland civil war. 
According to Solomon (2018:303), Islamism is a 20th-century totalitarian ideology, (whether 
radical Sunni or Iranian Shi’a) popularised by ISIS that aims to shape religious traditions to 
serve narrow political ambitions. Saudi Arabia and Kuwait have propagated their Wahhabi 
Islam into the African continent. They have achieved their mission by radicalising and 
indoctrinating annual pilgrims that visit Mecca. With millions of dollars at their disposal, these 
two countries also sponsor African students to study in the Gulf. These students are recruited 
and become the conduits of Islamism. With many Africans African adopting radical Islam, it 
is not surprising that groups like Boko Haram and others are opposed to the secular state 
(Solomon, 2018:308).  
 
The terms ‘Islamism’ and ‘political Islam’ are often confused. The ideology of political Islam 
developed in the 20th century in reaction to modernisation and colonialism. Political Islam is 
concerned about creating an Islamic state that will subscribe to the teachings of Sharia. Islamist 
groups may be labelled as part of a religious revival, but these groups are primarily political, 
interpreting Islam as a source of political identity and action. The attainment of a complete 
(making the Qur’an as the source of legal, social and political systems) Muslim life is 
absolutely necessary if an Islamic state is founded. Political Islam does not neglect spiritual 
needs, but it focuses on the political struggle means, using tactics and strategies that adapt to 
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the ever-changing political conditions (Kuru & Kuru, 2008:100). The Qur’an is the cradle of 
legal, political and socio system and professes to return to the example of Prophet Mohammed. 
Political Islam differs from Sufi Islam because Sufi Islam is more inward-looking, 
endeavouring to cleanse the believer’s soul. Sufism aims to develop the individual’s spiritual 
life and to enlighten people’s hearts (Kuru & Kuru, 2008:105). 
 
On the other hand, political Islam attempts to capture political control, enforce its beliefs on 
citizen  living under its decree. Whether it is Boko Haram in Nigeria, AQIM, Al-Shabab in 
Somalia, Ansar al-Din in Mali or the various Islamic franchises in Libya and Egypt, all these 
groups subscribe to the fundamentals of Islamism (Fadl & Brown, 2005:31). Even though 
Islamism was moulded together in the 20th century, its ideological origins can be located back 
to the 13th century to the era of the Ahmad ibn Taymiyya, Iraq (CE 1263-1328) and the 
Arabian1. Just like other despotic ideologies, Islamists do not accept or tolerate the proverbial 
‘other’. Violence is part of its creed. Political Islamists began to criticise Sufism in the 20th 
century. The forefather of the Pakistani Jamaat-e-Islami (CE 1903-1979), claimed that force 
was necessary to stop individuals from sinning and that non-Muslim countries should not be 
permitted to practice immoral manners (Philpott & Shah, 2017:4). This unbending intolerance 
was witnessed, for example, in Nigeria when Sufism was attacked by Abubaker Gumbi in 1992 
on the grounds that Sufism was a new phenomenon, having not existed during the era of the 
Prophet Mohammed,  and was consequently unacceptable. Political Islamists, especially those 
who are Salafists believe that Sufi orders have absorbed extra superstitions, practices and 
rituals, for example, the use of drums in mosques. It is not surprising that Ansar Dine, Boko 
Haram and Al-Shabab have previously attacked Sufi shrines. Salafism is an interpretation of 
Sunni Islam which is characterised by the use of violence in resisting the modern political 
system and infidels. The desecration of the historical Timbuktu Sufi places of worship in 2013 
was tantamount to cultural genocide (Wood, 2019:18).  
  
Founded in the 18th century by Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab, Salafism continues to be the 
official state creed of Saudi Arabia. Salafism’s Islamic way of life is guided by the Hadith (a 
collection of sayings about the Prophet Mohammed), the Prophet Mohammed and the Qur’an. 
Salafists consider themselves as Allah’s and the Prophet’s chosen people and they condone 
 
1  Only the Arabian Peninsula existed at that time; Saudi Arabia was yet to come into existence. It is fitting 




ancient practices that were practised during the times of Prophet Mohammed such as 
amputation of limbs and slavery. Salafism rejects the modern version of Islam that is practised 
by Sufi and Shi’ah Islamists. Salafism infused with political Islam becomes deadly when 
combined with violent and religious motivations (Horn, 2018:50).   
  
For Political Islamists, westernisation is not a cure but a problem. Returning to Islam is the 
only way to solve socio-political problems. Most political Islamic groups like ISIS, Boko 
Haram and many others have a common ideology of Islamising the state. Intimidation and 
violence are used to propagate their creed. Political Islam proclaims that it is natural for Islam 
to dominate other religions, impose its law on others and expand its power to the entire world 
(Solomon, 2018:303). These ideologies are not only constricted to Sunni Islam.  
 
Shi’a Islam maintains its own ferocious theological ideologies of the Islamist doctrine. Iran’s 
Ayatollah Khomeini said that the sword was the only weapon that could make people obedient 
and that the use of it was the only way to enter heaven. Drawing from 7th century Arabia, 
during Prophet Mohammed’s time, Islamists sought then and seek now to create an ideal 
society. Their main ambition is to institute Islamic law on the bases of Islamic states and 
Islamic society. Allah is the ruler of the world as it is in paradise. Individuals  are not supposed 
to legislate. Islamists oppose secularism because it puts human beings on par with Allah and 
this is regarded as a serious sin (Solomon, 2015:224). 
 
The case of political Islam clearly demonstrates that religiously inspired terrorism did not 
happen in isolation from broader trends of political and social trends. The religious revival 
constitute a response to the feelings of uncertainty and insecurity caused by the forces which 
globalisation and modernity had unleashed. In the rapidly ever-changing contemporary world, 
religion offers a sense of purpose, clarity and direction. Just like nationalism, religion offers 
some sense of identity and cohesion. In trying to understand what has pushed these groups into 
a political sphere, the breeding ground has been provided by globalisation and modernity 
identity (Roy, 2004:60). 
 
The widening gap between secular reality and religious lifestyle, exacerbated by the perceived 
failure of the secular ideology has forced some of these religious groups to reclaim what they 
think they had lost. In this light, the rise of religious terrorism has made the task of 
understanding the origins of new terrorism complicated. Religion is usually associated with 
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moderation and peace, yet the new terrorism narrative claims that the return of religious 
terrorism has been complicated by a rise in mass-casualty attacks. So how can this be? Some 
argue that one of the reasons could be  that religion allows easy distinctions between ‘us’  and 
‘them’ (Neuman, 2009:117).  
1.3 Justification/rationale/motivation for the study 
 
The rise in terrorism and violent extremism in Africa has threatened security resulting in death, 
displacement, destruction and instability. This is particularly relevant in West Africa.  For 
example, Boko Haram was formed in 2002 in Nigeria but remained unknown until 2010 but 
has committed more audacious atrocities than many terrorist groups. Boko Haram is also active 
in Chad, Niger and Cameroon and  has killed more than 13,000 thousand people since 2002. It 
has kidnapped hundreds of people including school children, torched entire villages, raped 
woman and forced them to marry jihadists (Onapajo, 2012:47). Boko Haram does not only 
pose a threat to Nigeria but to the entire West African region. Solomon (2017), argues that in 
a globalised world, any form of insecurity in any part of the world threatens global security. 
Hence there is a need to understand the drivers of terrorism in West Africa so that the Islamism 
cancer affecting the  region can be stopped. Nigeria, Mali and Niger have joined regional 
groups such as The United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilising Mission in Mali 
(NIMUSA) to try and counter threats caused by terrorism but it has not prevented terrorist 
activities in the region (Campbell, 2015). Apart from the obvious loss of life, these attacks are 
also slowing down the development of African economies. Krieger & Meierrieks (2019:125), 
argue that the Nigerian economic growth rate has been undermined by terrorist activities as 
terrorists have attacked government infrastructure and at times burnt entire villages. Affected 
West African states have used scarce financial resources meant for economic development to 
scale up military missions (Mutanda, 2017:36). Therefore, it is necessary to get to the root of 
these terror attacks in the hope of finding more effective ways to address and stop them. 
1.4 Research problem, research questions and aim of the study 
 
The problem statement is that terrorism poses an immediate threat to global stability, but in 
this study more especially stability in the West African region. It is important that strategies 
and systems are designed to deal with the dangers presented by terrorism. The aim and 
objective of this study is to analyse the root causes of terrorism in the West African states of 
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Nigeria, Mali and Niger from 1990-2020. One main research question and one sub-question 
will guide this study: 
1.    What are the triggers and root causes of terrorism in these states? 
Sub-question: In what ways, if any, has the legacy of colonialism helped to incubate terrorism 
in these states? 
1.5 Literature review 
 
This section will provide a brief summary of some of the key writings relevant to this study. 
Much literature on terrorism is centred on defining the concept (discussed also above in Section 
1.3.1). In reaction to the 9/11 attacks, the UN passed resolution 1373, which declared that the 
attacks on the Twin Towers constituted a threat to global peace and security but it did not 
establish an international standardised definition of terrorism (Ridley, 2014:9). Many scholars 
including Ganor (2009:9); Omotoso & Fajimbola (2017:84); Rapoport (2004); Graham 
(2004:1); Clapham (2003:14); and Obi (2006:88) agree that the concept of terrorism is broad, 
complicated and difficult to define. Despite the difficulties of not having a universally accepted 
definition of terrorism, Sandler & Arce (2007:778); Maiangwa (2013:2); and Omotoso & 
Fajimbola (2017:84), are of the opinion that terrorism seeks to achieve political and ideological 
goals by using violence. According to Clapham (2003:21), contemporary terrorism has been 
able to quickly adapt violent methods to achieve political goals. Davis, et al., (2012:134) and 
Cilliers (2006:61), contributed immensely to analysing terrorism in Africa by focusing on 
separating international terrorism and transnational terrorism. They contend that terrorism is 
not a new trend in Africa but a by-product or a hangover from decolonisation which could be 
linked to the failure of effective governance, sustainable development and to consolidate 
accountable development. 
 
David Rapoport (2004) contributed to the terrorism literature through his explanation of the 
‘waves’ of terror, namely, the Anarchist Wave (1880s-1920s), the Anti-Colonial Wave (1920s-
1960s), the New Left Wave (1960s-1990s) and perhaps, most destructively, the Religious 
Wave (1979-present). Weinberg & Eubank (2010:601), borrowed heavily from Rapoport in 
trying to explain how long the Fourth Wave of terrorism would last. They predicted that the 
Fourth Wave of terrorism was waning in 2009 due to the backlash from many Muslims and 




While acknowledging the significance and relevance of Rapoport’s four waves, Kaplan (2007), 
identifies the Fifth Wave of terrorism which has overlapped with the Fourth Wave. The Fifth 
Wave of terrorism is the most brutal and targets civilians, especially children and women 
compared to other waves. Clavarino (2014) and Asongu et al., (2019:884), argue that Islamic 
extremism in Africa is becoming radicalised while the rest of the world is still focusing on the 
Middle East. They note that terrorist groups that have made gains in Africa are AQIM, Al-
Shabab in Somalia, and Boko Haram in West Africa. Ridley (2014:118-158), explains the 
spread of terrorism in Africa but falls short of explaining why Islamic radicalisation is on the 
increase. 
 
Chelin (2018:82); Hicks (2018:109); and Johnson (2018:176), also made valuable 
contributions in their analysis of contemporary terrorism in West Africa and the Sahel region. 
Their work traces terrorist groups from their infancy and also acknowledge the role played by 
colonialism.  Solomon (2018:302), made a significant contribution in explaining the difference 
between Islamism and political Islamism. Solomon posits that Islamism was forged in the 20th  
century as a tyrannical ideology that pursues to shape Islamic traditions to serve narrow 
political aspirations. Political Islamism is concerned with creating an Islamic state that will be 
ruled according to Sharia law. So far most studies done on terrorism have focused primarily on 
the Middle East, and the dangers that these groups pose to the security of Western nations. 
Relatively little has been done to explore the root causes of terrorism, including why radical 
Islamic ideology is appealing and thriving in the West African region, specifically in the three 
chosen case studies, where the majority of Muslims are moderate in their approach to religion. 
Counter-terrorism and militarisation of the West African region have not halted the spread of 
radicalisation and terrorism (Ghatak & Prins, 2017:220).  
 
There is an abundance of studies on terrorism in Nigeria and Mali even though they do not 
directly explore the drivers of terrorism, with readers being spoilt for choice by contributions 
from Agbiboa (2017:109); Afolabi (2017:2167); Onuoha (2014:348); Stuart (2019:182); 
Iyekepolo (2016:2212), among many others. However, in contrast few scholars have focused 
on researching on the drivers of terrorism in Niger with the exception of  Hoffmann & Moe 
(2015:32); Hahonou, (2015:4); Jesús (2015:170); Sangaré & McSparren (2018:2). Still on 
Niger, this study will not have done justice if does not acknowledge the contribution of the 
International Crisis Group (ICG) on the Sahel, especially on the crisis in Niger. The ICG has a 
yearly report on the Sahel’s security and terrorism developments. Knowledge does not remain 
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constant but it always evolving. Bearing in mind that epistemology, which is an analysis of 
knowledge, it can be proclaimed that this study is intended to enrich the existing body of 
knowledge that the above scholars and others have already produced.   
1.6 Theoretical framework and research methodology      
 
This study will make use of the relative deprivation and the greed and grievance  theories in its 
analysis. A fuller theoretical explanation will be provided in Chapter Two. In terms of 
methodology, this study employs a qualitative approach that uses secondary data to analyse the 
root causes of terrorism in the West African case studies of Nigeria, Mali and Niger. Case 
studies are a suitable pick for a study like this because they allow the researcher to obtain 
thorough knowledge and present a visibly clear picture of the situation, program or that of the 
individual. In case studies, the researcher often ends up with conclusions that can be applied to 
other similar cases and there will be lessons that will be learned (Range, 2018). The 
interpretivist nature of the qualitative case studies is projected to refine and develop concepts, 
understandings, definitions and theories that encompass the reader by connecting to  familiar 
events.  
 
The study employed a qualitative approach and used an interpretivist design because a 
qualitative study produces findings by analysing subjective meaning or social construction of 
proceedings, practices or issues by gathering data that is not standardised and analysing 
literature rather than statistics and numbers (Rahman, 2017:104). In approaching its subject 
matter, qualitative research uses naturalistic and interpretive approaches that seek to decrypt, 
render, explain, describe and come to terms with the connotation, not the frequency, of 
naturally transpiring events  in the social world (Van Maanen, 1979:520).  
 
As this study may be identified as interpretivist, which adds to existing literature, explores new 
topics, advances comprehension and evaluates feasibility. This study aimed to add new 
information and understanding on the drivers of terrorism in West Africa. The qualitative 
approach adopted by this study was the most suitable as it pinned down the terrorism 
phenomenon by interpreting, describing and exploring it (Horn, 2018:34). It is the 
responsibility and duty of researchers to expose human rights abuses, social injustice, prejudice 
and crime. Accordingly, this study aimed to analyse the drivers of terrorism in the three chosen 
case studies. Knowledge acquired through explored practices often leads to new ideas being 
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constructed, improved understanding and the progression of beliefs (Horn, 2018:35). This 
desktop study utilises both primary and secondary sources including speeches, official 
documents, government websites,  books, internet sources and academic journals to inform its 
arguments.  
1.7 Ethical considerations 
 
This study did not require special or unusual ethical considerations. I declare that this 
dissertation, was  my own work and that all the information and sources used have been, and 
were acknowledged in both the text as well as in the bibliography. In this light, I am 
knowledgeable that plagiarism is an offence against the regulations of the University of 
Johannesburg and laws of the Republic of South Africa. 
1.8 Structure of the study 
 
This study consists of seven chapters. Chapter One provides the introduction to the study, the 
background, the Islamist ideology, literature review, and the research problem and questions. 
Chapter Two outlines the theoretical framework for the study. The study is based on and 
informed by the relative deprivation theory and the greed and grievance theory. Chapter Three 
traces the origins of terrorism as well as analysing the trends and characteristics of 
contemporary terrorism. It also discusses the impact of coronavirus on terrorism. Chapter Four 
analyses the drivers of terrorism in Nigeria by exploring the Nigerian context and tracing the 
emergence of Boko Haram. The drivers of terrorism are explored by discussing Nigeria’s 
colonial legacy, analysing state neglect and corruption. Nigeria’s weak state and elite 
competition are also part of this chapter. The impact of the coronavirus on terrorism forms the 
last part of this chapter. Chapter Five analyses the drivers of terrorism in Mali. It unpacks three 
interrelated factors in the form of  Tuareg’s nationalism, an increase in radical Islam and the 
nature of the post-independence Malian state. The study also discusses how Malian border are 
managed as well as the role played by governance. The impact of the coronavirus on terrorism 
in Mali is also discussed. Chapter Six analyses the drivers of terrorism in Niger by discussing 
state abandonment and analysing the increase of radical Islam. The situation of the youth and 
Niger’s poor record of governance are also discussed in this chapter. The impact of the 
coronavirus on terrorism in Niger forms the last part of the chapter. Chapter Seven summarises 
the study findings, concludes and provides recommendations for further study. 
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                        CHAPTER TWO: THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
2.1 Introduction 
The previous chapter provided the introduction to the study and the background. It explored 
the Islamist ideology, provided a literature review, and the research problem and questions. 
This chapter will discuss the theoretical framework. The theoretical framework to be applied 
in the study is based on and informed by the relative deprivation theory and the greed and 
grievance theory. The two theories were carefully chosen because they are interlinked and 
complement each other. This chapter will be divided into two sections. The first section will 
give a detailed analysis of the relative deprivation theory as well as an explanation of how the 
so-called ‘frustration-aggression mechanism’ can lead to rebellion and violence. The second 
section will provide a detailed description of the greed and grievance theory. Grievances that 
emanate from political and economic deprivation and marginalisation are found in both these 
theories.  
 2.2 The relative deprivation theory 
 
Conceivably the common misconception that many people make is to assume that terrorists are 
from low income earning families, are uneducated and are outcasts. This conception has been 
proven to be flawed as contemporary empirical studies have increasingly demonstrated. 
Terrorism has proven to be a matter of rational choice by individuals rather than a last resort. 
Richardson (2011:3) and Krueger & Laitin (2008:148-173), argue that individuals who join 
terrorist groups tend to be from wealthier and  aristocratic backgrounds than the average 
society. The relative depravation theory was developed by Robert Ted Gurr in the 1970s but  
actually dates back to ancient Greece. Aristotle argued that the inequality feeling or the relative 
sense instead of the absolute  measure drive the political revolution.  For Aristotle, the 
revolution is driven by those who do not  have and desire for political and economic parity, 
and the desire for those who have to increase the inequality gap (Richardson, 2011:6).   
Gurr (2015:22), argues that relative deprivation is informed by the actor’s own opinion of a 
discrepancy existing between her/his own value expectations and her/his value capabilities. 
The conditions and possessions of life that individuals deem they are entitled to are values 
expectations. Possessions and conditions of life that individuals think are capable of attaining 
and possessing are value capabilities. Values are desired items, conditions and events for which 
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individuals endeavour. Psychologically, values are goals of human motivation, presumably 
derived from instincts or needs (Podder, 1996:356). 
The relative deprivation theory describes how individuals respond to their socio-economic 
conditions (Krieger & Meierrieks, 2019:126). It is a theoretical concept often used to analyse 
contexts of perceived inequality and injustice. Members of society use the reference group to 
compare and evaluate their economic situation. A reference group is a group that is used by 
individuals as a point of comparison to form beliefs, behaviour and values. When their 
economic situation does not compare favourably to the reference group, members of society 
will then develop frustration and feelings of discontent. The relative deprivation theory 
assumes that these feelings will be instrumental in sparking violence (Svishcheva, 2018:28).  
At this point the study would like to pause and ask a question, how do feelings of relative 
deprivation evolve into acts of terrorism? Terrorism can be attributed to the collective value 
dissatisfaction from the discrepancies between the ‘ought’ and the ‘is’. In other words, relative 
deprivation arises when individuals feel that they are getting less than that to which they believe 
they are entitled. Social discontent is increased when there is an increase in expectation without 
increasing capabilities (Podder, 1996:356). A gap between disadvantaged individuals and the 
state is created. The bigger the gap between value expectations and value capabilities, the 
bigger the strength of the belligerence and violence. When people lose hope for attaining their 
societal values, they are more prone to revolt. The relative deprivation is all about social 
comparison. When these comparisons reveal large gaps between reality and aspirations, 
individuals then feel motivated to attempt social changes, especial if these comparisons are 
made on a group level compared to the individual level (Appelgryn & Bornman, 1996:224). 
 Another consideration is the frustration-aggression mechanism which appears to be the 
principal foundation for people’s capacity to resort to violence. Attempting to explain the 
totality of aggression, the frustration-aggression mechanism was brought to the fore in 1939, 
pronouncing that aggression was a result of frustration (Maile, et al., 2010). In the modern 
history of terrorism, the frustration-aggression mechanism assumes that frustration is induced 
by inequality. The discrepancy between the expectations of people and what they can really 
get subsequently leads to frustration (Saire, 2010:443). Frustration will then produce an 
aggressive response or a rebellion which will be directed towards the source of their 
deprivation. Frustration and aggression work hand in hand. Triggering aggression will require 
the existence of frustration to be present, for example, poverty. The degree of political 
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instability is determined by the degree of frustration. Akanni (2014:73), argues that inequality 
and structural poverty can also breed violent conflict and terrorism (this also links to the greed 
and grievance theory, discussed more fully in Section 2.3 below). 
Grievances emanating from sustained relative deprivation can cause terrorism to flourish 
(Krueger & Maleckova, 2002:122). For example, it is suggested that in Nigeria, the worst forms 
of terrorism and violence emanate from locations where the people are socio-economically 
deprived. Radical Islamists have challenged the state’s authority in the north of Nigeria where 
unemployment and chronic poverty are rife (Agbiboa, 2013:150). These suggestions will be 
thoroughly interrogated in Chapter Four. Terrorists are frustrated at those who are in power as 
they feel that they cannot find employment, they are economically marginalised and they 
cannot reach their desired goals (Akanni, 2014:73). Most conditions of frustration in West 
Africa have seemed to come from people being denied access to economic participation and 
natural resources.  
The nature of political systems is important in explaining what sparks rebellion and terrorism. 
Political systems with political rights and high levels of institutionalised civil liberties allow 
for groups to participate in matters that pertain their lives. In this political system, it is argued 
that groups will prefer participation over rebellion because participation is less costly and 
participation can be expected to bring benefits. Therefore, states that allow for democratic 
representation should, theoretically, have a lower risk of rebellion (Muller & Weede, 1994:41).  
However, in states that are very repressive and undemocratic, participation is not an option. In 
these autocratic and repressive states, the option left to choose from might well be rebellion 
and abstaining from politics. (Muller & Weede, 1994:42). However, the likelihood of success 
is low due to the difficulties of mobilising resources by groups in the absence of civil liberties. 
This would explain why repressive states such as dictatorships, one-party states, absolute 
monarchs, communist and military dictatorships comparatively have low levels of rebellion. 
On the other hand, if the political system is oppressive, but it allows for minimum participation, 
groups have a chance to mobilise resources, then groups as rational thinkers could decide that 
the benefits of rebellion exceed participation benefits (Gurr & Gurr, 1983:54). These groups 
do not necessarily have to overthrow the government, but they can force it to make concessions. 
Therefore, a high level of violent rebellion is associated with semi-repressive states.  
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Another concept to consider is the societal concept. According to Buzan (1993:5), identity is 
changeable and dynamic over periods of time because people adapt and change. The societal 
concept relates with states that are destabilised or undermined by their citizens, becoming 
weakened and vulnerable in terms of social identity and cohesion. Societal insecurity happens 
when individuals within a demarcated state presume that their social identity is being 
threatened. A mutual sense of relative deprivation could bolster and trigger this perceived 
threat, be it political, cultural, social or economic. The results will lead to the manifestation of 
societal insecurity. Societal insecurity is also exacerbated by intensive political and economic 
insufficiency. Buzan (1993:5), identified four different types of societal threats which 
include: economic threats (denial of resources and work, destruction or seizure of 
property);physical threats (injury, pain, death); threats to status or position (public humiliation, 
demotion); and threats to rights (denial of civil liberties, imprisonment). This study will now 
proceed to discuss the greed and grievance theory.  
 2.3 The greed and grievance theory 
Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler used an economic model in the 1990s to contextualise the 
causes of war as an eventuality of either greed or grievance. Through their econometric 
analyses, they decided that societies are not all the same as some are more likely to descend 
into conflict than others. The reason for this was that those societies have economic prospects 
for rebellion that are inviting (Istratii, 2015:1). Drawing from Collier and Hoeffler’s 
framework, greed and grievance are identified as the two spontaneous contingencies that lead 
to war and terrorism.   
According to Collier & Hoeffler (2000:14), individuals take up arms and rebel against the 
government because of greed and grievances linked to economics and politics, respectively. 
The economic model concerns greed whilst the political model concerns grievances as 
elements that may motivate terrorism. Greed is motivated by economic opportunities, whilst 
the latter is motivated by circumstances that may cause individuals to rebel. When rebels or 
terrorist groups make profits from a war situation, this is best explained by the economic model. 
When all other channels have been exhausted in redressing their grievances, rebels and terrorist 
groups may be stimulated by the political model to fight against the state to overthrow the 
government or to change the political system (Maphosa, 2011:94). 
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Greed is linked to a very deep yearning to be wealthy and to own possessions. Grievance is an 
individual conviction felt by an individual of feeling disregarded and victimised by another, 
including, for the purpose of this study, important state institutions (Grieco, et al., 2015:168). 
People may feel disregarded because of their ethnicity, gender, religion, race and social status. 
Grievance can also be used as a revenge weapon to address history or as revenge for past 
atrocities (Matsumoto, 2016:2). According to Collier & Hoeffler (2000:14), in the greed theory, 
armed conflict is likely to happen in any country, not because of grievances from those who 
oppose the government but because of the economic opportunities they are likely to gain by 
waging a war with the government. These opportunities are based on primary commodity 
predation. In the African context, oil, diamond, timber and gold are the major lootable 
commodities (Collier & Hoeffler, 2004:580).  
Collier & Hoeffler (2004:580), argue that there is a big risk of conflict in a country if primary 
commodity exports make up to at least 33% or more of Gross Domestic Product (GDP). 
Chances are high for states to descend into a conflict if they have natural resources like 
diamonds and oil as it has been the case with Nigeria because predation opportunities are high 
(controlling exports and primary commodities) . A country that does not have such exports has 
a low risk of only 1% because predation opportunities are low. High dependence on primary 
commodity exports such as oil is riskier than dependence on other commodities and less 
dependence on oil exports is less risky (Collier & Hoeffler, 2000:14) On the other hand, the 
abundance of natural resources such as diamonds prolong conflicts. For example, the ongoing 
civil war in in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) has continued unabated and is not 
showing any signs of slowing down.  
With regard to terrorism specifically, Maphosa (2011:93), argues that individuals who belong 
to an armed group or terrorist group are often motivated by economic incentives, such as being 
able to keep the loot. Individual goals are not necessarily the same as group goals. For example, 
an individual may join a terrorist group to make money, just as an individual would join the 
army to make money, it does not mean that the terrorist group as a whole is driven by economic 
incentives, just as much as it is doubtful that the national army is driven by the pursuit of profit 
(Vinci, 2006:31). To better understand group dynamics, it is best to assume that certain 
grievances in society are represented by terrorist groups. The inspirations of the group leader 
and the inspirations of the group must not be confused because they are not necessarily 
identical. Violence and rebellion are more likely to occur if there is an ethnic group that is 
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disregarded economically and politically. Whilst grievances may motivate terrorism, the 
eagerness to continue with terrorist activities may be motivated by commercial motivation on 
a group level (Maphosa, 2011:93). 
Unfair distribution of resources on ethnic grounds, whether real or perceived, can make other 
groups feel marginalised (Vinci, 2006:31). Therefore, the competence of the state is paramount 
in repelling terrorism. However, research shows that rich nations are less likely to face the 
same threat of terrorism. As such, a rich nation’s wealth transforms to a strong state that is 
more highly capable of catering to the needs of its inhabitants by providing public goods than 
weaker states (Collier & Hoeffler, 2000:14). Weak states fail to provide public goods for their 
citizens and are then characterised by a weak army that is not able to defend the state’s 
territorial integrity. Political exclusion and inequality can lead to grievances. High levels of 
inequality result in the poor being excluded from political making decisions because states with 
high levels of poverty allow for very little political participation.   
A conventional approach for understanding what motivates terrorism is to assume that terrorist 
groups represent the grievances of certain groups in society. These are nationalistic, tribal and 
ethnic drivers in society. Grievance is a justice-seeking motivation (Collier & Hoeffler, 
1999:5). The grievance theory has three main sub-divisions. These are polarisation, horizontal 
inequality and the above-mentioned relative deprivation. Each of these theories has its own 
definition although the definitions may overlap. As the study has already explained, relative 
deprivation is the difference between what a group and an individual think they deserve or the 
difference between achievement and ambition. For example, an individual may attain an 
education, the individual’s hopes are then raised but unemployment will lead to disappointment 
and may, in extreme circumstances, lead to the formation of conflict movements (Hekmat, 
2012:3). Polarisation is fuelled by intra-group identity and the feeling of alienation. For 
polarisation to happen, there has to be a presence of two or more ethnic groups within society. 
Horizontal inequality amongst society and groups is mainly classified by ethnicity, linguistic 
differences and religion. In social groups, socio-economic differences form the base of 
horizontal inequalities. If horizontal socio-inequalities widen, then ethnic violence is likely to 
occur (Majeedullah, 2015:3). Horizontal inequality is considered as the main cause of conflict. 
Countries with higher horizontal inequality have a higher chance of descending into violence. 
For example, according to Ridley (2014:158; Cullen , et al., 2018:1370), Mali has a population 
of 14 million people and 50% are illiterate. In Niger, less than 20% of the population is 
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urbanised and only 29% of the population is literate. Poverty and malnutrition are common in 
Mali as the average wage is $1.25 a day with more than half of the population living in poverty 
(Cullen , et al., 2018:1370). 
Horizontal inequality has four sources: 
(1) The credibility of the government may be decreased by discriminatory practices in the 
allocation of public goods and taxation. This may lead to violence and terrorist activity.  
(2) The high asset inequality is far more difficult to redistribute for inequality to be reduced.  
(3) The poor economic mismanagement which is often associated with favouritism towards 
certain ethnic groups. This may promote the formation of rebel or terrorist groups.  
(4) Finally, grievances that are connected to the distribution of natural resources. If certain 
groups feel that natural resources are not being fairly distributed, this may cause grievances 
and this may lead to conflict or rebellion (Majeedullah, 2015:3).  
2.4 Conclusion 
This chapter examined the relative deprivation and the greed and grievance theories. This 
chapter demonstrated how these two theories are interlinked and complement each other. 
Higher ethnic fractionalization, lower per capita income, lower secondary school enrolment,  
religious fractionalization, ethnic dominance, reliance on primary commodity exports, higher 
income inequality, higher population growth, lower economic growth and a lower democracy 
score are elements that could facilitate conflict and terrorism. All of these conditions are found 
in most of the African states under consideration in this study. The mere existence of these 
conditions poses a major challenge to the peaceful existence of the African state and the 
stability of the region and even wider continent more generally. Chapter Three will give a 
detailed analysis of the origins of terrorism, analyse the waves of terrorism, discuss the types 
of terrorist groups.  It will also evaluate the trends and characteristics of contemporary 
terrorism before discussing the impact of the coronavirus on terrorism.  





CHAPTER THREE: TRACING THE ORIGINS OF TERRORISM 
3.1 Introduction 
  
The previous chapter gave a detailed analysis of the relative deprivation and the greed and 
grievance theories. It proved how the two theories are interlinked and complement each other 
in explaining some potential causes of terrorism. Chapter Three will explore the origins of 
terrorism, the waves of terrorism and contemporary types of terrorist groups. It will proceed to 
explore religious semantics, principles and religious roots of contemporary terrorism. The 
study will further trace Muslim rage, before exploring the origins and divergence of Al-Qaeda 
and ISIS. This is important because they have inspired the emergence of terrorist groups in 
Africa such as Boko Haram and others. The trends and characteristics of contemporary 
terrorism will be analysed before discussing the impact of the 2019 coronavirus/COVID-19 on 
terrorism globally which will conclude the chapter.  
 
Terrorism’s origins can be traced to the beginning of human history. What could be argued as 
the first documented terrorist activity transpired in the 1st century B.C.E. when Jewish 
terrorists, the Sicarii, an offshoot of the Zealots, attacked and killed their victims using daggers 
in Roman-ruled Judea to incite revolt against Roman rule (Cronin, 2003:34). They were the 
first known groups to use violence subversively. In the 12th  and the 13th  centuries, in the 
Middle East, the Assassins, an offshoot of the Ismaeli sect of Shi’a Islam, were known for the 
assassination of Crusaders (Fisher, 2012:48). The Sicarii and the Assassins depended on 
strategic targets and individual efforts to carry out attacks, a strategy that is similar to those 
that are labelled as terrorists today. Exceptional methods employed by terrorists do not 
necessarily indicate a ‘new’ terrorism but represent a continuity of political violence dating 
back to the 1st century. These groups were exceptional because they employed methods that 
were unorthodox for their day. Muslim assassins and Hindu criminals are also the other known 
early terrorists. Contemporary terrorism is however assumed to have originated from the 
French Revolution (Rapoport, 2013:12). In 1795, the term ‘terror’ was coined together to refer 
to a French government policy used to protect against counterrevolutionaries. 
 
Cronin (2003:34), argues that terrorist groups are born from a specific local context and have 
unique characteristics as noted in 3.3. A historical examination of terrorist patterns reveals that 
the nature and motivations of terrorist groups are influenced by the international system. 
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Modern terrorism has political aspirations and has fought against empires, colonial powers and 
the international system led by the US and marked by globalisation. It is important to grasp 
how contemporary terrorism fits within the international system. Contemporary terrorists 
aspire to change the international order and replace it with an Islamic state (Crenshaw, 2018). 
 
Some scholars argue that modern terrorism is a collection of power struggles: small power 
against big power, traditional power against modern power, local power against central power.2 
Terrorist threats largely emanating from Muslim countries are, contrary to popular beliefs, 
rarely inspired by religion. Rather, they tend more to be inspired by tensions between the elite 
and poor, the rich and poor nations and the phenomenon of globalisation. Terrorists take 
advantage of frustrations of the underprivileged citizens in states where reform does not occur 
at the desired pace (particularly in the Arab world). This point is particularly relevant in this 
study because this is how ISIS managed to recruit and attract a large number of followers 
(Cronin, 2003:35; Mustasilta, 2019:205). Terrorism has different forms and manifestations and 
it is always evolving as the world evolves. This study will now briefly analyse the waves of 
terrorism that have been identified by various scholars.  
 3.2 The waves of terrorism  
 
According to Rapoport (2002: Internet source), terrorism occurs in overlapping or conservative 
waves. People’s hopes of better standards of living in the Western world were raised in the 
19th century by popular empowerment and universal suffrage. This resulted in the first phase 
of modern terrorism. The first wave was the Anarchist Wave which commenced in Russia in 
the 1880s and ended in the 1920s. It became history’s first global terrorist experience as it 
emerged in response to unfulfilled reforms implemented by the Russian Tsar to uplift the 
Russian standard of living to match Western standards (Graham, 2004:1; Hou, et al., 2020:200-
202). It should be noted that Russian terrorism did not emerge due to state oppression, but it 
emerged when popular expectations were not met and it raised inevitable disappointment. 
Terrorists engaged in attacking symbolic objects, assassinating important politicians in Eastern 
Europe to attract the attention of the common people to trigger a revolution that would 
overthrow the political order. Terrorist activities of groups such as the Russian Narodnaya 
 
2  Traditional power is when authority based on long established traditions and customs. Tradition sanctions                                  
authority. Modern power is based on a legal and rational authority. Exiting laws and formal authority make the             
law legal (Mustasilta, 2019:205). 
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Volya (People’s Will), and later the emergence of movements in Europe and the US reflected 
the Anarchist Wave (Rapoport, 2013:6; Graham, 2004:1). 
 
In the 1920s, the Anarchists Wave was replaced by the Anti-Colonial Wave which became 
dominant after World War I and carried on through World War II and throughout the early 
1960s The world transitioned from inter-state war to security relations under the UN and the 
Cold War. The Anti-Colonial Wave was sparked by the Versailles Peace Treaty with the main 
aim of achieving self- determination for groups in Yemen, Cyprus, Algeria, South Africa, Israel 
and Ireland. The Anti-Colonial Wave aimed to gain political independence and autonomy. 
There was a rise of far left-wing guerrilla groups in Latin America even though they remained 
in rural areas and disconnected from urban guerrilla activities (Fisher, 2012:52).  
 
European groups included the Red Army Faction (RAF), the Red Brigades and the Euskadi Ta 
Askatasuna (ETA). Despite prison walls, geographical borders and political boundaries, actors 
influenced and drew inspiration from each other through similar strategies and philosophies. 
These groups identified themselves as freedom fighters. It was during this time that that 
terrorist shaped their tactics and began targeting the police who were the eyes of the 
government. The wave receded as the empires dissolved (Rapoport, 2013:11; Graham, 2004:1). 
 
The New Left Wave succeeded the Anti-Colonial Wave in the late 1950s with the US being its 
primary target and the West generally. The Vietnam war served as a catalyst for the 
development of the New Left Wave The Vietcong’s victory over the Americans led to a 
resurgence in terrorist activities. With encouragement from the Soviets, or at times with the 
Soviets helping leftist and nationalist groups, terrorist groups sought to dismantle capitalism 
and redistribute wealth to the Third World (Rapoport, 2013:11; Graham, 2004:1). 
  
It was in the latter part of the 20th century that international terrorism gained prominence as 
there were whispers of the term ‘new age’ of terrorism. This newness in the New Left wave 
was explained in terms of its religious characteristic despite religion having had played a big 
part in political violence for hundreds of years. This newness was explained by Northern 
Ireland clashes between demonstrators and the police and the Israeli-Palestinian six-day war 
of June 1967. The intercommunal violence of 1969 in Northern Ireland posed questions on 




Increasing commonalities in international connections amongst these groups were the most 
important innovation. For example, the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) inspired and 
captured the imagination of young radicals after it murdered eleven Israeli athletes during the 
Olympic games of 1972 in Munich. The PLO and its associated groups also provided training 
in techniques such as hostage-taking, bombings and the hijacking of airlines in Lebanon and 
elsewhere (Hoffman & Guelke, 1996:390; Chojnowski, 2017:174). Kidnappings and hijacking 
of passenger planes were common during the era of the New Left Wave. The most popular 
kidnapping was conducted by the Red Brigades in 1979 when they kidnapped the Italian Prime 
Minister, Aldo Moro when he refused to negotiate with the group. The New Left Wave faded 
away in the early 1990s when communism collapsed but some groups remain active in Peru, 
Spain, Columbia and France (Graham, 2004:1).   
  
Contemporary terrorism; namely the Fourth and Fifth Waves, have been stimulated by religion 
with Islam at the heart of the wave. Originating from the 1979 Iranian Islamic Revolution and 
the 1989 defeat of the Soviets from Afghanistan, the Religious/Fourth Wave of terrorism 
pursues a single Islamic state that will be administered by the Islamic and Sharia law (Rapoport, 
2002: Internet source). Earlier groups have attempted to create their independent states but the 
Religious Wave differs from them because it uses suicide bombings and a promise of self-
martyrdom. Fourth Wave groups operate outside international law and do not have the same 
constraints as nation-states (Dishman, 1999:357; Dawson,  2018:104). 
  
In the 1970s and 1980s, terrorism assumed an international character due to advances in 
technology and in reaction to the dominance of international media. It was at this stage that 
isolated, scattered nationalist movements began to establish cross-border links with other 
organisations. Clandestine sponsorship of terror by states such as Libya, North Korea and Iran 
helped to facilitate this development (Chojnowski, 2017:168). State-sponsored terrorism 
reached its peak during this time. In most cases, these groups did not aim to fulfil their goals 
but ended up reacting to specific situations like Western imperialism which imposed a secular 
government on them. Contemporary terrorist groups are opposed to the secular state and want 
to replace it with an Islamic one.   
  
Contemporary terrorism poses a greater threat than other previous terrorism waves.  
Contemporary terrorism is often directed toward the US, its allies and Western countries. 
Scholars have argued that continued military and economic support for Israel, the deployment 
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of US soldiers in Saudi Arabia and the US’s policies toward the Middle East are the reasons 
behind increased terrorist activities in the West and Middle East. Terrorist activities have also 
spread to Africa (Ochieng’okinda, 20003:3; Perliger & Pedahzur, 2016:298-300). Fourth Wave 
Al-Qaeda terrorists carried out attacks on US embassies in Tanzania and Kenya in 1998, 
attacked the Twin Towers in 2001 killing over 3000 people, attacked the Madrid train station 
in 2004 and attacked the London subway in 2005 (Otiso, 2009:108; Dorman, 2018:22-23). The 
international community has observed the development of a new phase of Fourth Wave 
contemporary terrorism since the 9/11 attacks. The leftist or nationalist revolutionary ethos has 
been overshadowed by the powerful attraction to spiritual and religious movements. According 
to Rapoport (2013:11), international terrorism is being driven back to the early times by the 
forces of history. Contemporary  terrorist organisations such as Al-Qaeda, Boko Haram, ISIS 
and others seem to be echoing the behaviour of early terrorist organisations such as the Zealots-
Sicarii. It is important to note that groups such as Boko Haram, ISIS and others have 
characteristics of both Fourth and Fifth Wave Terrorists (Fifth Wave terrorists will be discussed 
below).  
  
The Religious Wave tactics are not a recent phenomenon but an extension of power struggles 
between the powerless and those with power. For example, on the international stage, terrorists 
have tended to target the US and the US-led global system. Fourth Wave terrorism has deep 
historical roots just like the other waves of terrorism. Fourth Wave terrorism is expected to 
precede for a generation or longer, given its historical patterns (Chojnowski, 2017:177). The 
jihad period is stimulated by elements of religious doctrine, widespread alienation and religious 
identity. These forces are dangerous mixes that resonate deep into the human psyche. 
  
Driven by religious extremism, Al-Qaeda and other terrorist groups have been  able to carry 
out devastating attacks because of the support and sanctuary they have received from those 
who have not received the benefits of economic and political globalisation. In this light, in 
dealing with terrorist groups, the world does not only have to eradicate a small number of 
terrorists but it also has to change the environments that allow terrorists to attain power 
(Hoffman,2002:307).  
 
The Religious Wave does not appear to be waning as religious terrorist attacks still continue. 
The question to ask is, how can there be a Fifth Wave of terrorism, with the Fourth 
Wave/Religious Wave having not yet crested? Radil & Pinos (2019:3), argue that Fifth Wave 
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groups are movements that have evolved beyond their existing wave and survived (Radil & 
Pinos 2019:3; Kaplan, 2007:547). Few terrorist groups survive for long periods of time because 
they operate in hostile environments. The cost of survival is high for those who persevere. One 
such price paid by terrorist groups is compromise ‘politically and ideologically.’ Kaplan 
(2007:547), argues that Fifth Wave movements are not catalysed by a certain event. Rather, 
they emerged from earlier waves and they are sparked by the same incident from the wave that 
they were born. These groups have been radicalised and have become disillusioned about the 
terrorist wave that they were born in. They then turn inwards, they become localistic, 
particularistic and centred on perfecting a tribal group or race. Compromise and patience are 
not part of the Fifth Wave group’s vocabulary. Honig & Yahel (2019:1223-1224), are relatively 
certain that if these groups come into power, there will commit genocide on the majority group 
as well as religious and ethnic minorities. Boko Haram, Al-Qaeda, ISIS and other terror groups 
indeed have components of both Fourth and Fifth Wave groups that Kaplan proposed as noted 
in Table 3.1 below. 
 
Table 3.1: Key Components of Jihadist Fifth Wave Groups  
 
 
Rejection of Existing 
Social-Political Order  
 
Muslim society is in a state of jahliyyah, or ignorance of divine 
truth, that is promoted by apostate regimes. This requires 
separation from society and rebellion against it.  
 
Idealisation of a Mythic 
Past  
 
Reconstituting Muhammad’s Medina Community and the 
caliphate, developed by his four righteous successors are the 
desired end-states.  
 
The Quest for Millenarian 
Justice  
 
The destruction of apostasy and the return to the purity of 
Muhammad’s Medina experience will generate universal happiness 
as a caliphate develops.  
 
Youth Culture  
 
Males between 18 and 39 form the bulk of jihadi groups.  
 
Brutalisation of Women 
and Children  
 
Islamist misogyny and forced veiling of women. Attacks on 
unveiled women, limitations on female education and employment. 
Forced marriages with jihadi fighters. Coerced recruitment of boys 




Women and children frequently kidnapped and sold into slavery.  
 
Ethnic and Sectarian 
Cleansing  
Campaign of targeted killing of religious minorities (Shi’ites, 
Alawites, Sufis), Yazidi and Christians. Destruction of mosques, 
shrines, burial sites and churches associated with religious 
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 minorities or deemed polytheistic. Broad use of takfir (e.g., 
excommunication) of Muslim opponents justifying their killing.  
 
Unrestrained Violence  
 
Relentless military campaign of suicide bombings, IED and car 
bombs aimed at soldiers, police and civilians. Takfir facilitates 
killing of opponents including fellow Sunnis.  
 
Charismatic Leadership  
 
 
Islamist Fifth Wave groups typically led by powerful dynamic emir 
who combines religious and military authority.  
 
Development of a New 
Society  
 
Violent destruction of decadent apostate order and creation of 
modern version of Muhammad’s Medina community and caliphate 
of his immediate successors.  
 
 
Source: Celso, A.N., 2015. The Islamic State and Boko Haram: Fifth Wave Jihadist Terror 
Groups. Orbis, 59(2), pp.249-268. 
 
Creating a ‘new world’ is the guiding dream for Fifth Wave movements where new man and 
women will live. This ‘new world’ is to be realised in the present lifetime (utopian society). 
Those living in this society will be revolutionary beings that have not been contaminated by 
the ‘old world.’ Groups like ISIS, Boko Haram and others are centred on cleansing the ‘old 
world’ order and replacing it with a pure and just society that will be guided by the principles 
of the Qur’an. These groups and others consider the contemporary world that we live in as an 
‘old world’ that is diseased, tainted, defiled, necessitating cleansing and purification (Horn, 
2018:86). A major characteristic of the Fifth Wave is the pursuit of purity and perfection. 
Terrorist groups like ISIS, Boko Haram and others are seeking to purify all humanity in one 
generation by programming and re-educating society to produce a ‘new world.’ The aim is to 
begin by purifying society and then Islam. Purification means a strict observance of the 
teachings of Islam. Those who do not adhere to the teachings of Islam, those who regard laws 
made by men ahead of the laws made by Allah, who do not pray, are apostates and have to be 
purified and purged (Wood, 2019:113).  
  
Ultimately, the Fifth Wave movement is all about producing children. Women are the core of 
this movement as victims and actors (Honig & Yahel, 2019:1223-1224). The main aim is to 
produce children that will be isolated from society (Kaplan, 2008:14). For example, ISIS 
recruited, kidnapped women and forced them to marry jihadists in Iraq (2003) and Syria (2015) 
so that they could produce children. Children born to Fifth Wave terrorists are born to fight. 
Their purpose is to create a ‘new world’ since they are considered not to be contaminated by 
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the ‘old world’ that is corrupt. Boko Haram, ISIS and others have also adopted the same route, 
kidnapping women and selling or forcing them to marry jihadists. Another example is the 
daring 2004 Boko Haram kidnapping of 250 girls in a Christian school in Chibok for 
conversion, forced marriage and slavery. Boko Haram will be discussed in more detail later in 
Chapter Four (Zenn, 2014:2). In this wave, violence against women tends to be present often. 
Rape is not only used as a multifaceted terror weapon and as a signature tactic, but it is a 
practical tool to produce children needed for building the ‘new world.’ In the Middle East, ISIS 
has targeted Kurdish, Yazidi and other perceived infidels, Sufis, Christians and Shi’a women 
and children. These women and children have been targets of forced conversion, forced 
marriage, human trafficking, persecution, rape, execution, soldiery and slavery. ISIS has 
justified its atrocities with religious scripts from the Prophet Mohammad and the Qur’an 
(Solomon, 2016:42). 
  
Fifth Wave groups are plagued by divisions, localism and brutality galvanised by an 
opportunity to the Prophet Mohammed’s mythical Medina. Such divisions have led to so much 
barbarism. These groups often develop rural insurgencies where state authority is weak. These 
groups, borrowing from the ‘insurgency theory’ by Che Guevara, hope that their localised 
groups will catalyse a populist revolution (Celso, 2015:254). The insurgency theory was 
adopted by leaders such as Mao Tse-tung and by Che Guevara in response to incompetent  
political bureaucracy and  lack of economic development. The theory encourages insurgent and 
guerrilla uprisings against the state and the replacement of the ruling elite (Young & Gray, 
2011:66). Fifth wave groups like ISIS  have been able to seize towns in Iraq and Syria, 
established Sharia councils and imposed the strictest version of Islamic law enforced by 
religious police force. The elitist character of Fifth Wave groups magnifies jihadist brutality. 
Extremism is reinforced by group dynamics and religious fanaticism (Hoffman, 2006:118-
126). There are different types of terrorists in the world. These groups change and evolve over 
time. This study will proceed to discuss the different types of terrorist organisations. 
Identifying the types of terrorists that operate in the world will help shed light on what types 
of terrorist groups operate in the Sahel.   
3.3 Types of terrorist organisations    
  
There are four types of terrorists groups that operate around the world in the modern era and 
these groups are categorised according to their motivations as it is presented in figure3.2. These 
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groups include right-wing terrorists, left-wing terrorists, separatist terrorists/ethnonationalist 
terrorists, and religious/sacred terrorists. All these groups have enjoyed relative prominence in 
the global world (Hou, 2020:200-203). Categories of terrorist groups are important because 
diverse motivations have led to different types of behaviour. Understanding the nature of 
terrorist groups involved can shed light on the manifestation of the arrangement of its 
development and violence (Cronin, 2003:39).   
  
 A terrorist organisation’s strategic decisions are to a large extent driven by group ideology. A 
group ideology offers terrorist groups a response and interpretation to the grievances that 
influenced the formation of the group. In simple terms, group ideology informs the terrorist 
group’s specific political goals and outlook. Ideology guides the terrorist group’s goals. 
Ideology is a formidable tool because it can shape a distinctive view of reality (Ahmed, 
2018:90). 
  
There were many left and right-wing groups in the 1970s and 1980s, for example, the 
aforementioned Italian revolutionary Carlo Pisacane and the Red Brigades from Italy. The 
categorisation used in this study will not be perfect because many groups have mixed 
motivating ideologies but usually one ideology will dominate. Left-wing terrorist organisations 
tend to prefer anti-materialistic, anti-authoritarian and revolutionary agendas. They are driven 
by idealist and liberal political concepts. Left-wing terrorists often participate in criminal and 
brutal types of behaviour such as bombing, arson murder and kidnapping, often targeting the 
elites who symbolise authority. These organisations commonly support communist or socialist 
ideologies and may seek to challenge the unfair allocation of resources in a state (Graham, 
2004:21; Czarnek, 2019:808-809). These groups seek to overthrow capitalism and its social 
order. 
  
 Left-wing terrorists draw inspiration from the Russian and European anarchists of the 1880s. 
These groups find it difficult to agree on their long-term goals. Western Europe left-wing 
groups in the 20th century were brutal and ephemeral. Social revolutionary terrorist groups 
declined in Europe when communism collapsed and the subsequent conclusion of the Cold 
War. However, some of these groups still exist. For example, the Revolutionary Armed Forces 




Right-wing groups lean towards fascism. These groups harbour anti-government, anti-Semitic 
and racist beliefs. These groups seek to maintain the present political order or seek to return to 
a past age were fortunes favoured a dominant group. They defy left-wing concepts like 
socialism and communism (Merari, 1978:342; Abramsky, 2017:17). Right-wing terrorist 
groups can be brutal and ruthless in their operations even though they have tended to be less 
organised and more reckless compared to left-wing groups. Right-wing groups delegitimise 
and dehumanise their enemies to justify their attacks. For example, the Vietnamese Party to 
Exterminate the Communists and Restore the Nation was formed on the belief that communism 
was to be renounced in Vietnam. In support of anticommunism, this group assassinate a 
government member and also carried out other violent attacks. Far-right terrorists often choose 
their targets according to religion, race, ethnicity and immigration status. Neo-Nazi groups and 
the Ku Klux Klan are examples of  groups Right-wing groups. They have become more 
opportunistic than calculated in recent decades. This makes them difficult to track and 
potentially explosive (Cronin, 2003:40). 
  
Nationalists/separatist terrorists, also known as ethno-nationalist terrorists, are the most 
predictable types of terrorists, usually, with a clear, rational and potentially negotiable political 
aim. Their ideology is based on the 19th century-style nationalism. These groups can be very 
violent over long periods of time. Ethno-nationalists aim to coerce the dominant group and will 
want to attract international sympathy for their cause. Ethno-nationalists harbour bitterness and 
resentment towards the dominant ethnic group (Dayioglu, 2019:70). Examples of these groups 
are: Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) of 
Sri Lanka, and Euskadi Ta Askatasuna (ETA) in Spain. These groups aim to establish a separate 
sovereign state that is based on ethnic dominance These groups are usually supported by the 
local population of the same ethnicity with whom their separatist goals may resonate. In the 
modern era, the ethno-nationalist/separatist group’s average longevity depends on the support 
that they get from their ethnic group (O'Boyle, 2002:28). 
  
According to Post et al (2002:112), religious/sacred terrorists refer to ‘People of the Book’ 
who are seeking to ‘force the end’. These are Muslims, Christians, Hindu and the Jewish 
terrorists who claim that their actions are guided by their religion. For example, the Jewish 
Defence Organization guided by Jewish extremism, the Daesh guided by Islamic extremism 
and the Irish Republican Army (IRA) guided by both religious and nationalist/separatist goals. 
The IRA, therefore, can be classified as a group that was driven by two ideologies. It wanted a 
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unified and independent Ireland and at the same time, it was led by Catholicism (Ahmed, 
2018:91).  
 
Figure 3.2. Classifying terrorist organisations and their characteristics 
 
 
Source: Ganor, B., 2008. Terrorist organization typologies and the probability of a 






Religious/sacred terrorists aim to advance their religious interests. They use violence to 
disseminate their religion in fulfilling what they believe is ‘the will of God’. These groups are 
born from a desire to shield their religion from threats that are considered to be hostile. These 
groups respond to radical clerics who interpret the scripture by sanction killing in the name of 
God (Graham, 2004:4). This phenomenon has very deep roots. In the Islamic case, members 
are recruited and led into the holy war by religious officials in the name of Islam (Marsden & 
Schmid, 2011:180). The IRA was disbanded in 2010 after the decommissioning and has been 
inactive but other groups like the Oglaigh na Heireann (ONH), Real IRA, Continuity IRA 
(CIRA) and more recently the IRA/New IRA have made attempts to take on the mantle of 
paramilitary republicanism (Morrison, 2017:587). Boko Haram, ISIS and other religious 
terrorists fall under this category. As noted in Table 3.1, Fifth Wave terrorist groups have 
unique characteristics. All types of terrorist groups are capable of committing acts of violence, 
but religious terrorists pose a great danger to the international security for the following 
reasons: 
  
 (1) Religious/sacred terrorists often feel that they are involved in the battle of good versus 
 evil, meaning that the question of human targets is open-ended: anyone who does not 
 belong to their religious sect or is not a member of their religion is considered to be 
 evil, therefore is fair game. Indiscriminate attacks on innocent civilians are not rare to 
 religious-sacred terrorists. Due to the exceptionality of their faith, religious/sacred 
 terrorists have tended to dehumanise their victims more than the other types of terrorist 
 groups by considering those who do not subscribe to their beliefs as apostates or infidels 
 (Hoffman, 2006:90-91). 
 (2)  To please the perceived commands of deity, religious/sacred terrorists directly or 
 indirectly engage in violence. The actions that religious/sacred terrorists take are 
 usually unpredictable. Their actions are not constrained in their behaviour by concerns 
 from their human targets because their audience lies elsewhere (Cronin, 2003:42). 
(3)   Religious/sacred terrorists are against secular values and laws. Therefore, their main 
 aim is not to modify the international system and the post-Westphalian state system but 
 to overturn or overthrow it. This is a serious threat to the existence of states than what 
 nationalists/separatist terrorists who try to carve an autonomous territory or to establish 
 a secular state (Romano, et al., 2019:5-7). 
(4)  Religious/sacred terrorists are alienated from their social system. They do not attempt 
 to change the current system to make it perfect, just or more egalitarian. Rather 
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 religious/sacred terrorists are trying to change the system as the world learned on 9/11 
 when Al-Qaeda targeted the Twin Towers and killed innocent civilians (Cronin, 2003). 
(5)  There is popular support amongst civil society which makes religious/sacred terrorism 
 worrisome, for example, Al-Qaeda, Boko Haram, ISIS and others are able to get 
 financial backing from Muslim nongovernmental organisations internationally, making 
 these groups truly global terrorist organisations (Cronin, 2003:42; Romano, et al., 
 2019:5-7). 
  
Religious/sacred terrorists and Fifth Wave terrorists are a contemporary problem that is facing 
the international community. As noted previously, these terrorists only answer to their God and 
they will not hesitate to kill in the name of their God. It is important to note that while religious 
and fifth wave terrorists might be considered to be examples of modern terrorism,  killing in 
the name of God actually dates back  hundreds of years and is not confined to Islam but many 
religions (Marsden & Schmid, 2011:180). It becomes very important to trace the early incidents 
in the history of religion where believers began killing other people in the name of God. The 
next section will be dedicated to analysing religious semantics, principles and religious roots 
of contemporary terrorism. This is important for the  African context because even though its 
origins are not African, terrorist activities is on the increase in Africa and are threatening the 
modern African state and the international order.  
3.4 Religious semantics, principles and religious roots of contemporary terrorism 
 
The ‘holy war’ which lasted for over 400 years was between Christians and Muslims. The 
Crusaders led the first military offensive in 1095 with the Christian armies invading the Middle 
East, killing those who stood in their way. In 1099, the Crusaders captured Jerusalem and 
massacred the inhabitants of the city who were Jewish and Muslim. After being defeated, 
Muslim armies slowly built their armies under the leadership of Nur al Din who swore that 
under ‘jihad’ he had the responsibility to regain captured territory and liberate Jerusalem. He 
was not able to fulfil this goal. However, his successor, the Kurdish warrior Saladin was able 
to retake Jerusalem in 1187 (Seib, 2017:46). 
 
For another century, Muslims and Christians fought for control of the main cities as control 
shifted back and forth. Both Christians and Muslims competed to outdo each other in 
committing acts of savagery on combatants and civilians. These horrific acts of barbarism were 
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defended by the actors as necessary acts in the service of the Lord. This history serves as a 
foundation for understanding how religion came about in being the base of violent extremism 
(Haddad, 1983:237; Polk, 2018:7).        
 
From the time of the ‘holy war,’ jumping forward to nearly a millennium, the war continues 
unabated. Al-Qaeda bombed the Twin Tower in the US because it views the US as the modern 
Crusader heartland, which has sent its military to the Middle East during the 1992 Gulf War 
(Ford, 2001:2001). In declaring ‘war on terror,’ George W Bush used the word ‘crusade’. 
Osama bin Laden quickly responded, ‘Our goal is for our Muslim nation to unite in the face of 
the Christian crusade.’ This is how Al-Qaeda and other extremist groups have manipulated 
Islam and the Qur’an to suit their purposes They have skilfully done so to overwhelm those 
who support moderate Islam (Shehailalalwi, et al., 2018:84). 
 
The Qur’an is not like the Bible, which is a collection of God’s work, but rather a direct word 
of God recited by Prophet Mohammed, the messenger of God (Albader, 2018:577). Therefore, 
the Qur’an is treated as not lending itself to interpretation. In practice, even the word of God 
has different meanings to different people. For example, the term ‘jihad’ which translates to 
‘sustained struggle’ is understood differently. ’ According to some people, it means a continued 
struggle within an individual to live within the precepts of Islam but to others, it means 
continuing the aggressive struggle against the enemies of Islam ‘holy war’. In the West, the 
term has been used synonymously with terrorism (Shehailalalwi, et al., 2018:83). Furthermore, 
some people view jihad as an individual and a collective duty of all Muslims to join the jihad 
if a Muslim community is attacked. But the question is ‘ What is an attack?’ Is it a military 
confrontation like the Gulf War or cultural encroachment by the West into the Middle East? 
 
The Qur’an does contain some controversies. Consider the following: ‘Fight in the cause of 
God those who fight you, but do not commit aggression: God loves not the aggressors.’ Then 
consider the following: ‘Whoever commits aggression against you, retaliate against him in the 
same measures as he committed against you.’ Some scholars have argued that this becomes a 
justification for violence only by ignoring how this sentence fits into the Islamic ethical and 
moral framework. This sentence has been used by Al-Qaeda’s Ayman al-Zawahiri in justifying  
the killing of the innocents (Seib, 2017:49). According to Ford (2001:2001), 87% of jihadist 
propaganda contains citations, justifications, actions and words from the Qur’an and the 
Prophet. Analysing the Qur’an can be a lifetime’s work. This discussion is illustrating that the 
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Qur’an does contain some controversies and that different people can interpret the Qur’an in a 
different way to justify their actions. 
  
Islam is not the only religion that extremists have relied on to justify their actions. In Colorado, 
Springs, US, in 2015, the gunmen accused of wounding nine and killing three people claimed 
to be a Christian and justified his deeds as God’s work. Palestinians have also been attacked 
by Jewish extremists. Christian and Muslims have been attacked by Hindu extremists in India. 
Protestant and Christian extremists terrorised Northern Ireland for many years. Hundreds have 
been killed in Myanmar in the violence between Buddhists and Muslims (Seib, 2017:50). 
Anders Breivik, a Christian terrorist, tried to galvanise Norwegians against what he considered 
as the spread of Islam in Europe by killing seventy-seven people in the Norway 2011 bombing.  
  
The list of incidents is ecumenical and depressingly lengthy, but because of the prominence of 
ISIS and Al-Qaeda, and their kin, as indicated before, this study will be focusing on Muslim 
extremism. Whether driven by unreasoning insanity, reasoned malice or whatever beliefs, 
many extremists wrap themselves around religion to disguise their violence as something 
noble. Criminal irresponsibility on the part of the state, organisation and individual can never 
justify killing people in the name of religion. Other cultural aspects and religion cast broad 
shadows. Beyond the acts of individuals are ramifications related to broad culture-based 
conflict, ‘clash of civilians’ (Seib, 2017:50).  
 
The world watched in disbelief as religion returned to global affairs as Al-Qaeda launched an 
aerial assault on the New York Twin Towers and the Pentagon on 9/11. The identities and 
motive of the perpetrators began to emerge as the Twin Towers fell. The perplexing question 
that people began to ask themselves was ‘why would someone do such a thing and why would 
someone do such a thing in the name of God?’ In the post-Cold War period, this question has 
risen frequently (Juergensmeyer, 2003:185; Bester, 2008:13; Chojnowski, 2018:44). 
 
The Al-Qaeda network has not acted alone in the religious assault of the modern secular state. 
In the last few decades, it seems, religion has been associated with violence in many parts of 
the world-from the destruction of the Twin Towers to suicide attacks in Palestine and Israel, 
the Tokyo nerve gas killings in 1995 by Aum Shinrikyo and the French 2015 terrorist attacks 
in the northern parts of Saint-Denis which were carried out by three suicide bombers outside 
the Stade de France stadium. The actors who committed these desperate acts of terror are united 
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by the collective hate of the modern secular state. The odd part about this war is not only the 
difficulty of defining it, and its non-state international character of terrorism, but also the 
motivation of the opposition to the secular state that has been attributed to religion 
(Juergensmeyer, 2017:24). 
 
From the time of enlightenment, secular politics has comfortably ignored religion and 
marginalised its role in society (Friedland,1999:310). No one would have predicted that 
modern conflicts of the 21st century would involve religion-an old foe the secular state thought 
it has banished. Most religious people and their organisations are either supportive of the 
secular state or uninterested in it. Religious authority has given Al-Qaeda’s cadres the moral 
authority to employ violence on the icon of universal economic power. It has become the fight 
between good and evil. In this light, the attack on the Twin Towers was religious. The attack 
was designed to be calamitous, an act of biblical scope (Juergensmeyer, 2017:219). 
  
Religious terrorism is striking because it has no military purpose but is exclusively symbolic. 
The acts are meant to attract media attention. Most terrorist attacks that take place in the world 
are usually accompanied by a moral justification. In the contemporary world, it is not a question 
of religion becoming politicised, but politics has become religionised. In this light, terrorism 
has become difficult to combat. It is not easy to negotiate with religious terrorists because their 
enemies have become ‘Satanised’ (Bester, 2008:13; Chojnowski, 2018:44). According to 
Juergensmeyer (2017:182), Satanisation is when the opponent rejects one's moral position or 
religious beliefs and the enemy appears to be powerful to destroy one’s community, then the 
opponent’s victory would be unthinkable. It seems there is no way the opponent can be defeated 
in human terms. The opponent is envisioned as a superhuman foe, a cosmic foe. Satinisation is 
designed to discredit and humiliate the enemy. Then the groups asserts its moral superior power 
over their enemies by sub-humanising them. When Osama bin Laden described the US as 
embodying the ‘forces of evil,’ he spoke of a monster that only divine power could defeat. 
Boko Haram has also described the West as an evil force. It is also important to note that 
violence has also empowered religion. Violence has given religious institutions some attention 
that they have not enjoyed since enlightenment two centuries ago (Juergensmeyer, 2017:219). 
 
The secular state has in many ways undermined religious authority and this has made many 
religious groups to be angry with the secular state and the liberal international system. Many 
Muslim groups feel that the West is spreading and imposing its values into Muslim territories 
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at the expense of Islam. In this light, it is important to trace the origins and divergence of Al-
Qaeda and ISIS. The next discussion will trace the origins of Al-Qaeda and ISIS. 
3.5 The origins and divergence of Al-Qaeda and ISIS 
 
Al-Qaeda and ISIS (including Boko Haram, which will be discussed separately in Chapter 
Four) both adhere to Salafi jihadism which is characterised by two criteria: firstly, as the study 
has mentioned before, they emphasise returning to a ‘pure’ Islam as it was during the times of 
the Prophet. Secondly, they both believe that violent jihad is a personal religious duty. 
However, there are several differences in ideology between Al-Qaeda and ISIS which 
determine the nature of the threat each poses to the state and society (Neuman, 2009:1). 
  
Al-Qaeda (which means ‘the base’) emerged in 1988 in Afghanistan from the anti-Soviet jihad. 
In the 1980s, after the Iranian revolution, the killing of President Sadat of Egypt, a scheme was 
devised by Pakistan and Saudi Arabia to lure volunteer fighters to join the jihad in Afghanistan. 
They aimed to undermine Iran’s status in the Muslin world (Roy, 2004:291; Spencer, 
2018:676). A large number of Arabs heeded the call and went to Afghanistan and fought on 
the side of the mujahideen against the Soviet Union and the Afghan Marxist regime who were 
considered to be ‘infidel’ invaders. The Saudi government, Pakistan and global Muslim 
organisations funded these individuals. Osama bin Laden used his influence and money to raise 
awareness among Muslims about the jihadi that was being fought against the Marxist regime. 
The Soviets withdrew from Afghanistan in 1988 and this was viewed as a major victory for 
the mujahideen. Nothing was done to disband or monitor fighters who remained in 
Afghanistan. For Osama bin Laden, this was an opportunity for him to expand his network to 
other parts of the world such as Kashmir and Palestine. Encouraged by their victory after the 
disintegration of the Soviet Union, their focus changed to the sole remaining power, the US 
(Jones, 2014:6).  
 
Capitalising on the network that he had built to defeat the mighty Soviets, Bin Laden decided 
to make Al-Qaeda a global network. He aimed to bring together struggling jihadist groups 
under his network. In the 1990s, Bin Laden viewed the US as the bigger enemy than the local 
corrupt regimes. It was at this time that Al-Qaeda viewed itself as the global backer of jihadist 
groups in the world. Its goal was to provide finance and technical assistance to groups that 
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would attack the US and its interests anywhere in the world (Farrall, 2017:16-27; Wright, 
2006:56). 
  
Unlike ISIS, Al-Qaeda’s operations have always focused on fighting against a faraway enemy 
(Western nations). Bin Laden believed that attacking the US would draw the US into invading 
the Middle East, thus the US would be drawn into a protracted conflict, like the Soviet Union, 
then it would be defeated in guerrilla-style warfare. Al-Qaeda’s early modus operandi was 
indicated by the attacks in 1998 on American embassies in Kenya and Tanzania. It utilised the 
capacity of local Islamist groups and coordinated well-planned attacks on US embassies. Over 
the years, Al-Qaeda structured itself into a network of affiliate groups with the command centre 
being located in the Pakistani tribal areas. It is estimated that it has 21 affiliate groups which 
include Al-Qaeda in Somalia (Al-Shabaab), Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, Al-Qaeda in 
Yemen, Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, among others (Buchanan-Clarke, 2018:215). 
  
What is called the Islamic State of Syria and the Levant (ISIL), the Islamic State (IS), the 
Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) or Daesh evolved from Al-Qaeda. Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI) 
was led by Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi who used extreme violence that earned him the nickname 
‘the butcher of Bagdad.’ According to Weaver (2006), Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi was a school 
dropout and had a long prison record. He had been a bully, a bootlegger, a heavy drinker, a 
thug and allegedly a pimp in Zarqa’s underworld. On the other hand, Bin Laden was the son 
of a respected billionaire who had studied economics at Abdulaziz University. There was a 
split between Al-Qaeda and AQI due to Al-Zarqawi’s alacrity when he targeted Muslims he 
deemed as tarfir and apostates who should be killed. The punishment for those he deemed 
apostates was public beheadings filmed on camera, now a propaganda trademark of ISIS 
(Melhem, 2015:150). Unlike Bin Laden, Al-Zarqawi focused on destroying the near enemy 
(any government that did not institute strict forms of Salafi-Wahhabism). For example, 
according to Al-Zarqawi, all Shi’a Muslims were apostates and were beheaded whenever 
captured. Bin Laden was against attacking Shi’a Muslims in fear of igniting a sectarian war. 
Al-Zarqawi targeted Shi’as to instigate a sectarian war in Iraq. Bin Laden believed that 
sectarian violence will paint a negative image on the Al-Qaeda franchise. Al-Qaeda command 
centre and AQI were no longer communicating by 2006. In 2006, Abu Bakr al- Baghdadi 





ISIS became extremely active during the 2003 war in Iraq where it established its presence, 
vision and ideology. It had intentions of establishing an emirate in Iraq but was forced to 
temporarily abandon its plans due to the superiority  of the American allies (Hove, 2018:4). 
The withdrawal of the US military from Iraq created a power vacuum which was quickly filled 
by ISIS. In addition, the 2011 Arab Spring also played to ISIS’s advantage as it destabilised 
Syria. ISIS took advantage of the situation and established an operational base in Syria. ISIS 
managed to achieve part of its aims when it gained control of large parts of territory in Iraq and 
Syria. In 2015, it managed to declare a caliphate in the territories that it controlled and enforced 
a strict form of Sharia law. The Sunni Islamist ISIS destabilised the Middle East, carried out 
audacious attacks in Africa, Europe and the Middle East. Its expansion poses a threat to 
international peace and stability. ISIS is more than just a terrorist group because it embraces 
radical Islam into its politico-military structures by force on  Muslims and non-Muslims (Hove, 
2018:4). Now that this study has discussed how Al-Qaeda and ISIS originated, the study will 
proceed to trace and discuss contemporary terrorism’s religious roots. This will help explain 
why contemporary terrorist organisations cannot be separated from religion. 
  
3.6 The roots of Muslim rage 
 
The Islamic religion is the second biggest religion after Christianity. Islam has comforted 
millions of women and men and given them some peace of mind. It has brought some sense of 
meaning and dignity to underprivileged lives. Islam has taught people from diverse creeds to 
live side by side in reasonable tolerance and people from diverse races to live in brotherhood. 
Furthermore, it has inspired a great civilisation where people have called home including non-
Muslims. In simple terms, it has enriched the world (Jones, 2015:8).  
 
However, just like other religions, Islam has to a certain extent inspired some of its followers 
to commit acts of violence, through fundamentalism. This hatred surpasses hostility to specific 
policies, actions, countries and interests and extends to values, principles and practices of 
Western civilisation. Western values are seen as genetically immoral and those who accept and 
endorse them are considered ‘enemies of God.’ This saying is habitually used by the Iranian 
leadership in political and religious pronouncements. In Islam, the good and evil struggle 
quickly assimilated political scopes. In retrospect, the Prophet Mohammed was not only a 
religious leader but also the head of a community, a soldier and a ruler. His struggle comprised 




Hence, in the holy war, Islamic fighters are fighting for God and those who oppose them are 
fighting against God. In principle, God and the Prophet are the heads of the Islamic State. The 
caliphs being his vicegerents (administrative territories). The army belongs to God and the 
adversary is God’s adversary. The obligation of God’s army is to dispatch God’s adversaries 
to a place where they will be chastised by God (in the afterlife). In the classical view of Islam, 
mankind is split into two: the house of Islam where faith and Muslim law prevail and the other 
is the house of the Unbelief which is the duty of all Muslims to convert them to the Islamic 
religion. In reality, the rest of the world is still out of Islam’s hands and even in Islamic 
territories, some Islamic radicals think that Islam has been undermined (Lewis, 2002:194-195; 
Buchanan-Clarke, 2018:215-216). Boko Haram has ambitions of establishing an Islamic state 
in Nigeria which will convert many people to the Islamic faith. Boko Haram will be extensively 
discussed in Chapter Four. Boko Haram and other contemporary terrorists will do anything to 
undermine the modern state (Agbiboa, 2017:146). Even though they are against the 
international system, they use modern weapons and technologies that are available on the 
market to their advantage. They use different methods in carrying out attacks on their targets. 
The next section will be dedicated to discussing the characteristics and trends of contemporary 
terrorism.     
3.7 Characteristics and trends of contemporary terrorism 
 
Walter Laqueur, a pre-eminent historian of terrorism, noted that there was a revolution (in 
terms of the use of violence by terrorists) that was taking place two years before the 9/11 attacks 
on the US. He noted that terrorism was no longer only a calculated use of violence that most 
people had become familiar with. Instead, the new religious terrorism that confronted the world 
aimed at destroying all lives and liquidating satanic forces as punishment for human crimes. 
Contemporary terrorism no longer has limits to what kinds of weapons to use in perusing its 
apocalyptic aims (Allen, 2017:118). Laqueur (1996:34), also predicted that contemporary 
terrorists would soon not only be able to make chemical and biological weapons but would 
soon be able to make weapons previously considered only science fiction. He predicted that 
terrorists would make weapons that would be catastrophic. He claimed that convectional 
vocabulary had become inadequate in explaining contemporary terrorism hence, there was a 




As noted, a vital attribute of contemporary terrorism is its religious imperative. Religious 
terrorists may be anti-globalist or anti-Western as in Islam or be ultra-nationalist as it is with 
Hindu and Jewish groups. Honig & Yahel (2019:1220-1221), identified religious terrorism’s 
three common characteristics. Firstly, the struggle is seen as a defence of dignity and basic 
identity. The defence if not only to defend lives but to defend the entire culture. It is seen as a 
cultural war infused with religious implications. For example, the Palestinian struggle assumed 
a religious route when mullahs and sheikhs interpreted it as a defence of Islam. Secondly, it 
would be unthinkable to lose the struggle. If the struggle faces a negative outcome, it is 
perceived as beyond human conception. For example, there are many Muslims who have 
refused to acknowledge the idea of the existence of the Israeli state in Arab territory (Bester, 
2008:13). Thirdly, the battle is a deadlock and cannot be won instantaneously. If the struggle 
is seen as hopeless in human terms, then the possibilities of a victory lie in God’s hands. 
Besides, religiously motivated terrorists only feel accountable to a deity and therefore lack an 
earthly constituency. In this light, religious inspiration makes contemporary terrorist groups to 
be more than a terrorist organisation. Contemporary terrorism can be regarded rather as an 
ideology, a belief system or a set of ideas organised as a recruiting network (Gallagher, 
2017:62). Over the years, Boko Haram (to be discussed in Chapter Four) has evolved to become  
an ideology and franchise that is followed by many individuals.   
  
 A trend of large-scale indiscriminate killing of civilians began in the 1980s when large car 
bombs were detonated where there was a huge concentration of civilians. For example, Islamic 
Jihad used a car bomb to destroy a US embassy in Lebanon in 1983 (Stern & Berger, 2015:40). 
The willingness to commit suicide for the terrorism cause has become common. Indiscriminate 
large-scale attacks on civilians are designed to attain big media coverage. Modern mass media 
broadcasts footages of terrorist activities, bigger and extravagant attacks are thus needed to 
capture public awareness. Contemporary terror groups stage fewer lethal but efficient attacks 
as they have become organised, sophisticated and systematic (Gunaratna, 2004:19; Buchanan-
Clarke, 2018:217).  
  
Compared to the hierarchical organisational structures of the 1960s and 1970s, contemporary 
terror groups are progressively part of undistinguishable broader, amorphous organisations 
which have a tendency to function on a linear basis. This behaviour has affected how they make 
decisions, targeting and operations in consenting vaster independence and freedom in planned 
decisions, given the deficiency of central leadership (Valasik & Phillips, 2017; Jenkins, 
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2001:224-225). A structure that is less cohesive with members diffused allows for groups who 
coordinate, conduct and communicate their operation through mass media and the internet. The 
lack of a centralised structure in terrorist organisations makes law enforcement and intelligence 
gathering difficult. Those united together by a common inspiration and experience rather than 
personal interaction, held together by transnational cooperation have clearly overtaken 
identifiable contemporary terrorist leadership (Valasik & Phillips, 2017). 
  
Contemporary terrorism’s loose structures accommodates full time, professional and part-time 
amateurs. The ‘lone wolf’ syndrome, first developed in the US by far-right groups, allows for 
individuals to carry out attacks alone under the inspiration and guidance of radical ideologies. 
Individuals and extreme-right groups keep in contact through the internet. This has allowed the 
leaders of terrorist organisations to take tribute for the individuals who have embraced their 
indoctrination. The Oklahoma attacks by two individuals in 1995 killed at least 168 people 
(Pfefferbaum et al., 2016:72-73).  
  
Earlier accounts of terrorist activity were usually followed by communication from terrorists 
giving details about why a certain attack was carried out. In contemporary terrorism, there has 
been an increase in terrorist incidents that are unclaimed or unannounced and have become a 
common characteristic (Abrahms & Conrad, 2017:279-281). The perpetrators are no longer 
concerned about publicity because their objectives have changed to be punishment oriented. 
Terrorists also capitalise on the anxiety and fear generated by maintaining their anonymity after 
carrying out violent terrorist attacks. Religious terrorists are not concerned about gaining public 
support, hence, they is no need to justify their actions (Kearns, 2019:1-4). As noted, 
contemporary terrorists are willing to use any available weapons to cause maximum damage 
to their target. Currently, in 2020, the world is battling to flatten the curve on the 
coronavirus/COVID-19 pandemic. Although it is not the focus of this study, it is nevertheless 
important to ask the question: how will/have terrorists responded to the coronavirus pandemic? 
This study will proceed to discuss the impact of COVID-19 on terrorism.  
3.8 The impact of the coronavirus/COVID-19 on terrorism globally 
 
The impact of coronavirus/COVID-19 in 2020 has been devastating to the whole world as it 
began to spread at the end of 2019 after the first case was reported in Wuhan, China. The 
coronavirus is not likely to end very soon and its effects will have profound consequences for 
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years to come. The coronavirus can be spread primarily by coming in contact with an infected 
person and coughing. It is a very infectious disease that has managed to spread to all corners 
of the world and it has been recognised as a pandemic. The world is struggling for existence 
due to the coronavirus with many individuals feeling as if they are at war with an invisible 
opponent. The economic consequences caused by the coronavirus pandemic are becoming 
explicitly clear (Rogg, 2020:55). According to the UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres, as 
cited in Murphy (2020), the coronavirus pandemic threatens the maintenance of international 
security and peace which may generate increased violence and social unrest which impedes the 
ability to fight the pandemic. The impacts of the coronavirus differ from country to country 
and each country will recover differently from other countries. Governments have taken 
extensive actions to mitigate the coronavirus such as lockdowns, work from home, stay home, 
limited access to private and public institutions and limiting the movement of people 
(Chukwueloke &Oghuvbu, 2020:36). 
 
The coronavirus, unlike Ebola, has reached global diffusion, reaching everywhere, irrespective 
of gender, age, location, race, class and nationality. Some people are more at risk than others 
depending on sensitivity, exposure and adaptive capability but hierarchies, inequalities and 
asymmetries do matter, which is not a new thing in international relations. The coronavirus has 
made hierarchies, inequalities and asymmetries clear in the way individuals access healthcare 
and how they increase the effects of the coronavirus. The coronavirus does not pick its victims 
but enduring and pre-existing economic and social inequalities ensure that the virus 
discriminates. During its short existence, the coronavirus has become a global security threat 
(Milani, 2020:143).  
 
The Sahel has not been spared from the coronavirus pandemic. An atmosphere of panic has 
been created by the coronavirus pandemic resulting in pandemonium in the economic and 
socio-structures of states in the Sahel. Deadly pandemics are not new to the West African 
region as they have battled with the deadly Ebola virus in 2014. The 2104 Ebola virus outbreak 
enhanced the region's preparedness to fighting coronavirus. Regardless of this preparedness, 
the coronavirus has taken a toll in West Africa and on all global individuals (Comerford & 
Davey, 2020).  
 
The surprise part of the coronavirus has passed but the world remains uncertain if it will return 
again and the economic impacts caused by the coronavirus pandemic have resulted in 
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individuals feeling insecure. Lockdown measures are being eased in some countries while 
being re-implemented in other countries. This has caused a lot of uncertainty. Uncertainty 
comes along with feelings of division, mistrust and dissatisfaction. When individuals seek to 
find comfort and certainty, feelings of grievance and hatred become more asserted (Burchill, 
2020:6). It is in this type of setting that extremism and terrorism can flourish. In times of a 
crisis, insecurity fuels feelings that someone is to blame for the crises. These uncertainty 
feelings make the extremism message a welcome respite from uncertainty regardless of how 
far from the truth their messages may be. It is in these settings that individuals will find 
messages that suit them. Taking advantage of this uncertainty, terrorists will seek to gain 
support and recruit followers by exploiting the situation (Comerford & Davey, 2020). 
 
Globally, many people have lost their jobs and are leaving in fear of their future. This can lead 
to mild psychological symptoms that include, increased paranoia and anxiety which may 
worsen if disruptions to their lives continue and can in turn lead to self-destructive behaviour 
like substance or drug abuse and domestic violence. These kinds of setbacks to people’s lives 
can make people susceptible to radicalisation which offers ‘simple solutions’ (terrorists will 
shift the blame to governments, the West, Jews and non-believers and then claim that they have 
the solution to their problems). Many people are staying at home during the coronavirus 
pandemic, which means that there are spending more time online. This gives terrorists more 
time to engage with their purported constituencies (Basit, 2020:9). The stress and disruption 
cause by disruptions to people’s lives presents fertile ground for radicalisation. ISIS has 
exploited the pandemic to bolster its extremist propaganda and recruitment. ISIS has used 
coronavirus hashtags to redirect internet users to its extremist platform. In Turkey, it has 
targeted migrants from Turkmenistan for recruitment because they have lost their jobs during 
the coronavirus pandemic (Ackerman & Peterson, 2020:61). Preying on anxieties, uncertainties 
and disruptions, there has been a widespread increase in the online extremist platforms. Far-
right groups in the US have seen an 800% increase in the volume of users since the lockdown 
with more than 6000 users in March 2020 alone. ISIS, Boko Haram and Al-Qaeda have also 
seen the same increase in online activities. This has prompted Antonio Guterres, the UN 
Secretary-General to acknowledge the problem, noting that terrorist groups are targeting young 
individuals to disseminate their hateful rhetoric (Ackerman & Peterson, 2020:61). 
 
Regardless of ideology, the coronavirus pandemic provides a wide range of channels for terror 
groups to explore. Terrorist groups like Al-Qaeda and ISIS have claimed the coronavirus 
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pandemic as an endorsement for their worldviews and ideological narratives by calling it God’s 
wrath. There are several variations when it comes to terrorists marketing their misinformation 
and conspiracy theories (Ackerman & Peterson, 2020:62). Terrorists do not care if the 
information they put out is accurate as long as it resonates with their followers. For example, 
lockdown and social distancing measures are unpopular in Nigeria and Boko Haram seized the 
opportunity to state that it rejects lockdown and social distancing measures imposed by the 
government. This was an attempt by Boko Haram to gain supporters despite putting the lives 
of millions at risk (Burchill, 2020:15). Far-right groups see an opportunity from the coronavirus 
of spreading the virus to immigrant communities, Jews and Blacks. When the virus was first 
reported in China, ISIS called it God’s punishment on communist China for abusing the 
Uyghur Muslims. Later when the virus had spread to Iran, ISIS labelled it God’s wrath for Shia 
Muslim’s ‘idolatry.’ When the virus further spread to western nations, ISIS called it God’s 
punishment on crusaders and infidels for fighting against the mujahideen (Crisis Group, 2020). 
Sunni jihadists have made claims that the coronavirus is a plot from the enemies of Islam. Pro-
ISIS groups have attempted to encourage conversion by targeting the western world. They have 
heightened their propaganda by disseminating extremist narratives in the English language to 
target vulnerable individuals under lockdown (Crisis Group, 2020).  
 
In late April 2020, it was reported that Boko Haram had significantly expanded its territory 
with attacks in Chad prompting Open doors (an organisation that specialises in religious 
persecution) to express fears that the coronavirus pandemic may have opened doors for terror 
groups to expand territory. Similarly, ISIS, a terrorist group responsible for the 2014 mass 
atrocities in Iraq and Syria seems to have gained strength since the coronavirus pandemic 
began. Nadia Murad, a Nobel peace prize laureate and advocate, noted that ISIS had killed 
several Iraq personnel since the coronavirus began (Ochab, 2020). Relying heavily on 
ideology, terrorist groups have capitalised on turmoil to expand their reach. Abubakar Shekau, 
the Boko Haram leader, has called on his followers to exploit the weakness of the West and 
carry out attacks on western interests declaring that the coronavirus is brought about from ‘evil’ 
and that their version of Islam is ‘anti-virus.’ On the other hand, Daesh has increased its 
propaganda campaigns to promote its extremist ideologies (Ochab, 2020). 
 
 Despite the presence of foreign troops in West Africa, terrorist activities have continued 
unabated in Burkina Faso, Niger, Nigeria and Mali with ISIS expanding its reach to 
Mozambique. Terrorist groups have exploited the ‘humanitarian vacuum’ created by the 
60 
 
coronavirus pandemic to compete with the modern state especially in regions where the state 
is weak. In weak states, terror groups have capitalised on government mishaps to aggravate 
frustration (Avis, 2020). Seeking to gain some degree of legitimacy, terrorist groups like 
Lashkar-e- Taiba and Jaish-e-Mohammed have provided social welfare and other services to 
affected residents in Pakistan. Similarly, not to outdone, the Taliban, which controls a vast 
amount of land in Afghanistan and aspires for governance, has provided health service, 
launched its health information to combat the coronavirus pandemic and has guaranteed safe 
passage for all health workers crossing its territory. Seeking to contrast the dysfunctional 
Lebanese state, Shi’ite Hizb’allah in Lebanon has disinfected public places, deployed 20 000 
activists, 3000 nurses and 1500 doctors to fight the spread of the coronavirus pandemic 
(Haverty, et al, 2020). 
 
Governments have responded differently in implementing lockdown measures (in varying 
degrees and levels) to mitigate the coronavirus pandemic. Failure by some governments to 
protect its citizens during the coronavirus pandemic has been used by terror and extremist 
groups to foster illegitimacy (Scott & Overly, 2020). Governments will need to maintain public 
trust, minimise tensions and enhance security in order to respond effectively to the coronavirus 
pandemic. Governments should not show preference to any certain group over others. The 
above statement fits the scenario in the US where during a crisis the US government is 
confrontational and divisive instead of being supportive and inclusive. The US government has 
accused China of being responsible for the coronavirus. Competing information from different 
levels of government leads to uncertainty which has been exacerbated by squabbles between 
levels of government. Extremist groups have taken advantage of this situation in the US to sow 
seeds of division and hate (Burchill, 2020:18)  
 
Finally, mitigating terrorism during the coronavirus pandemic cannot come from governments 
only as much as it cannot be expected that social media companies should identify and delete 
all extremist and terrorist propaganda views on their platforms. Effective responses to 
moderating the spread of extremist propaganda which spreads terrorism will require local 








As noted, terrorism is indeed not a new concept but an old one that relies on violence for 
political ends. The type of violence employed has become lethal and indiscriminate in 
contemporary terrorism because religious terrorists are concerned about punishment and are 
not concerned about justifying their actions. The international system, globalisation and 
capitalism have contributed immensely to the manifestation of contemporary terrorism. 
Globalisation has contributed greatly to widening the inequality gap and alienation, affecting 
those who do not have to fight back. This chapter gave a brief analysis of the origins of 
terrorism dating back to the 1st-century B.C.E, and also described the waves of terrorism. It 
was also necessary to classify the types of terrorist groups so that it becomes clearer to 
understand why certain types of terrorist organisations do what they do. To a large extent, 
group ideology drives terrorist strategies, political goals and outlook. This chapter also 
analysed religious semantics, principles and the divergence of Al-Qaeda and ISIS. The study 
also explained how different religions justify their violent actions on religion. The brutality of 
attacks carried out by Abu Musab Al-Zarqawi led to the split between Al-Qaeda to form ISIS. 
The religious roots of contemporary terrorism were also discussed, and the study also traced 
the roots of Muslim anger towards the US and the West. The study discussed the characteristics 
and trends of contemporary terrorism. The impact of the coronavirus on terrorism was also 
discussed briefly before concluding the chapter. The next chapter will analyse the root causes 















CHAPTER FOUR: TRACING THE ROOT CAUSES OF TERRORISM IN NIGERIA 
4.1 Introduction 
 
The previous chapter explored the origins of terrorism, the waves of terrorism and 
contemporary types of terrorist groups. It  proceeded to explore religious semantics, principles 
and religious roots of contemporary terrorism. The study further traced Muslim rage, 
contemporary terrorism’s roots before exploring the origins and divergence of Al-Qaeda and 
ISIS. The trends and characteristics of contemporary terrorism were analysed. The impacts of 
the coronavirus on terrorism were discussed before concluding the study. This chapter will 
explore the Nigerian context, examine the emergence of Boko Haram. It will discuss the 
Nigerian colonial legacy, analyse state neglect and corruption in Nigeria.  It will analyse the 
relationship between the weak state, failed states and terrorism, and will discuss the connection 
between elite competition and terrorism. This study will also discuss the impact of coronavirus 
on terrorism in Nigeria.     
 
The political, security and economic environments in Africa are dynamic, fluid, complex and 
often hostile. There are many factors that impact economic growth, stability and the security 
of the state. The African continent is rich in natural resources, but many African regions are 
wracked with economic decay, poverty, fragile democracies, transnational crime, famine, 
patronage, illegal immigration and the threat of civil war (Barlow, 2019:33). Nigeria is no 
different from the above-mentioned characteristics. In Nigeria, the mounting tide of populism, 
factionalism, calls for secession and nationalism can be traced to the failure of politics and the 
way governance is applied or not applied. This has resulted in grievances from the affected 
communities, sometimes resulting in armed conflict. In some cases, populism has mutated into 
a strong sense of nationalism which is the driver of conflict as in the case of the Niger-Delta. 
Enthused by religious terrorism, political and economic exclusion, an increasingly hostile 
social and mainstream media, transnational hostility, tribalism, oppression, xenophobia, race 
anger and other social factors: such ‘lost hope’ and populist elements are achieving traction in 
Nigeria and Africa in general. Hence Nigeria and most of the African continent has become a 
fertile ground for terrorism to flourish (Bannon & Collier, 2003:2). Terrorist activities in West 
Africa, in particular, have posed the most challenging and dreaded issues. (Dentice, 2018:3). 
Africa is indeed vast, encompassing remarkable cultural diversity and geographic variations. 
The Africa continent as it is the case in Nigeria, has various ethnic groups, unique customs and 
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traditions, languages and religions which terrorist groups have exploited in pursuing their aims. 
Boko Haram has exploited these ethnic and regional differences to gain support in the Muslim 
dominated north of the country. (Mark, 2015:6). This study will now explore the Nigerian 
context. 
 4.2. The Nigerian context 
 
Nigeria, Africa’s most populous country has struggled to contain religious revolts, conflict, 
and maintain its territorial integrity since independence. In particular, the Nigerian security 
apparatus has been stretched to its limits since the emergence of Boko Haram (Agbiboa, 
2017:109). 
 
Nigeria has the best and the worst of what an African country can offer to the world (Bouchat, 
2013:2). Nigeria has the largest population and the biggest economy in Africa. It accounts for 
15.5% of Africa’s population having reached 202, 869, 200 in November 2019 as reported by 
Worldometers. The Nigerian economy has been growing steadily for the past decade, however, 
it still relies heavily on oil exports which make up to 75% of government revenue. Despite all 
these encouraging figures, Nigerian society remains highly unequal. Almost half of the 
population of (46%) live in poverty with the figure rising to 66% in the north of the country. 
Social marginalisation is prevalent and Nigeria rates poorly in terms of health compared to 
other African countries, with 37 neonatal deaths per 1000 live births compared to the sub-
Saharan average of 31 in 2017 (Afolabi, 2017:2167). 
 
The benefits of oil exports are mainly concentrated in the south. For example, according to 
Worldometers (2018),  Lagos’s GDP was $33.680 billion compared to Borno’s $5.18 billion. 
Nigeria is split along the urban-rural divide, with the rural areas experiencing more poverty. 
Human and social development is also split, with development projects being focused on urban 
areas at the expense of the rural areas. School attendance is also low in the north due to terrorist 
attacks on schools in Borno state by Boko Haram (Stuart, 2019:183). Furthermore, human and 
social development is not gender balanced. In all northern states, 80% of women cannot read 
and write compared to 54% of men. Low literacy rates  in the north of Nigeria has been cited 
as a contributing factor for the emergence of Boko Haram (discussed below) and its ability to 
maintain a steady recruitment. First, low high school and literacy rates contribute to 
marginalisation, which pushes young people into joining Boko Haram (Johnson, 2018:182).  
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Second, poor literacy contributes to poor understanding of Islamic texts, leaving individuals to 
rely on preachers for interpretation, thus making them vulnerable to radicalisation and easy 
recruitment (Onuoha, 2014:348). In the north of Nigeria, conditions are indeed dire and have 
been exacerbated by the influence of Boko Haram (Johnson, 2018:182). In February 2019. the 
Borno state governor,   Kashim Shettima estimated that Boko Haram has been responsible for 
almost 100 000 deaths since it was formed. From 2016, over two million people were internally 
displaced while 73,404 were externally displaced, living as refugees in neighbouring countries 
with Cameroon hosting 62,002 refugees and Niger accommodating 11,402 refugees (Tukur, 
2019). In this light, it is important to trace how Boko Haram emerged.  
4.2.1 The emergence of Boko Haram 
 
Boko Haram developed in early 2000 as a non-violent small religious sect outside Maiduguri 
in Borno state, which borders Niger, Chad and Cameroon in the northeast of the country. It 
developed as a small Sunni sect advocating a strict implementation and interpretation of 
Islamic law in Nigeria (Blanchard, 2014:1). Boko Haram was led by the charismatic 
Mohammed Yusuf, an Islamic cleric known for his oratory skills and had studied in Saudi 
Arabia. The name Boko Haram is a compound name, comprising of Hausa and Arabic 
languages. In the Hausa language, Boko means ‘Western education’ while Haram in Arabic 
means ‘forbidden or sinful.’ The exact date of when Boko Haram was formed will always 
remain a subject of speculation. Boko Haram membership comprises of political elites, 
unemployed graduates, drug addicts, bankers, university lecturers and migrants from nearby 
countries (Agbiboa, 2017:146). 
   
The sect maintained a low profile until the emergence of Mohamed Yusuf in 2002. In its 
infancy, there were no calls to use violence until Mohamed Yusuf was killed in 2009. The 
group is vehemently anti-Western and believes that democracy is incompatible with Islam. The 
group is strongly opposed to what it sees as a Western-based incursion that threatens traditional 
beliefs, customs and values of Muslim communities in the north of Nigeria. Boko Haram seeks 
to establish an Islamic state in Nigeria (Okemi, 2013:3). 
 
There was a major development for the group in 2009 when the Nigerian security forces 
cracked down on the group. The crackdown left 700 dead at the police headquarters in 
Maiduguri, including Muhammad Yusuf. The group appeared to dissipate but re-emerged a 
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year later under the leadership of Mallam Abubakar Shekau (Johnson, 2018:182). This was 
marked by an increase in the number of terrorist attacks, beginning with the audacious Bauchi 
prison break on September 2010 which was meant to send a message that Boko Haram had 
become a force to be reckoned with and it was meant to expose Nigeria’s security porousness, 
followed by a car bomb outside the barracks in Abuja in December 2010. The number of 
attacks, nature and fatalities committed by Boko Haram increased exponentially since Mallam 
Abubakar Shekau became the leader of the group because he was more radical than his 
predecessor whom he wanted to avenge his death at the hands of the Nigerian police. Boko 
Haram has become one of the deadliest terrorist organisations, responsible for killing up to 
100,000 people by 2017 and displacing over two million civilians since it was formed. The 
group has staged high profile attacks, such as the 2014 kidnapping of 276 girls in Chibok 
(Tukur, 2017). 
 
Borno state, where Boko Haram originated, is traditionally a Muslim state with 80% of the 
population being Muslims. The major ethnic groups are the Bafur, Shuwa Arabs and Kanuri. 
The Borno state has an infrastructure that is poorly developed with most roads not tarred. 
Electricity supply is restricted to urban areas where government offices are located. Water 
supply is also poor with local authorities failing to maintain boreholes (Johnson, 2018:181). 
Borno state is underdeveloped because of the north-south economic divide which concentrates 
most of the wealth to the south (Iyekekpolo, 2016:2218). The unfair distribution of resources 
has created grievances in Nigeria and  as the greed and grievance theory suggests,  if the needs 
of citizens are not addressed, then they will evolve to become grievances. This seems to be the 
case in Borno state where failure by the Nigerian state to address grievances has led to violence.  
 
The rise of Boko Haram should be understood against the background of the economic, 
political, social and ecological dynamics of the West African region, in particular, the 
marginalisation of the northern region by the Nigerian state. There has been a rise in tensions 
and increased recruitment for Boko Haram due to economic hardships. There is also a need to 
acknowledge the weaponisation of natural resources by armed groups which deprives the local 
population access to a fair share of the scarce resources (Stuart, 2019:182). Boko Haram 
emerged because of multifaceted reasons that were coupled with religious and ethnic tensions. 
Boko Haram’s growth has been driven by the lack of capacity to resolve conflicts peacefully 
by the Nigerian state, marginalisation and not listening to grievances. Many people are left 
with no choice but to join Boko Haram to make their grievances heard (Iyekepolo, 2016:2212). 
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For the marginalised, Boko Haram is becoming more of an ideology and less of an extremist 
religious group. It looks like its leadership has split into different cells, each with its own 
different persuasions and motives. The group has become a franchise in Nigeria, meaning that 
not all terrorist activities that take place are necessarily committed by Boko Haram members 
because it has split into different cells (Nzongola, 2014:21). The question to ask now is why 
does Boko Haram have deep-seated animosity for the West? The answer may well lie in the 
colonial legacy that the Nigerians inherited from the British. This study will proceed to discuss 
the Nigerian colonial legacy.  
 4.2.2 The Nigerian colonial legacy 
 
The Nigerian state is a product of British conquest and colonial ambitions in the 19th and 20th  
centuries.. The British administration amalgamated more than 2000 groups into a single 
national unit, disregarding linguistic, cultural, religious and ethnic boundaries (Johnson, 
2018:180). The British governed Nigeria by using policies that encouraged ethnic 
consciousness and exclusiveness. Precolonial methods of rule were modified to suit colonial 
rule. This carried on  after Nigeran gained independence and created a state where Nigerians 
remain divided along cultural, religious, ethnic and regional fault lines. Vande (2012:38), 
argues that  citizens will concentrate on their dividing fault lines rather than channelling their 
frustrations on how they are being governed.  
 
During colonialism, the British favoured certain religious or ethnic group over other groups in 
their colonies. This meant that post-colonial African governments inherited states that were not 
only religiously and ethnically diverse, but also unequally developed along religious and ethnic 
lines. On a sad note, in Nigeria, like most African states, the Nigerian political elite did not 
dismantle the colonial structures they had inherited from colonial rule after independence. 
Instead the elite, leaders and ruling movements reinforced them to maintain power. The elites 
perfected colonial rule structures into a Machiavellian state craft (Johnson, 2018:17). The 
ruling elite has in some cases deliberately politicised religious differences to entrench their 
power. In the last two decades, terrorist organisations have done the same to garner support. 
Boko Haram has tried to exploit the grievances of the marginalised to create a religious conflict 
by attacking Christian churches. The Chibok kidnapping of schoolgirls was also an attempt to 
create tension and  cause conflict between Christians and Muslims. The girls were forced to 
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convert to Islam, while others  were forced to marry jihadists with a few of them released. The 
rest of the girls have not returned home since they were kidnapped  (Gumede, 2019:23). 
 
Under colonial British rule, three diverse regions emerged. The Hausa-Fulani dominated the 
north, the Igbo dominated the south-east and the Yoruba, the south-west. This formed the fault 
lines which have been the centre of Nigerian politics ever since independence. Geographically, 
the Hausa-Fulani is predominantly Muslim, the Yoruba south-west are mixed between 
Christians and Muslims and the Igbo in the south-east are predominantly Christian. In 2004, 
Nigeria was ranked as the most religious country in the world, with 90% of the population 
believing in God or Allah and affirming a willingness to die for their beliefs. Muslims make 
up to 48.8% of the Nigerian population whilst Christians are 49.3%. The Yoruba have been 
accommodating to other religious and ethnic groups. The Yoruba are first of all Yoruba, then 
Muslim or Christian then Nigerian. Is some families, both Muslims and Christians can be found 
in one family (Johnson, 2018:180). The consequences and the importance of religion in Nigeria 
is strongly felt in the north of the country.   
 
As noted, since independence, Nigerian citizens still rely on religious, ethnic and cultural 
identities to inform their political loyalties. Boko Haram’s actions are informed by their 
religious beliefs and also link to the greed and grievance theory because their grievances have 
not been addressed. These loyalties have led to suspicion, enmity and violent conflicts. Citizens 
become frustrated by political and economic challenges, exacerbated by a state that is 
unresponsive to the needs of its citizens, then citizens would disengage and withdraw from the 
sphere of public discourse. Citizens in a state that is not responsive to its citizens do not get 
involved in politics due to the lack of space for participation, they find other alternative ways 
to express their political desires and goals. When citizen are alienated from mainstream 
politics, there is usually a decline in political engagement which is referred to as civic 
disengagement and leads to anti-politics. The main manifestation of anti-politics is that citizen 
disengage from politics and retreat to private existence (Johnson, 2018:179). Citizens also find 
other means to express their desires and these can be extreme, manifesting in physical revolt 
or even through acts of terrorism.   
 
As noted, the post-colonial Nigerian government did not make attempts to dismantle the state 
system it inherited from the colonial masters but those in power used it for their personal 
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benefits. This study will proceed to discuss how state neglect and corruption have aided 
terrorism in Nigeria.   
4.3 State neglect and corruption in Nigeria  
 
It can be argued that contemporary terrorism in Nigeria is a result of persistent state failure to 
deliver good governance. When those who have been given the authority to govern, steal 
money that is meant to improve the lives of the citizenry, the youth are denied employment, 
health and good education. The youth will then be affected economically, socially and 
psychologically (Awoyemi, 2012). Their everyday lives are then filled with hopelessness, 
frustration, dejection and they can become easy targets for recruiting, indoctrination, co-option 
into illegal activities and can be easily brainwashed (Zumwe, et al., 2013:123). 
 
This study would like to argue that the wave of contemporary terrorism that is affecting Nigeria 
is the ultimate price that the Nigerian society faces for producing a generation of deprived, 
frustrated and disillusioned youths as a result of a dysfunctional and corrupt Nigerian state. 
Abject poverty and underdevelopment can be predominantly benchmarked upon high levels of 
corruption in Nigerian society3 (David, 2013:58). Chukwu & Ngban (2018:84-87); Hope 
(2017:125-128) and Ikoh (2018:576-580), have conceded corruption’s prevalent and almost 
unstoppable dimensions as well as its contagious consequences in Nigeria.  
 
Farouk (2012:4), argues that corruption and terrorism have similar consequences on society 
and the citizenry in that they both kill. However, terrorism kills immediately while corruption 
kills by propagating chronic poverty and committing ethical genocide for future generations. 
Corruption generates absolute poverty, undermines good governance, rule of law, democracy 
and causes insecurity by destroying the capacity of the institutions of the state. If it is 
perpetuated by state employees, it creates social vices and unemployment which is also linked 
to the greed and grievance theory (Ikejiaku, 2009:20).  
 
Correspondingly, terrorism is equally destructive. It creates fear, insecurity and  causes death. 
These are some of the effects that terrorism and corruption have to qualify being labelled 
 
3   Corruption is the abuse of public office for the private benefit of the officeholder or a third party. Political 
 corruption is widely seen as unethical behaviour which contravenes norms of the political order (David, 




as‘monsters’ (Zumwe, et al., 2013:132). The concept ‘monster’ was put in brackets because it 
has become government rhetoric to talk about corruption and terrorism in Nigeria in the same 
breathe but often nothing is done about it (Zumwe, et al., 2013:132). In many cases, those who 
have been appointed to root out corruption and stop terrorism in Nigeria have often been 
accused of corruption themselves and some have been accused of aiding and sponsoring 
terrorism (Farouk, 2012:4).  A classic exhibit of the above statement is the cases of Mike Okillo 
and Tafa Balagun (former Inspector General of the police) who were tasked with stopping 
corruption but were later accused of stealing and laundering over $100 million. They were 
found guilty and sentenced to six months in prison (Ajayi, 2005). 
 
Boko Haram considers corruption to be a Western legacy and value, hence it wants to replace 
the Nigerian state with a Muslim state of Nigeria. As the Boko Haram leader Mohammed Yusuf 
said, “All the government officials who claim they went to Western schools are involved in 
corruption. So Western education is linked to corruption, injustice and inequality.” (Iaccino, 
2016). In this light, Boko Haram opposes anything that is Western and is of the view that 
Western values corrupt Muslims. Boko Haram has linked the level of poverty that exists in the 
north of the country to corruption. In its onset, the group based its operations in the poorest 
locations of Nigeria. It is in these parts where many people are not educated and unemployed, 
making it easier for Boko Haram to recruit and organise. A rallying cry for the group has been 
provided by corruption and poor governance in Nigeria (Zumwe, et al., 2013:132). 
 
It is arguable that it would have been more difficult for Boko Haram to gain supporters if 
Nigeria was more of a functional state. The injustice, lack of employment, corruption and other 
frustrations have made the Boko Haram ideology grow exponentially. The destitute poor 
recruits become foot soldiers for the group because the prospects of finding a job are very slim. 
Furthermore, if one looks at the economic and social conditions of other African countries, it 
does not come as a surprise that those with high levels of corruption and poverty have become 
terrorism hotbeds (Ikelegbe, 2005:223). For instance Niger, Chad, Mali, Somalia and Sudan 
are countries where terrorism is flourishing because there are high levels of radicalisation, 
corruption, poor governance and poverty. Other terrorism hotspots in the world like Pakistan, 
Syria and Yemen are considered to be the most dangerous countries on the planet and are also 




It then becomes quite easy to make the connection. For destitute individuals living from hand 
to mouth, their lives are a series of struggles often ending in anger, despair and resentment. 
These are precarious combinations in the minds of the young who do not see any hope of 
escaping their desperate situations. For terrorist organisations, these young minds can be 
manipulated to pick up arms (Zumwe, et al., 2013:132). By promising a sense of community, 
stoking covert frustrations at poverty, and providing a sense of brotherhood, a recruiter will 
find it easy to convince a recruit to carry arms and be a kidnapper of a suicide bomber (Ikejiaku, 
2009:22). Chronic corruption has been a major contributor to the failure of the Nigerian state 
to perform its constitutional duties. This study will now proceed to discuss how a weak state 
can enable terrorism to flourish. 
4.4 Weak state, failed state and terrorism 
 
According to the traditional Westphalian model, threats to international peace tend to come 
from aggressive states. An unprovoked attack on another state for the purpose of punishment 
or reparation at the expense of another state constitutes an aggressive state (Weber, 2013:38-
39). In the 21st century, threats are equally more likely to come from non-state actors, weak 
states or failed states.4 This study would like to argue that the absence of effective governance 
and quality institutions creates suitable settings for the emergence of armed conflict. To begin 
with, state institutions are created to serve the general public and they are expected to be 
proficient, impartial and non-discriminatory in implementing state policies. Citizens need to 
know that they can trust their government and that the state is legitimate for them to support 
and cooperate with the ruling government (Taydas, et al., 2010:198). Poor governance in the 
form of weak courts, corruption and inefficient administration makes  citizens lose confidence 
in the political system of the state. A gap is then created between the citizens and state 
institutions. This gap will generate dissatisfaction, grievances, and distrust with the political 
system. If the legitimacy gap continues to increase, the risk of a domestic conflict can increase 
and social tensions between different ethnic groups can worsen (Shock, 1996:107). 
 
 
4  A weak state refers to a situation where the government is unable to control public order in its territory, 
 is unable to effectively control its borders, cannot maintain its public institutions. State failure refers to  
  the government that (if one exists) absolutely has no control over its territory. It cannot provide or 




Secondly, weak state institutions can contribute to the opportunity for terrorism and rebellion. 
State weakness is revealed if a state is not able to perform its duties and control its citizens as 
it has been the case in Nigeria. Citizens become frustrated as the frustration-aggression 
mechanism argues. Under such conditions, rebellion and terrorism become possible. On the 
other hand, as argued by the opportunity theory, if the legitimacy of the state improves, then 
the cost of labour and recruitment go up for rebels. The promises made by terrorist groups will 
become unattractive and less credible hence recruiting new members will become a difficult 
task (Taydas, et al., 2010:199).  
 
State weakness also has another important component in the form of globalisation. 
Globalisation has facilitated neoliberal economic forces to weaken state capacity as well as 
weakening its capacity to provide public goods to the public. The privatisation of violence has 
accompanied state failure. It does not come as a surprise that Nigeria is facing a challenge in 
stopping the trafficking of arms through its porous borders that end up creating instabilities. 
The impact of Boko Haram has led to the forced movement of people across borders with 
insurgents spreading across neighbouring borders causing instability in the region. Newman 
(2007:466), argues that Nigeria has a war economy. Goods smuggling, drug trafficking and 
people smuggling are common criminal activities in a war economy; that is criminal activities 
and networks prosper in states that cannot effectively control their population.. 
 
The Nigerian weak state has resulted in religious and ethnic violence, the spread of weapons, 
humanitarian disasters, forced migration and suppressed nationalism. In this globalised world, 
state weakness in the Nigerian context does not only pose a threat to its population, but also to 
its neighbours. The Nigerian state has failed to provide basic services to most of its citizens 
which connects directly to the relative deprivation theory. Nigerian citizens have resigned to 
providing basic services such as water for themselves. Because of the high violent crime rate, 
there is big insecurity in property and lives. Residents and neighbourhoods sometimes provide 
their own security or resort to hiring ethnic militias to provide protection. Those tasked with 
running state institutions have benefited from the inefficient Nigerian state (Uadiale, 
2012:93).   This study will proceed now to discuss the role played by political elites in aiding 





4.5 A connection between elite competition and terrorism   
 
Elites are a small group of a privileged and cohesive groups of people found within ethnic 
groups who often play an important role in ethnic mobilisation (Iyekekpolo, 2018:6). Elites 
can also be found in important sectors of the state and society such as the bureaucratic elite, 
the military elite and the economic elite. Political elites are a group of people, political parties, 
corporations and civil society who hold power, control and organise government and all the 
manifestations of political power (Vergara, 2013:31-32). This study will use the terms ‘elite’ 
and ‘elites’ to refer to political, military and economic elites. Elites aspire for political control. 
In Nigeria, elites have perfected the art of the ethnic game for a society that has high levels of 
poverty, inequality, and various ethnic groups, it has been very easy for the elites to exploit 
Nigerian society (Uadiale, 2012:88). The problem with Nigeria lies in how religion and 
ethnicity are used as a powerful instruments in politics and how politics is manipulated to serve 
the selfish interests of the ruling elite. 
 
The political behaviour exhibited by Nigerian elites draws its values from the colonial legacy 
whose political culture was rooted in political totalitarianism. After independence, the Nigerian  
elites were not interested in creating institutions that would enhance democratic principles but 
were focused on fostering the paraphernalia of liberal democracy such as the separation of 
powers, multi-parties, rule of law, independence of the legislature and a written constitution. 
These institutions were not modified to consolidate democracy but were altered for personal 
gains by the elite. This misapplication of democratic values enthused the struggle for power, 
supremacy, conflict of interest and prestige among the Nigerian elites (Ladan-Baki & Enwere, 
2017:1). These power struggles have resulted in a situation where the state is busy fighting 
political battles and has neglected its constitutional duty of providing basic services to its 
citizens. Unfulfilled expectations have become frustrations which connects to the frustration-
aggression mechanism where frustration can lead to aggression. This helps to explain why 
Boko Haram and other Nigerian terrorists such as the Northern Arewa Groups, Oodua People’s 
Congress (OPC) and the Movement For The Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) 
 may have resorted to violence as a channel of expressing their grievances (Alao, 2013:138).   
 
The present Nigerian elites have developed a predatory and aristocratic outlook of their 
functions and position. This is primarily to loot the treasury and to be served, not to serve. 
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When they are not busy looting the state, elites also manipulate, construct, arm, fund, control 
and recruit militia movements (Iyekekpolo, 2018:6). The ruling bourgeoisie is not united but 
divided along sectarian lines. This has resulted in state power being vulnerable to neo-
patrimonialism and prebendalism.5 Militia movements are formed to intimidate political rivals. 
There are many linkages between the elite and armed groups. Political elites have managed to 
manipulate and mobilise youths who are unemployed. In the Niger-Delta, the increase in 
militant activities can be traced to elite power struggles. It can be argued that this linkage 
between armed groups and the elites produced the phenomenon of Boko Haram (Alao, 
2013:138). This phenomenon is a result of mobilisation and manipulation by the elite as well 
as class opportunistic competition. The elites have mobilised youth to kill non-Muslims in the 
north and to overthrow the ruling elite (Mbah, et al., 2017:177). The youth have channelled 
their frustration and anger into the Boko Haram insurgency which feeds into the frustration-
aggression mechanism. The aforementioned ‘monsters’ created by the elites have become loose 
cannons, not only haunting the northern region but Nigeria and the neighbouring countries as 
well. Uadiale, (2012:88), argues that Boko Haram has close connections to Nigerian state 
governors and that they are directly funded by the state to sustain their activities. Boko Haram 
is not a secret society because they teach openly in their mosques and are well known by 
government officials who use them as pawns in pursuit of power.   
 
At post-independence Nigeria, the elites structured and consolidated power in a way that 
promoted a zero-sum game in politics. Powers struggles between elites soon mutated to warfare 
with some elites using armed gangs to accumulate and retain power. It politicised and deepened 
divisiveness, leading to elite struggles to adopt religious, ethnic, regional moulds which 
personalised power. Unfortunately, the end product of this divisiveness was violence, which 
became a tool used for appropriating and perpetuating power from other groups. This form of 
elite competition turned the Nigerian state into a predatory and marauding force. In this light, 
state agents became suppressive, brutal, repressive and abusive against their citizens, activists, 
opposition and protesters (Uadiale, 2012:82). With the government losing support due to 
corruption, economic decline and ineffective governance, the government turned to state 
violence to repress resistance, challenges and dissent. The legislature and the executive have 
been divided along religious, ethnic and regional lines in the battle for supremacy, constituting 
 
5   Prebendalism is characterised by a high level of personalised rule in which resources are extracted and 
 redistributed along patrimonial, religious, ethnic and religious lines in order to consolidate power and 
 ensure regime survival (Iyekekpolo, 2018:6). 
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a hindrance in the advancement of democratic values and practice (Ladan-Baki &Enwere, 
2017:2017:9). 
 
From the above, this study argues that this competition amongst the elites has contributed to 
terrorism, armed violence and conflict in Nigeria. The exclusion of new aspirants and the 
monopolisation of political power has produced a syndrome of insufficiency of elite 
competition, with connotations for stability, development, and democracy (Agara, 2007:44). 
The struggle for those who aspire to be elite and elite competition feeds into the wider dissolute 
societal deprivation, alienation, and marginalisation. This has encouraged the mobilisation of 
religious, ethnic, and regional sentiments through manipulation, propaganda, mobilisation to 
formulate the right conditions for the rise of groups like Boko Haram. In Nigeria, the struggle 
for elite power has necessitated the manipulation of religious beliefs for both Muslims and 
Christians. The elites have used religion to gain political influence and legitimacy (Bribena, 
2019:58). It can be argued that the behaviour of the elite is driven by greed which gives birth 
to grievances. The problems that Nigeria has are likely to be exacerbated by the recent 
coronavirus pandemic which has affected the entire globe in 2020 This study will now briefly 
discuss the impact of coronavirus on terrorism in Nigeria.  
4.6 The impact of the coronavirus on terrorism in Nigeria    
 
As the entire globe is focusing on flattening the coronavirus pandemic, Boko Haram and ISIS 
have stepped up their terrorist activities across the region and beyond ISIS has gained territory 
in Mozambique as it continues to expand with its Islamist extremists taking over an important 
port on March 24, 2020). Nigeria, along with Chad, and Niger have been warned by security 
experts to remain on high alert as terrorists are likely to take advantage of the coronavirus 
pandemic to gain territory and launch attacks. Hukwueloke & Oghuvbu (2020:40), argue that 
West African outstretched resources earmarked for humanitarian supplies, health and security 
have been diverted to flatten the coronavirus curve. This leaves the other departments such as 
security underfunded, this may be the opportunity that terrorist groups have been waiting for.  
 
Terrorist groups everywhere have proven to be opportunistic, adept at taking advantage of the 
confusion caused by the coronavirus pandemic to advance their ideological ambitions as it has 
been the case in Nigeria. Ideologically, there are two ways that terrorist groups can take 
advantage of to exploit the current coronavirus situation. If the coronavirus pandemic manages 
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to spread to Muslim communities (of which it has), then terrorist groups like Boko Haram and 
others who operate in Nigeria may make use of conspiracy theories on the origins of the virus, 
blame the Zionists, Jews and the West of whom they are often labelled as ‘enemies of Islam.’ 
On the other hand, if the virus does not manage to spread into Muslim areas, especially those 
controlled by terrorist groups, terrorists will frame is as divine punishment for those areas that 
were affected by the coronavirus. Either way, terrorist groups have an advantage as they will 
use the coronavirus outbreak to further radicalise their followers, recruit and justify their 
narratives of enmity, division and hate (Campbell, 2020). 
 
Operationally, it is arguable that Boko Haram and other terror groups operating in Nigeria  such 
as OPC, MEND will try to capitalise on the coronavirus to wreak more deadly attacks with the 
Nigerian state already vulnerable to terrorist attacks and struggling to contain terrorist groups 
in its country. The Abubakar led Boko Haram group killed 92 soldiers from Chad in the Lake 
Chad area and also killed 47 Nigerian soldiers in the north of the country on 24 March 2020 
and has continued to commit more deadly attacks. To further complicate the already volatile 
situation, the deployment of 250 additional British troops will be delayed due to the 
coronavirus pandemic (Bukarti &Crone, 2020).   
4.7 Conclusion 
 
Generally in Africa, there is a tendency for elites to use any means to capture state power, 
monopolise it to serve their personal interests. In this process, the masses are excluded from 
enjoying the benefits of the state as the elites will use or threaten violence on their opponents.  
The Nigerian political process undermines the development of democracy through the struggle 
for power. The emergence of Boko Haram can befittingly be placed within the context, 
character, nature of post-independent Nigeria. In other words, as the study has noted, Boko 
Haram is simply being used as pawns in the hands of the elite. Boko Haram finds it easy to 
plan, coordinate and execute its goals because it is funded by the elites who mobilise armed 
groups to gain and consolidate power. Corruption and the weakness of the Nigerian state which 
was inherited from colonialism, perfected by the ruling elite for predatory purposes leaves 
unemployed youths no choice but to join Boko Haram and other armed groups.  
 
The factors that have contributed to the rise of terrorism in Nigeria include poverty, 
marginalisation, exclusion, corruption, disillusionment, disenchantment, indignation, poor 
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governance and discontentment. But, alienation, elite competition and state failure have acted 
together and formulated the contemporary phenomenon called Boko Haram. After the death of 
President Yar’ Adula, Boko Haram emerged as an instrument to take back the presidency by 
the northern elites. The intensity of the attacks by Boko Haram increased after Goodluck 
Jonathan, a southerner and a Christian assumed the presidency in 2010.  
 
This chapter introduced the study, gave a detailed analysis on the Nigerian context, examined 
the emergency of Boko Haram, discussed the Nigerian colonial legacy, analysed state neglect 
and corruption in Nigeria, analysed the relationship between weak state, failed state and 
terrorism, discussed the connection between elite competition and terrorism. This study 
discussed the impact of coronavirus on terrorism in Nigeria before concluding the chapter. This 
























CHAPTER FIVE: TRACING THE ROOT CAUSES OF TERRORISM IN MALI 
5.1 Introduction 
 
In the previous chapter, a detailed analysis on the Nigerian context was provided before 
examining the emergence of Boko Haram in that country. It discussed the Nigerian colonial 
legacy and analysed state neglect and corruption in Nigeria as well as the relationship between 
weak governance and terrorism and between elite competition and terrorism. The study ended 
the chapter by discussing the impact of the coronavirus on terrorism. Chapter Five traces the 
root cause of terrorism in Mali by examine how weak state institutions and poor governance 
have aided the development of terrorism in Mali. It is important to trace the source of 
contemporary terrorism in Mali so that leaders can take appropriate actions to address 
contemporary challenges facing the Malian state. The weak Malian state did not manifest after 
independence but has a history of colonial conquest which is a source of contemporary Malian 
problems.     
 
Since the Cold War ended, the West has hailed Mali as a geographical barrier against radical 
Islam in Africa through its borders shared with Algeria and Mauritania (Soares, 2006:78). Mali 
was regarded as a ‘poster child’ for tolerance, secularism and good governance (Soares, 
2006:78; Solomon, 2015:67). However, after the 2012 coup, Mali has been described as a 
‘second Somalia’ or a ‘second Afghanistan’ by Ahmedou Ould-Abdallah, the former United 
Nations (UN) envoy. The Malian government is facing repeated attacks in the north from 
AQIM and other Islamists who are fuelled by drug trafficking and kidnapping Westerners. 
Northern Mali was turned into a magnet of Islamists in 2012 hosting Islamists from Nigeria, 
Algeria and Mauritania.  Islamists hijacked the 2012 rebellion to  destabilise the region.  15 
UN troops were killed in UN camps in Kidal in 2016 after being ambushed by Islamism groups.  
 The UN envoy argued that Mali was top of the list compared to the crisis being experienced 
in Syria (Ham, 2012). How, then, did the ‘poster child’ of tolerance, good governance, and 
secularism as well as being the geographical barrier to radical Islam, suddenly resemble 
Afghanistan? It is important to trace how Mali became a terrorist enclave within a short space 
of time. Three interrelated factors need to be understood if this study is to trace the origins of 
terrorism in Mali as previously noted in Chapter One. These factors are the Tuareg’s 
nationalism, an increase in radical Islam and the nature of the post-independence Malian state. 
These three factors will be unpacked after the following background has set the scene to the 
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Malian conflict. This study will then move on to analyse how Malian borders are managed, as 
well as the role of governance in Mali. The impact of coronavirus on terrorism in Mali will be 
unpacked before concluding the chapter.  
5.2 Background to the 2012 Mali conflict 
 
On March 2012, captain Amadou Sanogo of the Malian army staged a coup against the 
incumbent Malian President Amadou Toumani Toure. His reasons were that the incumbent did 
not fully equip the Malian army with new and sufficient weapons to suppress the Tuareg 
rebellion. Little did he know that the power vacuum created by the coup would aid the Tuareg 
Azawad National Liberation Movement (MNLA) to seize control of Kidal, Gao, major towns 
of Timbuktu and northern Mali (Solomon, 2013:12; Solomon, 2015:67). Iyad Ag Ghaly’s 
Ansar Dine and Al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) soon replaced the secular (MNLA). 
Many Western states and the captain were left surprised by these developments because Mali 
is known to practice a moderate and tolerate Islam but radical terrorist groups seemed to have 
quickly gained support that threaten the secular modern Malian state.  
 
It can be argued that West’s perception that Mali was a poster child of good governance was a 
façade. This study would like to argue that widespread corruption, weak state capacity, 
incompetence, catastrophic weakness of the military and institutional dysfunctions are all 
predicaments that led to the 2012 Malian crisis. The prevailing similarities under the regime of 
Oumar Konare (1992-2002) to the regime of Amadou Toumani Toure (2002-2012, with those 
encountered by donors and the contemporary Mali regime are not accidental (Lecocq & Mann, 
2012). Longstanding dysfunctions before and after 2012, stem from deeper and structural 
problems that are not so much related to how Mali is governed but more to the weakness of the 
Malian state which have for decades gone unaddressed. Since its inception from colonialism 
in 1960, the Malian state has been deficient in its empirical existence and there have been 
unsuccessful attempts to reconstruct it. The developments that happened inside Mali and in its 
neighbours after 1990 made the deficits of the Malian statehood more salient, but these 
deficiencies predated these developments and might casually be related to them (Craven-
Matthews & Englebert, 2018:9).  
 
Most of the contemporary problems that Mali faces started at independence with Modibo Keita, 
the country’s first president (1960–1968), who is still admired by the Malian intelligentsia.(He 
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made efforts to rebuild Mali’s economy by moving his country economically and ideologically 
towards China and the Soviet Union). Keita overburdened his embryonic state with unrealistic 
and socialist-oriented policies that were centred on nation-building. He adopted a command 
economy, phasing out chieftaincy, created cooperatives, nationalised banks and closed French 
military bases in pursuit of absolute sovereignty in 1961. His ambitious plans failed, and it cost 
Mali dearly with inflation spiralling out of control and the Malian franc losing its value. The 
closing down of French military bases led to the emergence of the Tuareg rebellion in 1963 
and 1964 which Keita put down but valuable scarce state resources were spent and seeds of 
grievances were sowed at that time which exist even  today  (Dickovick & Wunsch, 2014:33-
36). 
 
Keita was overthrown by President Moussa Traore in 1968 who tried to implement some of 
Keita’s failed socialists policies. Traore’s regime was outstretched, authoritarian, corrupt and 
remained mired in crises. The current problems of corruption that still haunt Mali are not 
merely an outcome of democratisation but emanated from the 1970s. The Traore and Keita 
regimes failed to secure Malian borders. Mali experienced insurgences from 1963, 1990, 2006 
and 2012. It had successful coups in 1968, 1991 and 1991(with the  recent coup in 2020) and 
many unsuccessful coups (Craven-Matthews & Englebert, 2018:11). All these insurgencies 
and coups greatly undermined state-building and economic development.  
 
On the positive side, however, the Konare regime (1992-2002), seemed to improve governance 
and human development. There was an increase in primary school enrolment and the child 
mortality rate was reduced to under a 100 per thousand people from 230 (Craven-Matthews & 
Englebert, 2018:11). Positive improvements under the leadership of Kanare  did not represent 
an improvement in state-building capacity. The improvement in school enrolment and health 
were a reflection of donor funding not an improvement in the Malian state capacity and this 
provoked more grievances than it actually provided opportunities. Attempts to step out 
corruption were not maintained  as the Kanare regime relied on patronage to survive. Mali was 
in its worst shape ever by the end of the Kanare regime in 2012 (Sangaré & McSparren, 
2018:2). Failure to improve the lives of its citizens led to grievances which the Bamako 
government has failed to address since independence, which then leads this study to the next 
topic on Tuareg nationalism.  




The Malian history has long been marked by the failure to address the demands and grievances 
for independence and greater autonomy by northern nomads and small-scale farmers such as 
the Peul, the Tuareg and the Songhai (ICG, 2015:14). The call for a separate homeland for the 
Tuaregs is not new as they identify northern Mali as Azawad. The call for a separate state dates 
back to the 15th century when the Songhai empire encroached into their territory and dislodged 
them. The contemporary wave of Tuareg nationalism can be traced to the 19th century when 
the French colonialists incorporated the ethnic Tuaregs into the Malian state and the continued 
isolation of the Tuaregs after the Malian state achieved independence in 1960. The Tuareg 
resistance started from 1893 until 1917. The  Tuaregs surrendered to French colonialists due 
to numerous bloody defeats (Chauzal &Van Damme, 2015:30-31).  
 
Northern Mali has been a battleground for rebellion by the ethnic Tuaregs, a nomadic 
pastoralist ethnic group found in Burkina Faso, Niger, Algeria, Libya and Mali. Despite being 
repressed by the government, they have armed insurgencies against the Malian government 
(Bere, 2017:62). The Malian Tuareg did not like being separated from other Tuareg in Algeria, 
Mauritania, Niger, Libya and Burkina Faso. In this light, the Malian Tuaregs consider 
themselves to be Arabs, not African and they consider themselves superior to blacks whom 
they perceive as people who are only good to be slaves (Solomon, 2015:68). In the south, 
blacks also have negative stereotypes about the Tuaregs as they consider them to be lazy 
nomads. The north-south divide is influenced by these stereotypes. The Tuaregs feel 
marginalised but their sense of marginalisation is based on a simple reality: pastoral nomadism 
does not equip one with the necessary skills to partake in the modern economy (Solomon, 
2015:68; Moseley, 2013:15). The north and south populations have always had a distrustful 
relationship dating back centuries. These resentments were further exacerbated by the French 
occupation. This is similar to the British’ divide and rule colonial policy in Nigeria which 
created ethnic and religious resentment among various Nigerian ethnic and religious groups. 
The north of the country has been politically, socially and economically marginalised. This 
marginalisation has led to higher levels of poverty and unemployment in the north compared 
to the South. It is not surprising that the Tuaregs have rebelled four times since independence 
from colonial France: 1963-1954, 1990-1996, 2006-2009 and in 2012 (Bøås &Torheim, 
2013:12790). The frustration-aggression mechanism assumes that frustration is induced by 
inequality which will lead to aggression. Many young Tuaregs left Mali in search of work in 
neighbouring countries with many being recruited into Muammar Qadhafi’s military forces. 
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Some fought in Afghanistan, Palestine and Lebanon acquiring not only valuable combat skills 
but were exposed to Islamist extremism (Solomon, 2013:13).  
 
The Arab Spring protests happened in 2011, as the global world watched the long-time 
Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak and Tunisian President Zine el-Ben Ali being forced out of 
power by popular pressure. But the fall of the Libyan leader Colonel Muammar Gaddafi had 
dire consequences for the Sahel region. The Colonel had a vision for a united Africa hence he 
was involved in many developmental and infrastructure projects across the African continent. 
The Colonel also personally mediated in many African conflicts, at most times confounding or 
prolonging them (Hicks, 2018:114). Colonel Gaddafi had employed many Tuareg rebels 
including the MNLA’s future leader, Mohamed ag Najem, who stayed loyal to him until the 
last days of his rule. When it was obvious that the Colonel’s days in office were numbered, the 
Tuaregs fled to northern Mali seizing large ammunition from the Libyan stockpile. Not 
surprisingly, the birth of the Tuareg Azawad National Liberation Movement (MNLA) was 
announced in October 2011, just a few days before the Colonel was killed (Anders, 2015:17). 
Within months, the MNLA had taken over northern Mali towns of Niafunke, Menake, Tessalit 
and Anderamboukane, defeating the Malian army and forcing thousands of civilians to flee to 
neighbouring Niger, Mauritania and Burkina Faso (Anders, 2015:17). 
 
There was brief cooperation between AQIM and MNLA but things changed when Ansar al-
Din entered the equation, formed by then secular Iyad ag Ghali in the early 1990s, a veteran 
Tuareg rebel in 2012. He, however, began to learn Salafi doctrines in the late 1990s which he 
tried to impose on MNLA during its early days of taking over northern Mali. When his 
doctrines were rejected, he created Ansar al-Din in revenge and pledged alliance to AQIM. 
MNLA was forced to retreat to around Kidal, whilst AQIM and Ansar al-Din were largely in 
Timbuktu. By January 2013, AQIM and Ansar al-Din had reached central Mali, forcing the 
French to intervene (Hicks, 2018:114). While conquering territory, they killed non-Muslims, 
imposed a strict form of Sharia law and imposed Salafi Islam on the territories they held. In 
the next section, this study will discuss the increase of radical Islam as a second factor in tracing 






5.2.3 The rise of radical Islam in Mali  
 
In understanding the contemporary terrorism situation in Mali, the rise of radical Islam is the 
second key factor. For over two thousand years, the tolerant Sufi Islam has been practiced in 
Mali but in recent decades it has been threatened by radical Islam. Radical preachers from 
Saudi Arabia (Wahhabis) and Pakistan (Dawa Al-Tabligh) have had a big influence on the 
Malian population by sending young Malians to Saudi Arabia and Pakistan for theological 
education. They have also been involved in community projects and have built mosques and 
madrassas in Mali. Their aim has been to transform Mali into a fundamentalist theocracy 
(Solomon, 2013:13). The type of traditional tolerant Islam practiced in Mali is often associated 
with Malikite Islam. Sufi teachings have a heavy influence on Malian Islam. Malikite Islam is 
also influenced by animist practices which pre-date Islam’ s arrival in Mali. Blacksmiths, griots 
(historian or storyteller) and hunters have always played an important traditional role in Malian 
society. These traditional roles have helped to shape a distinct form of Islam in Mali, which 
regularly includes syncretic practices (an attempt to reconcile different religious practices) 
(Hicks, 2018:120). 
 
The rise of Islamism in Mali facilitated groups with similar ties to have closer ties with others 
in the region. The relationship between Algerian-based Salafist Group for Preaching and 
Combat (GSPC) and AQIM is not only religious but commercial. These groups engage in 
organised crime, drug trafficking and kidnapping of foreigners. Depressed northern residents 
have benefited from the GSPC’s activities by being paid cash to move cocaine through its 
villages. The rise of radical Islam means that moderate Islamic leaders have lost credibility. 
Islamists have offered suffering Malian citizens their own brand of liberation theology which 
has resonated with the suffering millions in northern Mali. This connects to the greed and 
grievance theory which argues that if people’s grievances are not addressed then these 
grievancs may motivate terrorism. This leads us to the third factor of insecurity in Mali: the 
nature of the post-independence Malian state (Kone, 2012:8). 
5.2.4 The post-independent Malian state 
 
As noted in Chapter One, the effects of colonialism have shaped and still continue to affect 
present and future generations of Africans (Zeleza, 2017:2). Like Kenya, the contemporary 
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Malian state is a by-product of colonialism,   characterised by weak governance and weak state 
institutions. Since gaining independence in 1960 until the pro-democracy coup of 1991, Mali 
was a single-party state which subscribed to African socialist models under the leadership of 
Lieutenant Moussa Traore. This regime combined crony capitalism, benign neglect and 
marginalisation of the Tuaregs. Its kleptocratic behaviour led to widespread poverty and 
unemployment. This led the military to stage a coup in March 1991 and arrested the ‘life 
president’ Traore. In 1992, Mali held its first democratic multi-party elections. However the 
economic situation of ordinary Malians did not improve as the ongoing conflict in the north 
and the frequent resignations of Prime Ministers undermined the legitimacy of the 
democratically elected government (Harmon, 2014:72). Mali continued to hold democratic 
elections that were hailed by the West and the international community but state institutions 
were not consolidated. The state continued to neglect the north of the country which has led to 
radical Islam to increase. With the Malian state failing to improve the lives of its citizens and 
address their grievances, this has causes terrorist activities to increase.   
 
The relative deprivation theory best explain why there was an increase of terrorism in Mali. 
Given that in  2010, Mali produced 52.4 tonnes of gold, making it the third-largest producer 
after South Africa and Ghana. Before 2012, Mali attracted significant donor support from 
Europe which totalled $5.6 billion and its economic growth was 5.8% compared to its estimated 
16 million population by 2010. Despite these impressive figures of donor support and economic 
growth, the standards of living for ordinary Malians continued to drop since the 1990s. The 
Malian government policies favoured the elite at the expense of the poor as it is the case with 
Nigeria (Van de Walle, 2012:12). 
 
The institutionalisation of corruption under the Toure government (2002-2012) further 
exacerbated the situation in Mali. On the military side, recruitment was not based on the levels 
of qualifications that one possessed but it required one to have a relative who has a high rank 
in the military (Sow, 2018:5). This does not come as a surprise why the Malian military 
crumbled so fast when faced by the Tuareg attack in 2012. It is not clear if the same type of 
recruitment is still being used in the Malian military. The Malian poor state of its military was 
once again exposed in 2013 when they retreated instead of fighting the Islamist forces who 




Solomon (2015:68), argues that there is evidence of high-ranking government officials dealing 
in drugs that came from South America to Gao and then they are transported to Europe. One 
egregious example of corruption under the leadership of Traore was when $4 million meant 
for Global Fund to Fight AIDS was stolen.. As noted, the Toure regime continued to alienate 
the northern Tuaregs, most of whom were poverty-stricken by not fulfilling the promises made 
after the end of the 1990s Tuareg rebellion, instead of using donor funded money to develop 
the north, he instead used it to co-opt political elites in the north. Under the Traore regime, civil 
servants took bribes from issuing official documents. Positions in the national police, military 
schools, customs and tax offices were sold to candidates leaving the majority of Malian 
disillusioned. These selfish acts by Malian officials fit into the greed and grievance theory 
which asserts that greed is the desire to own wealth and possessions which leave other people 
without resources. Greed will generate grievances from those who do not have resources. If 
grievances are not addressed they may evolve and become terrorist acts (Harmon, 2014:86). 
 
Malians were further divided by the ‘consensus style’ of president Toure. Friends, relatives 
and people from his own ethnic group were appointed to senior government positions. This 
made Malians ethnically conscious: Maure, Fulani, Bozo, Tuareg and Songhai. Cohesion in 
the military was undermined by the politics of co-option. Senior military officers were co-opted 
into senior civil service positions while lower ranting officers were starved of funding. This 
would later lead to junior army officers staging a coup in March 2012 (Kisangani, 2012:72; 
Sow, 2018:7).  
 
As the Toure regime became more corrupt, autocratic and uncaring, Islamists took advantage 
of the political gap and filled it with a rhetoric of social justice and criticised secularism. 
Islamists built clinics, schools and engaged in charity work providing food which contrasted 
the incumbent government of Toure. While there were many sources of insecurity that had 
intensified over the years, a spark was needed to engulf the West African region into conflict 
and the spark was Libya. As the one French diplomat noted that those who decided to bomb 
Libya did not have a slight clue what consequences it would have on the region (Ham, 2012). 
Qadhafi had supported the Tuareg cause for decades with many Tuareg occupying senior 
positions in the Libyan military. The removal of the Qadhafi forced the Tuaregs to go back to 
northern Mali to face broken previous peace initiatives promises. They joined MNLA and 
launched an attack on government forces in January 2012 (Solomon, 2013:15). Poor 
governance has greatly affected the Malian government’s capacity to respond to secessionist 
85 
 
and terrorist attacks. The Malian army was unable to defend its territorial integrity. Terrorists, 
hunting groups, ethnic militias and armed Islamic groups have destabilised Mali since 2012. 
France and the US have deployed soldiers into Mali to help fight terrorism. Under the 
leadership of President Ibrahim Boubacar Keita, corruption, election rigging and attacks on 
protestors continued until he was deposed by the military in 18 August 2020. The military 
appointed  Bah N’Daou as the acting president until the 2022 elections. (Maclean & Peltier, 
2020). This study will proceed to discuss the Malian borders.  
5.3 The Malian borders 
 
The Sahel region stretches from Mauritania to Sudan in the east. For centuries, this area has 
been used to facilitate trade. Currently, people still use the same routes to transport goods,  
drugs, smuggle weapons and human trafficking. This has caused lawlessness in the Sahelian 
countries with many countries failing to police their borders.  Tull (2019: 406-408), goes so far 
as to suggest that, in many Sahelian countries, borders are “just a line in the sand” (Tull, 
2019:406-408). Most of the border crossings are in the featureless and inhospitable desert. 
There is a vast distance to be covered in the Sahelian borders. For example, Mali shares 7 243 
km of land boundaries with seven bordering countries. It shares a 1376 km border with Algeria, 
a 821 km border with Niger, a 1000 km border with Burkina Faso and a 1196 km border with 
Chad (Hicks, 2018:109). The vast distatnce of these borders means that it is not possible for 
Mali to have enough resources to polices their borders, hence terrorist and other groups are 
able to go about their business uninterrupted.  
 
The Malian army has about 6 000 soldiers and it lacks the means to train and deploy an effective 
border force. Trafficking of goods has carried on unhindered or undetected by the weak border 
and police agencies. This would help in explaining how a large number of Tuaregs crossed the 
border from Libya in 2011 with large caches of ammunition. Once the ungoverned parts of 
Mali and the Sahel were taken over by armed groups, there is very little that any weak and 
cash-strapped states in the Sahel region could do about it. For example, in 2012, the MNLA 
captured large parts of northern Mali when the Malian army was busy squabbling in the 
barracks and in some cases the Malian army simply ran away (Hicks, 2018:122-123). 
 
It is of great importance to underline that cigarette smugglers, people smugglers, tribal rebels, 
violent jihadists and drug traffickers who have operated in the Sahel regions are not the same 
86 
 
but different. These groups are interconnected and have managed to create well-developed 
networks as they have been able to use the traditional trade system over the years due to the 
lack of effective state control (Gberie, 2015:6). Rebels, jihadists and drug traffickers are known 
to work together to achieve their goals. For example, AQIM demanded protection money for 
the safe passage of drugs through its territory in Mali from Al- Mua’ qi’oon an AQIM offshoot, 
which later on merged with the Movement of Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) to 
form Al-Mourabitoun, known for illicit cigarette smuggling. These above groups are known to 
be radical Islamists.  Radical Islam ideology has taken over the traditional Sufi religion in Mali. 
A few years ago this would have been unthinkable because radical Islam was not only rejected 
universally but it was despised (Lebovich, 2013:5). This study would like to pause and ask a 
question: why would the local population, especially the local leaders, prefer religious rule 
from rebels and foreigners instead of life under the Bamako government? To answer this 
question, this study will turn its attention to the role of governance and poor governance in 
Mali.  
5.4 The role of governance and poor governance in Mali  
   
It is argued that governance or the lack of it has facilitated the rise of radical Islam in the Sahel 
region. To answer the question that the study has posed, it is important to acknowledge two 
distinct areas. Firstly, there is a question of how genuine armed groups have been able to 
establish political authority in the ungoverned parts of the Sahel due to poor governance. The 
second question to consider is the extent to which weak state institution has failed to give 
ordinary citizens health services, quality education, a sense of citizenship or a promise of 
employment. In Mali, as  is the case in Chad and Niger (the latter to be discussed in the next 
Chapter), many communities feel excluded from the economic and political dialogue with 
elections often a sham. There is a deep belief that those who hold official positions look after 
their own ethnic tribes and family at the expense of the masses (Harmon, 2014:76). 
 
Mali continued to hold elections since 1991 regularly, busily holding campaign rallies in 
remote areas and hoisting billboards. However, these democratic elections are not what they 
seemed. Losers would cry foul and local media would report that certain individuals were paid 
to vote for certain candidates. Voter turnout has been generally low in Malian elections 
averaging about 40% since 1991, even though these elections would be endorsed by 
international observers. Most citizens would vote along tribal loyalties. In this light, the Malian 
87 
 
experience proves that holding regular democratic elections does not consolidate democracy. 
It instead leads to what democratic theorists refer to as ‘the fallacy of electoralism’ (Morse, 
2012:164-166). The greed and grievance theory argues that if individuals are not included in 
political decision making, it can lead to grievances. These grievances have been expressed in 
the form of terrorism in Mali.  
 
As noted the police, army and intelligence services were neglected but the neglect on health 
and schools was acute. Mali scores poorly on the UN Human Development Report. The adult 
literacy rate is 33%, with half of the youth not enrolled in school. Life expectancy is under 58 
years with the under-five years mortality rate at 122 per 1000 live births (UNDP, 2015). 
Northern Mali is the least developed region of the country. Paved roads do not exist in Kidal 
to Gao and outside of Timbuktu. Most homes in this region are constructed from mud and 
concrete and very few fields are irrigated states (Hicks, 2018:122-125). Clinics and schools are 
sparsely distributed. It is often argued that ‘The National Pact’ was the best chance for the north 
to achieve economic development because it promised inclusive development and the 
integration of rebels into the national army. However, the pact was not given the necessary 
funding. Many have cited the failure of ‘The National Pact” as the root cause of Tuareg 
rebellion in the 2000s. The Toure regime adopted a ‘hands-off’ policy in the north of Mali but 
instead relied on the cooperation of regional elites. It is not surprising that these conditions 
have incubated the root causes of instability and terrorism in Mali and other Western African 
member states (Hicks, 2018:122-125). 
 
AQIM continues to focus its terrorist activities on France in West Africa. It has proven what it 
is capable of by the audacity and scale of the Ivory Coast, Bamako and Ouagadougou attacks. 
Militancy has spread in Mali reaching the central and southern parts of the country after the 
French operation Barkhane in 2014. New groups have emerged, such as Macina Liberation 
Front under the leadership of Amadou Kouffa who has claimed responsibility for attacks in 
southern Mali. The Malian government has not made any serious efforts to address the Tuareg 
grievances or to offer them some form of self-government (Gberie, 2015:7). 
 
There has been progress made in Mali to restore some order, such as the peaceful 2013 elections 
which returned former President Ibrahim Boubacar Keita into power but Mali is still to re-
establish its territorial integrity and political authority. The United Nations Multidimensional 
Integrated Stabilising Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), a local and unpopular UN established 
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group carries out patrols and maintains peace (Hicks, 2018:133). The Malian government has 
tried in vain to establish control in Kidal but has failed. There has been slow progress to 
implement peace accords signed with militants over the last decades. The same goes for other 
Sahelian states who have failed to improve governance and consolidate democracy. There have 
been attempts to address terrorism by forming regional groupings such as the CEMOC 
(Mauritania, Mali, Niger and Algeria) and the Sahel G5 (Mali, Burkina Faso, Niger, Chad and 
Mauritania) but these efforts have been derailed by regional rivalries. The superior superpower 
of Western states like France may have crushed some of these groups but it does not change 
the political economy of the Sahel. France still maintains a strong military presence in the 
region but Islamist groups continue about their business uninterrupted across the dessert, 
striking foreign targets at will (Hicks, 2018:133). With many governments focusing on the 
coronavirus pandemic, terrorist groups may exploit the situation for their benefit. This study 
will discuss the impact of the coronavirus on terrorism in Mali.   
5.5 The impact of coronavirus on terrorism in Mali 
 
There is no denying that the corona/COVID-19 virus has received public attention across the 
planet since its emergence in late 2019 in China. The pandemic has captured the attention of 
governments and citizens. The coronavirus pandemic has also captured the attention of terrorist 
groups such as Al-Qaeda and ISIS who have issued statements regarding the pandemic. Al-
Qaeda even went further to offer guidelines to its followers on how to prevent the spread of the 
pandemic emphasising that “Islam is a hygiene-oriented religion.” Terrorist groups recognise 
the threat posed by the pandemic but are also savvy enough to take advantage of the situation 
and carry out attacks (Coleman, 2020). ISIS has called on its followers to use this opportunity 
to launch attacks because the security capabilities are overburdened. 
 
The coronavirus reached virtually all countries in the world including Mali even though the 
number of infections has remained relatively low compared to other countries and regions. Yet, 
the poor health system, widespread malnutrition and limited resources threaten to destabilise 
Mali which has already had a coup. The pandemic may offer an opportunity for terrorist groups 
operating in Mali an opportunity to exploit susceptibilities amongst communities and gain 
support to further their ambitions. Already, there has been an increase in the number of lethal 
attacks carried out in Mali and Niger (which will be discussed in the next chapter). It is feared 
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that those countries that are providing military and financial support to Mali may shift their 
resources and attention to their domestic affairs (Milani, 2020:142). 
 
Moreover, terrorist groups have demonstrated that they can integrate themselves into the local 
communities, often by providing basic services such as security and health as Mali and other 
countries in the Sahel are overburdened by the coronavirus pandemic. As the coronavirus 
spreads to remote areas of Mali, terrorists will surely exploit weak points. It is vital for Mali 
and the international community not to turn their focus away from countering terrorism. An 
extended approach and continued collaboration that tackles the drivers of terrorism are 
necessary to stop the spread of terrorist activities in Mali (Coleman, 2020).  
 5.6 Conclusion 
 
The recent 2020 coup staged by the Malian military exacerbated by the coronavirus is evidence 
that Mali is far from being stable. Terrorists have already taken advantage of coronavirus 
pandemic to increase their influence and attacks. The military has turned its focus on replacing 
the president, leaving a gap that terrorist and other armed groups will surely exploit. The Malian 
state was already overwhelmed before the coronavirus pandemic and it will be further exposed 
as the coronavirus is likely to be amongst us for some time. The military coup was ill-timed by 
the Malian military as the Malian state should be pulling all of its available resourced together 
to try and flatten the curve on the coronavirus pandemic, improve security, governance, 
mitigate its economic challenges. Terrorist groups are already one step ahead in Mali, ready to 
take advantage of what the post-coronavirus world will offer. As noted, contemporary terrorist 
groups are flexible and adaptive. It is easy for them to adapt to the new realities, survive, 
expand and carry out devastating attacks. Mali needs to develop a cost-effective counter-
terrorism apparatus to ensure cooperation with other countries is strengthened to deny terrorist 
groups any room to manoeuvre. This chapter introduced the study, set the scene by laying out 
a background to the Malian conflict, discussed Tuareg’s quest for independence and 
nationalism, traced the rise of radical Islam in Mali, discussed the post-independent Malian 
state, analysed how Malian borders are managed, discussed the role of governance and 
discussed the impact of coronavirus on terrorism before concluding the chapter. This study will 





CHAPTER SIX: TRACING THE ROOT CAUSES OF TERRORISM IN NIGER 
6.1 Introduction 
 
In the previous chapter, it was found that the root causes of terrorism in Mali appear to derive 
from the rise of radical Islam, poor governance, poor border management, corruption, weak 
state capacity and the quest for independence by the Tuaregs. This chapter will discuss the root 
causes of terrorism in Niger. It will introduce the study, analyse the security situation of Niger. 
The study will proceed to lay out the historical perspective of Niger. It will discuss state 
abandonment and the record of poor governance in Niger, analyse the increase of radical Islam 
and Salafism in Niger, as well as a discussion on  the situation of the youth in Niger. The study 
will discuss the impact of the coronavirus on terrorism in Niger before concluding the chapter.  
 
Boko Haram, AQIM and ISIS are prime examples of how over the past couple of years, terrorist 
groups have become powerful than ever. Counterterrorism measures such as travel bans, 
financial sanctions, targeted killings, designation and special operations are insufficient against 
terrorist groups that are in control of major villages, towns cities, and supply lines, have 
thousands of fighters, generate revenue and provide public goods. Targeted killing of terrorist 
leaders by the use of drones can disrupt terrorist groups from their operations but this strength 
is also its weakness. Collateral damage resulting in civilian death from drone attacks has in 
many instances fuelled anger and resentment amongst the local population, destabilising local 
political conditions. Groups like Boko Haram and others have opaque command structures, 
meaning that the death of the group’s leader may have an uncertain impact and in many cases, 
a more radical and violent leader is likely to emerge (Chelin, 2018:98). 
 
The rise of Boko Haram, ISIS and other Al-Qaeda affiliated terrorist groups pause a threat to 
human and state security in Niger and the Sahel over the last two decades. Until recently, 
countries like Burkina Faso and Ivory Coast have been isolated from terrorism have been 
attacked by AQIM which has expanded its footprints. These terrorist organisations discourage 
economic growth and tourism while they continue to destabilise states that are trying to 
consolidate democracy. Traditional peace agreements and mediation become improbable 
because of the extreme ideologies that these groups espouse. Additionally, their ties to 
transnational criminal networks propagate human-trafficking and illicit drug networks that 
breed colossal suffering across the Sahel. Defeating terrorist groups like Boko Haram and 
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others that operate in the Sahel has proven to be difficult as they have demonstrated that they 
can adapt and survive under heavy military pressure. In this light, military responses to 
terrorism is not enough. Defeating these terrorist groups will require military responses to be 
backed by government efforts in the Sahel to identify and address the causes of terrorism which 
make individuals susceptible to recruitment. 
6.2 The Nigerien security situation  
 
The security situation in Niger is compromised because non-state actors and the state are 
competing to assert their authority over the population which is a by-product of colonialism. 
The political order and the international community still regard the idea of a strong state with 
the monopoly on violence as an important aspect of international relations. It has become 
almost impossible to ignore the challenges that the modern state faces from non-state actors 
(Ali, 2017:3-4). In many African settings, non-state actors are responsible for providing 
political order and security rather than the state as it can be argued about Niger. In many Sahel 
countries, the state is weak or does not exist in remote regions of the country. This void is filled 
by militia groups as is the case in Nigeria, Mali and Niger where armed militias are hired to 
provide security for the local population. Meanwhile, armed conflict and terrorism are 
simultaneously driven by the same actors. This would help to explain why the African 
statehood continues to exhibit the historical colonial process where security practice and 
governance were merged to help to control the population and territory. This was pursued by 
forming alliances with local leaders, who were allowed to retain control over their territory, 
population and applied customary laws. This means that many systems of governance and 
particular socio-political identities were maintained when the colonialists left (Hoffmann, et 
al., 2015:7).     
 
Many political orders that exist in Africa were shaped by this pluralism. Niger is dealing with 
contested limits to the control of the state over population and territory. Fierce competition 
amongst non-state actors and the government elites to govern territory often accompanies the 
fragmentation of state authority. The lives of the local population are made precarious by armed 
conflicts that break out over power and resources since those who claim to provide security to 
the local population are often the drivers of insecurity and terrorism. It is important to note that 
this protection is often provided along ethnic lines to protect lives and property in settings 




By contrast to Nigeria and Mali, the Nigerien case since 2012, illustrates an insecurity that is 
different as it is not yet an open armed conflict zone, but it is important to note that it is stained 
by regional insecurities and profound underlying tensions that may escalate. Fortunately, these 
tensions have not escalated even though they remain a present threat (Hoffmann & Moe, 
2015:32). To a Western observer who does not reside in Africa, the growing terrorist activities, 
instabilities and the deteriorating security situation in Niger may appear as fragile democracies 
and weak states crumbling under pressure from armed groups and terrorist organisations. But 
on  closer inspection, Niger has vast complex problems. The failure by the Nigerien state to 
provide basic services-including securing its territorial integrity, combined with spill-over 
conflicts from the region have enabled the plethora of actors to emerge as security providers in 
trying to fill the security vacuum, including jihadists, separatists movements, terrorists and 
reformists (Hoffmann, et al., 2015:5). 
 
The Nigerien security and terrorism conundrum, a predicament stemming from the colonial 
order and political arrangements, not only risks generating a wider and deeper self-destructive 
action, but also sending shockwaves of concern across the entire African continent. It also has 
spill-over effects that affect the globe, especially Europe, in terms of increased illegal 
immigration from West Africa (Hahonou, 2015:4). Terrorism, state fragility and armed conflict 
in the Sahel started receiving attention from the international community after the Malian 
conflict in 2012. It is important to trace the drivers of insecurity and terrorism in Niger as a 
major concern. To do that, this study will lay out a historical perspective on the erosion of state 
institutions in Niger that has led citizens to express their frustrations on matters regarding ‘state 
abandonment’- lack of service provision to remote areas of the country which has led to non-
state security providers to emerge. These security providers operate in areas where the state is 
fragmented and they are beginning to challenge the state in many of its central functions 
(justice, education, health, social services and many others) (Hoffmann, et al., 2015:33). As 
noted, this study will proceed to lay out the historical perspective of Niger.   
6.3 Historical perspective of Niger  
 
Located in West Africa, Niger shares borders with countries that have political, economic, 
security and terrorism problems. (Nigeria, Mali and Libya). The landlocked Sahelian 
Francophone country is an important hub in the Western African trading routes as it brings 
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together cultures, different people and goods. It was a French colony for forty years until it 
gained independence in 1960. Its citizens are known as Nigeriens. The north of the country is 
partly covered by the Sahara desert. Most of the population lives in the south of the country 
along the Niger river and most of the people rely on subsistence farming with 84 percent of the 
population depending on agriculture to survive (Cooke & Sanderson, 2016:8). The main ethnic 
tribes are Djerma-Songhai and the Hausa. Nomadic Tuaregs and the Fulani are also found in 
Niger. Tuaregs are 10% of the population compared to 5% in Mali. Islam is its main religion 
even though a small minority of the population practices traditional African beliefs and 
Christianity (Jensen, 2020:382).   
 
Niger, like Mali, has failed to bring about any meaningful development to its people. It rates 
102 per 1000 live births in its infant mortality rate. Each Nigerien child averages just five years 
of schooling with 85% of the population not able to read and write (Hicks, 2018:127). Niger’s 
population was over 23 million by 2019, growing at 3,9% since 2014 as it has the highest 
fertility rates in the world. This has no doubt put a strain on services such as health, education 
and the environment as the agricultural and grazing land has been degraded. This creates a ripe 
context for the relative deprivation theory (Worldometer, 2019). 
 
As noted, the 2011 collapse of the authoritarian leader Muammar Gaddafi had many 
consequences for the Sahel region as it profoundly affected Mauritania, Mali, Nigeria, 
Cameroon, Chad, Niger and Burkina Faso. The regional, national and local conflict dynamics 
of the Sahel region were changed by the return of hired mercenaries from Libya. However, 
returning mercenaries were well managed in Niger unlike in Mali. (Hahonou, 2016:5). Niger 
has undergone a series of sporadic attacks from rebel and terrorist organisations such as Boko 
Haram, ISIS and AQIM from Mali and Nigeria since 2012. The attacks shave been mainly in 
the north and east of the country. As noted, Niger, unlike Mali, managed to avoid a major crisis 
as the Malian conflict failed to flow into Niger due to its reinforced military cooperation with 
the US and France. With France getting a third of its uranium supply from northern Niger and 
the US maintaining a military base in Niger, these two superpowers took steps to protect their 
interests since 2013. Despite military cooperation from the West, there have been sporadic 
attacks on its uranium mines in the north and Boko Haram has also carried out attacks in 
Niamey, east of the country. Despite these attacks, Niger remains relatively safe from external 
threats but it is important to note that it enjoys very little territorial sovereignty (Jesús, 
2015:170).   
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Yet, the problems that Niger faces cannot be solely blamed on jihadists and terrorists. Niger is 
mainly concerned with internal insecurity and the threat of a coup as there has been an increase 
in tensions between the political elite and military leaders in recent years. Niger’s fragile 
insecurity is not new but has been developing for decades. It has encountered challenges in 
providing basic services to its population since the early1970s and in the last two decades it 
has failed to provide security and protect its territorial integrity. In the domain of security, this 
has resulted in two main consequences: Firstly, the legitimacy of the state has been eroded. 
Secondly, this means that individuals and groups of people have organised individually or 
collectively to secure their property and themselves. This has resulted in the fragmentation of 
public authority (Sangaré & McSparren, 2018:2). Terrorist groups have taken advantage of this 
situation to expand their operations.  
 
Despite having an abundance of uranium reserves, Niger has remained one of the poorest 
countries in the world with the northern Agadez and the eastern Diffa regions experiencing 
Tuareg rebellions from 1991-1994 and 2007-2009 which were marked by political and 
economic marginalisation. The government of Niger has made efforts to integrate ex-
combatants into its national army but there has been frustration against the recruitment of ex-
combatants. The way northern Niger is managed resembles that of Mali in many respects. To 
begin with, the same conditions that led to the Tuareg rebellion have not been addressed and 
they still exist. The region has become a weapons and drug and trafficking hub with the 
involvement of political and local elites (Bøås, 2018:3). Despite efforts to increase its military 
budget, Niger remains extremely susceptible because the state does not exist or is not 
recognised in many parts of the country as it can be argued that it has abandoned its people.  
The Nigerien state does not have the capacity to provide public services to its population. Most 
people in this region prefer customary justice as they do not recognise state justice because the 
state is quasi-absent. Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) have intervened in the region 
but it has not stopped frustrations with the government from growing with many Diffa residents 
expressing the common phrase “Niger has abandoned us” (Sangaré & McSparren, 2018:15). 
 
This study will proceed to discuss state abandonment in Niger, focusing on Diffa because it is 





6.4 State abandonment in Niger (Focusing on the Diffa region) 
 
The Diffa region’s situation on the Nigerian border illustrates how an unpopular state which 
has failed to provide basic services to its population can create the conditions for a rise in 
terrorist activities and Islamic movements as an alternative to poor governance. Despite the 
discovery of oil in the remote Diffa region, it remains poor with high levels of poverty and 
unemployment. About 42% of children in Niger suffer from malnutrition and 25.4% of youths 
were unemployed in 2019. The Diffa region has endured severe floods from 2012-2014 which 
greatly undermined their livelihoods by destroying food production. Without support from the 
government, these desperate individuals are left with no choice but to join terrorist groups. This 
links directly to the relative deprivation theory which argues that people who are socio-
economically deprived can produce the worst form of violence and terrorism (Sangaré & 
McSparren, 2018:15). Niger has experienced droughts in the last decade which has put more 
than 6 million people in risk of hunger. Half on Niger’s budget comes from donors, yet the 
country has failed to fulfil its commitments to improving education, health and development 
of the country. Donor money was underspent in 2014 whilst some of it was diverted to the 
military to counter the threat from AQIM and Boko Haram (Hoffmann, et al., 2015:39). The 
education budget has been cut and the money has been diverted to the military since 2012.  
 
The Diffa region has become unstable following the violence in Nigeria since 2012 which 
brought an influx of refugees into the region. There were already conflicts between youths and 
the army (which is seen as repressive), government and unemployed youths, various Muslim 
groups (conservatives and reformists) and various pastoral groups competing for grazing land. 
The situation was further complicated by the returning Tubu fighters from Libya who  
organised themselves into Arab militias. These militias protect themselves from other groups 
and also fight for control of pastoral land smuggling routes (Alemu, 2018:84). 
 
To further complicate the already volatile situation, there are growing frustrations in the 
Nigerien army with the military expressing its unhappiness with lack of funding and bad 
working conditions. To further add insult to injury in the situation in Niger, there are rumours 
of heightened inter-ethnic rivalries within the military. Rampant corruption has increased 
infighting between the different branches of the security sector. The public has been frustrated 
by police inaction when they report crimes and many have resorted to buying firearms to 
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protect themselves. The legitimacy of the Nigerien state has been gravely undermined by the 
behaviour of security forces which has been exacerbated by government failure to provide 
basic services to its citizens. This has produced frustrations, discontent and has created an 
opportunity for security actors to emerge including religious Islamic organisations, some of 
which commit terrorists acts (Hoffmann, et al., 2015:39). Not all religious Islamic 
organisations want to overthrow the existing political order in Niger, as do MUJAO and Boko 
Haram who are radical movements. This study will proceed to analyse radicalisation and 
salafisation in Niger.     
6.5 Radicalisation and Salafisation in Niger  
 
Lack of governance, failure to control the borders, corruption and failure to consolidate 
democracy are the conditions that are found in both Mali and Niger. Salafi-oriented 
organisations have played an influential public role in Sahel states since the 1990s. In states 
embittered by predation, corruption and lack of governance, these organisations found fertile 
ground in the Sahel. In Niger, as it was the case in Mali and other Sahelian states, funds are 
channelled from rich Gulf states to Islamic charities who use the money to build mosques and 
madrasas. Structures built by these organisations provide an attractive option to secular 
government schools (Solomon, 2018:205-312). 
 
These Salafi oriented organisations have gained ground in the region as they have preached 
against moderate Sufi oriented Islam. Salafisation is not new to the Sahel but rather linked to 
the failure or incapacity of Sahelian states to address longstanding grievances of corruption 
and underdevelopment (Manthorpe, 2013). The spread of Islamism does not appear to be 
coordinated and it has many components transcending borders with similar objectives: to 
oppose the secular state, introduce Sharia law, reaffirm Muslim values, identity and codes of 
conduct. In Niger, the rise of the Islamist ideology has offered the opportunity for people to 
voice their grievances. For example, Yan Izala, the Salafi-oriented group organised 
demonstrations that turned into riots in 2015 which had anti-French and anti-Christian 
overtones (Schritt, 2015:50). The protests did not only target religious symbols but they also 
targeted the Issoufou government and the West in general. This was the origin of radical Islam 
as Islamic fundamentalists capitalised on the protests to spread their radical messages to the 




Niger has evolved ever since Boko Haram entered its territory in 2003 from neighbouring 
Nigeria. Boko Haram fleeing from Nigeria used the Nigerien territory to recuperate as it was 
easy for them to cross the poorly controlled borders and the Nigerien government was 
unwilling to confront Boko Haram (ICG, 2015:10). In 2015, the government arrested suspected 
Boko Haram members and sympathisers but it did not stop periodic attacks from Boko Haram. 
The increase of Salafism in Niger does not necessarily translate to heightened support 
for terrorism in Niger. Boko Haram began recruiting members in Niger from 2015 based on 
material incentives, not ideological incentives, especially in Diffa. The Boko Haram way of 
life has not really appealed to the Nigerien youths as they are aware of the brutality and 
atrocities that have been committed by Boko Haram in Nigeria. In the eyes of Nigerien youth, 
Boko Haram’s rejection of Western education represents backwardness (Schritt, 2015:60). 
There were large protests against Boko Haram in 2015 in every Nigerien town. It is 
dumbfounding that Nigerien youth have criticised the Boko Haram ideology while at the same 
time they admire ISIS and Al- Qaeda. To get to understand this unusual situation we have to 
take a closer look at the situation of Nigerien youths. 
6.6 The Nigerien youth situation 
 
As noted, Niger has the highest birth rate in the world, with almost 7 children born per woman. 
Most Nigeriens are youths, 70% of them being under the age of 25. 63% of the youths live 
under the poverty line. The situation in Niger is based on gender segregation. Males dominate 
public life. Given the mass unemployment situation in Niger, most youths are unable to find 
jobs and provide for their families. They then direct their grievances to the government and the 
West by attacking government institutions and Western corporations (ICG, 2015:14). This 
feeds directly into the grievance theory’s sub-division of horizontal inequality which argues 
that if socio-inequalities widen, then violence is likely to occur.  
 
With no promise of employment, Nigerien youths join fada or palais.6  Communities affected 
by high levels of poverty have a high number of palais. Nigerien youths are now a force to be 
 
6  Informal conversation groups joined by youths of the same neighbourhood. The fada originated in the 
 1990s after unemployment rose due to Structural Adjustment Programmes (SAPs) The fada are centred 
 around tea parties and to address boredom. The palais are a recent phenomenon that started around 2007 
 and are masculine. They are in contrast to the fada as their activities are centred on violence, sex, crime, 




reckoned with due to Niger’s demographics and violent masculinity in public protests. These 
youth have to be controlled and governed. Political machines have taken advantage of 
the palais for political mobilisation and in many cases, youth leaders are paid for mobilising 
their followers (Schritt, 2015:61). 
 
The main growth areas in Niger that offer the best return in investment are in people smuggling, 
drugs and arms trading (Brachet, 2018:18). Nigerien youth can connect to the global world and 
get global prices through these goods. When smuggling was made illegal in 2015 (people 
smuggling was an officially recognised profession in Niger and in some cases, smugglers even 
paid taxes), customs officers and the police then began to demand higher bribes from the 
smugglers (Wallis, 2020). It can be argued that increased insecurity in Libya, northern Niger 
and Mali creates a malicious circle where illicit goods are the only commodities that can 
survive high bribes and increased protection costs. This insecurity has increased the incentives 
for youth to get involved in trafficking (McCullough, et al., 2019:53). It is clear that the 
Nigerien government is unable to protect its territorial integrity due to poor governance. This 
study will proceed to discuss poor governance in Niger. 
6.7 Niger’s poor record of governance  
 
As in Mali, Niger faces a Tuareg rebellion in the north of the country. Failure to control its 
borders and lack of development in the periphery regions have contributed to instability in 
Niger. Central governments have for decades paid very little attention to the development of 
the periphery (ICG, 2015:8). The powerful politicians have allowed these regions to stagnate 
because they were not an immediate threat to their power base as long as the politicians enjoyed 
the profits of corruption. It can be argued that resource exploitation and the legacy of 
colonialism produced uneven economic development and poor state of governance in Niger. 
As long as natural resources continue to flow from Niger, the West (France and the US) and 
its corporations are happy to support the status quo regardless of poor governance and human 
right abuses.  Conversely, the West has to be seen to be doing something about illegal 
immigration, terrorism and drugs but will not acknowledge their role or the colonial legacy in 
enabling the problem. The West uses climate change as a scapegoat for food shortages and 
instability in the region because it is a global problem to shift responsibility from them 




The Nigerien Movement for Justice (NMJ) led by Aghlay ag Alambo staged the last major 
Tuareg rebellion in 2007 which was fighting for a greater share from the profits of the uranium 
mines in the north of the country near the Algeria border. This rebellion was inspired by the 
brief success of Ag Bahanga in Mali. The north of Niger is underdeveloped and remote like 
Mali. The Tuaregs, Fulani and the Tubu communities have felt marginalised from power 
especially by the southern Hausa tribal group which originates from southern Nigeria. Uranium 
facilities owned by the French and the Chinese were attacked in 2007 by the Tuaregs who were 
joined by the Fulani and the Tubu (Zouandé, 2016:80). Attacks on foreign companies are best 
explained by the greed and grievance theory which argues that countries that depend on natural 
resources are likely to experience armed conflict.  
 
President Mamadou Tandja did not only crush the rebellion but he also destroyed the desert 
tourist industry in 2007. Colonel Gaddafi tried to mediate in the conflict however, the group 
undermined itself by splitting apart. It was feared that the MNLA revolt in Mali exacerbated 
by thousands of Tuaregs fleeing from the Libya crisis could rekindle the MNJ but this was to 
be the case. Tuareg leaders, Aghlay ag Alambo and Rhissa ag Boula were brought into the 
political fold and made advisors to President Mahamadou Issoufou’s advisors whilst some 
Tuaregs were integrated into the army and this helped stop a spill over conflict from Mali. 
Despite the steps taken to avert spill-over effects from Mali, Niger remains in danger of 
descending further into state collapse if similar instabilities like those in Mali are allowed to 
happen again (Hicks, 2018:127). 
 
State-building and democracy promotion have fared poorly in Niger. The country has 
experienced four coups and has also experienced some military rule since independence. Niger 
returned to civilian rule in 2011 but old habits have begun to return with authorities uncovering 
two coup plots in 2011 and 2015 with prominent presidential candidates and the military elites 
arrested. In 2015, the elections were contested by the tiny elite who had spent the last twenty 
years moving in and out of government. In Niger, as is the case in Mali the opposition is 
accused of being unrepresentative and ineffective. The Nigerien government has failed to 
honour a commitment it made in 2010, to increase the lucrative extraction sector and 
transparency. Hama Amadou’s supporters have been arrested for calling for his release while 
security forces have cracked down on those who denounced the rule of Issoufou in 2014 and 
2015. Journalists have been the target by the Issoufou regime with some of them arrested since 
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2015 (Miles, 2016). The above mentioned poor record of governance has pushed desperate  
individuals to join terrorist groups.  
 
Niger has joined several regional coalitions to combat terrorism and it has miraculously 
escaped regional spill overs but it has not escaped AQIM and Boko Haram. These two groups 
are still able to strike inside Niger with relative ease. Niger faces the same challenges as Mali, 
lack of development and governance with a large section of the population feeling isolated and 
marginalised. The frustration-aggression mechanism and the greed and grievance theory fit the 
scene in Mali and Niger where it can be argued that those who are in leadership positions look 
after their own selfish interests leaving the rest of the population languishing  in poverty (ICG, 
2015:15).  
 
To what extent can the failure of governance be blamed for the rise of radical Islam in Niger? 
As noted, the failure of governance in Niger is not isolated but Sahel states like Mauritania, 
Chad and Mali have the same problem. Sahelian states have failed to build effective state 
institutions such as the border patrol and the army which has resulted in vast swatches of 
territory where the presence of the central government is weak or does not exist at all. Jihadists, 
smugglers and drug traffickers have colonised these open places and operated economic 
systems and social arrangements as it is shown in Figure 4.1.  
 
The lack of job opportunities has also driven some into the hands of Islamic jihadists. Islamist 
ideologies were not so much created by the lack of governance in Niger or even force a large 
number of people to embrace radical ideas. Rather, lack of governance incubated an 
environment in which jihadists, smugglers, criminals and rebels groups could thrive (Hicks, 
2018:130). The world is currently battling to mitigate the threat posed by the coronavirus 
pandemic which terrorists may exploit to further their aims. This study will discuss the imact 
of coronavirus on terrorism in Niger.  
6.8 The impact of the coronavirus on terrorism in Niger 
 
Niger has remained relatively little affected by the coronavirus just like other countries in the 
Sahel region compared to South Africa and North Africa. However, limited resources, poor 
health infrastructure could mean that the spread of the coronavirus will contribute to deepened 
insecurity as the country is already facing waves of attacks from terrorists and other armed 
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groups. Terrorist groups want to avoid a situation whereby the coronavirus spreads amongst its 
followers but they also want to take advantage of the psychological climate created by the 
pandemic to increase recruitment. 
 
Figure 6.1: Migration Routes Through the Central Sahel 
 
 
Source: International Crisis Group, 2015. The Central Sahel: A Perfect Sandstorm (No. 227). 
International Crisis Group. 
 
Besides, terrorist groups have previously shown the willingness to take advantage of the 
preoccupation of states with mitigating the coronavirus pandemic. They will likely use this 
opportunity to organise, construct, recruit, radicalise and gather their recruits for a new wave 
of operations (Rezrazi, 2020:8). 
 
An ISIS franchise carried out attacks in Niamey on December 2019 and January 2020 resulting 
in deadly causalities. Lethal Terrorist attacks have already increased in Niger since the 
coronavirus pandemic began. With the government of Niger preoccupied with mitigating the 
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coronavirus pandemic, the capacity of the government will be weakened. ISIS is not only 
present in Niamey but also in Mali.  If the capacity of the Nigerien state is weakened by the 
coronavirus, the Sahelian state will not only deal with terrorist groups only as terrorists but as 
governance competitors (ICG, 2020:1). The coronavirus will serve as a litmus test for Niger 
and other Sahelian states. The pandemic will severely affect the already volatile security 
situation in Niger.    
6.9 Conclusion  
 
The trajectory of the Sahel is worrying, it remains unstable with old grievances not being 
addressed. If these grievances are not addressed, then violence will continue or escalate. 
Competition to access power, deep disenchantment with the central government, resource 
scarcity, lack of governance and marginalisation will cause tensions to escalate in Niger. Some 
bread and butter conflicts will end up gaining jihadi dimensions. The Sahel is an integrated 
region, with no effective borders, it can be said that no conflict can be said to be confined to 
one country. Sahelian governments have exaggerated the jihadi threat to shrink political space, 
securitise policies and they have used it as an excuse to cover their failures. The failure of the 
Nigerien government to bring about a sense of citizenship, development and good governance 
to its people will stoke radicalisation as youths will begin to see political Islam as a solution to 
their problems. The tendency by the West to shore up regimes that do not have legitimacy is 
not a long-term remedy to sustainable peace. For every dollar spent by the donors and the West, 
they should demand accountability, good governance and development. This chapter 
introduced the study, analyse the security situation of Niger. The chapter proceeded to lay out 
the historical perspective of Niger. It then discussed state abandonment and the record of poor 
governance in Niger, analysed the increase of radical Islam and Salafism in Niger, as well as a 
discussion on  the situation of the youth in Niger. The chapter then  discussed the impact of the 









CHAPTER SEVEN: MAIN FINDINGS, CONCLUSION AND 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
7.1 Introduction  
 
Terrorism is indeed becoming a prevailing mode of conflict in West Africa. This study focused 
on Al-Qaeda-affiliated or Al-Qaeda enthused terrorist organisations that have operations in 
West Africa, namely, the contemporary prominent ISIS, Boko Haram, AQIM and others. 
During the course of the study, it was not possible to come up with a clear definition of 
terrorism because the term is very controversial but various definitions from different scholars 
were utilised. Despite its controversies, many scholars generally agree that terrorism is aimed 
at civilians. It is politically motivated and it makes use of violence to achieve its political goals. 
Terrorism can indeed be found in most religions and has a long history which can be traced to 
the 1st century B.C.E. Terrorism keeps on changing and evolving with the ever-changing times 
and it has made very good use of globalisation and modern technology to advance its cause. 
 
All waves of terrorism cause distress to global peace but the Religious and the Fifth Waves of 
terrorism cause an even greater threat to the human race and the international order. These two 
waves are influenced by religious extremists who seek to create a new world by wiping out the 
old one that is defiled. In creating a new world, religious extremists will use the most 
destructive weapons available to kill as many people as they can to spread fear and advance 
their cause. Al-Qaeda’s ideology has influenced the spread of terrorist organisations in Africa, 
Asia and the Middle East with groups such as Boko Haram and ISIS amongst others becoming 
more radical and brutal than Al-Qaeda. The difference in ideology between Osama bin Laden 
and Al-Zarqawi led to ISIS being formed.  
 
It can be argued that West Africa inherited a poisoned chalice from colonialism and did not 
make any attempts to change the oppressive system but the ruling elites perfected it to 
accumulate and maintain power at all costs. Former Anglophone and Francophone colonies in 
the Sahel face the same problems and challenges that threaten their fragile states. Poor 
governance, failure to maintain territorial integrity and to secure their borders are common 




There is a danger that the militarisation of West Africa by the West or jihadists will render 
West Africa dependent on military force to manage conflicts. Four major consequences will 
result from the militarisation of West Africa: 
1. A culture of violence will emerge as local mechanisms of conflict resolution will be 
weakened. 
2. A regional arms race will be created to counter threats from terrorism and neighbouring 
states will also want to keep a military balance in the region. 
3. This will result in development funds being diverted to military expenditure. 
4. Since Sahelian states have weak and small armies, intervention in regional conflicts 
will leave them vulnerable at home. Terrorism in West Africa has an osmosis with north 
Africa. Therefore, any counter-terrorism efforts will require north African to be 
involved since they have better experience in dealing with terrorism and have stronger 
and bigger militaries.  
 
In many cases, conflict and terrorism are products of intrastate crises that are rooted in poor 
governance, socio-economic deprivation, authoritarian rules and exclusion of minorities from 
governance. If Sahelian states are to address the instabilities that they face, they will need to 
improve governance and give their citizens prospects of being included in economic 
development. Attention has to be paid to improving regional security forces, including the 
national armies, intelligence services, border agencies in order to help their countries to regain 
and control their territorial integrity. Those who have been marginalised need to be given 
access to employment opportunities, health care and school. Each state has to give its people a 
sense of citizenship and the citizens must feel that the state is investing in them. This would 
help to counter the narratives of radicalism and rebellion which have proven to be popular in 
the Sahel region. If they fail to make positive changes in governance then the region is likely 
to continue experiencing violence and instability. 
 
If participatory democracy is established, good governance is addressed and socio-economic 
deprivation is mitigated, only then, groups like the Tuareg can begin to feel part of the national 
community. It is in such conditions that regional problems can be solved by regional 
cooperation. France should play a bigger role in bringing about regional cooperation and in 
doing so, it can promote democratic principles. Terrorists are likely to take advantage of the 
coronavirus pandemic which has turned the world upside down to expand their influence 
because the modern state is likely to emerge weaker after the virus is mitigated.  
105 
 
Since most states in the Sahel have failed to provide security and protect their territorial 
integrity, they should consider shaping their policies to accommodate non-state or private 
security providers to fill the vacuum in the urban and rural areas (reformist non-violent ethnic 
militias and religious groups). Sahelian states should acknowledge the increased importance 
that non-state security providers serve as it points to a lack of security provision by state forces. 
Non-state security providers often articulate economic, social and political grievances that 
should be carefully considered. As such, they should be treated as potential forces of social 
change rather than enemies of the state (Craven-Matthews &Englebert, 2018:10). 
The frustration-aggression mechanism fits the scenario in many West African states where 
many have been denied access to natural resources, exacerbated by ecological bastardisation 
and environmental degradation due to oil exploration and global warming. This setting has 
generated frustrations which has led to aggression, and in some extreme cases, terrorist activity 
(Ghatak & Prins, 2017:220). Failure by the state to meet value expectations of its people who 
feel a sense of entitlement can lead to uncertainty amongst the population and unhappiness 
towards the state. 
There is a lot of evidence to argue that the impact of the coronavirus pandemic will sustain 
many uncertainties around us for the future. The questions are how long will lockdown 
measures remain in place or what will be the impact of reintroducing lockdown measures in 
places where the coronavirus has resurged? Currently, society and governments are seeking a 
post-coronavirus society by working hard to develop a vaccine and return to normal. The 
impacts caused by the pandemic are yet to be seen but terrorists have already capitalised on the 
situation to further their ideologies. As noted, the economic impacts caused by lockdown 
restriction are obvious and have forced governments to ease some of the restrictions imposed 
on their citizens. A multi-dimensional impact will emerge from the coronavirus era and it will 
have a huge impact on terrorism. In particular, immense spending on health care systems to 
boost employment, increased social spending to assist those who have lost their jobs and 
stimulus spending on the economy means that there will be less money left for other sectors of 
the economy. This means that there may be less money to spend on defence and security. The 
Sahel relies heavily on foreign funding from the West to keep terrorist groups at bay. If the 
West decides to reduce funding and withdraw its military assistance to the Sahel, then it will 
not be long before terrorist groups outrun weak Sahelian states. The economic stimulus 
spending means that it is at the expense of defence and security. The world must avoid a 
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situation whereby the coronavirus crisis produces another crisis. Counter-terrorism efforts and 
overseas commitments will not be on the same levels as before because there is an increased 
demand for domestic spending. 
Real or perceived economic deprivation fuels grievances and hate. If unemployment issues 
continue unaddressed, especially among the youths, then those who feel deprived will start to 
identify with terrorist messages. Attention has to be focused on minimising job losses. If the 
world does not recover from the effects of the coronavirus, then there is a need to rethink 
economic responses that encourage sustainable development and peace which reduces feelings 
of marginalisation. Terrorism will continue to be fuelled by feelings of contempt, delusion, and 
anger. The response to the coronavirus pandemic from the world has to be carefully and 
skilfully crafted. In the face of the pandemic, the world should pursue increased recognition 
and reinforcement of our shared humanity. Global responses should not fuel terrorism but 
reduce it as it is clear that the coronavirus impacts will not dissipate soon. 
The aim of this study was to analyse the root causes of terrorism in the West African states of 
Nigeria, Mali and Niger. This study drew from the relative deprivation and the greed and 
grievance theories as possible reasons to explain the causes of terrorism. This study was guided 
by the following research question and a sub-question: 
1.    What are the triggers and root causes of terrorism in these states? 
Sub-question: In what ways, if any, has the legacy of colonialism helped to incubate terrorism 
in West Africa? 
 
In answering the main research questions, the study had to provide a historical background of 
terrorism, which included an analysis of  the origins of terrorism  and its waves. In addition to 
identifying the characteristics of contemporary terrorism, the study also discussed the impacts 
of the coronavirus on terrorism on a global scale which is a contemporary issue  at the time this 
study was written.  The triggers and root causes of terrorism were addressed in three separate 
case studies which included Nigeria, Mali and Niger. Anglophone Nigeria faces the same 
challenges that the two Francophones have due to the legacy of colonialism which left them 
with weak states. This study clearly demonstrated weak state structures inherited from 
colonialism have helped to incubate terrorism in West Africa. Colonialists did not create proper 
governance structures as they were only concerned about looting primary raw materials from 
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their colonies. This above statement is a clear statement that the study also addressed the sub-
question as posed by the study.   
7.2 Main findings and recommendations for Nigeria  
 
The main findings on Nigeria are that the Nigerian state has become a battleground for elite 
competition at the expense of the poor. Nigerian elites have found it easy to pit ethnic, religious 
and regional groups against each other because of the high levels of poverty and inequality. 
This has enabled the elites to continue looting the state with impunity as corruption has 
continued unabated. Corruption has generated absolute poverty in Nigerian society, 
undermining democratic principles, accountability, weakening state institutions and good 
governance. Boko Haram has preached that corruption is a Western value that must be replaced 
with a Muslim state of Nigeria and this may be appealing to those who have been marginalised 
by the state.  
 
Many Nigerian citizens, especially in the north have lost legitimacy in the Nigerian state 
because the state does not have effective governance. Therefore many citizens do not trust, 
cooperate and support the government. On the other hand, Boko Haram offers an alternative 
form of government to the poor. The Nigerian state is weak, unable to control its citizens and 
cater for their basic needs such as security, food and water. Many citizens provide basic 
services such as security and water for themselves. 
 
Ending the recurring violence in Nigeria will require the causes of terrorism to be identified 
and addressed. Most research projects have ignored the Nigerian context and tended to focus 
on Boko Haram’s terrorising activities. Boko Haram and the increase of terrorism in Nigeria 
have historical reinforcements in the Nigerian context. The political elites are responsible for 
the emergency of Boko Haram for political opportunities. The Sharia legal system has brought 
comfort to those in the north of Nigeria as it is viewed as an ideal society that the northerners 
long for. This belief has been entrenched into the minds of the people by the insurgent leaders 
with the calls for jihad. Kleptomaniac leaders have played a big role in capping these beliefs 
as their selfish behaviours have left the population frustrated, aggrieved and deprived, creating 
a fertile ground for radicalisation and for religious leaders to give meaning and construct their 
own ideal social reality which has created requiring conflicts. Instead of advancing the interests 
of the people and security, the political elite has instead promoted party and self-interest 
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thereby, creating a political opportunity for terrorism to metamorphose from ideological and 
economic factors (Iyekepolo, 2016:2222). 
 
Understanding the causes of terrorism in Nigeria needs one to understand that terrorism was 
born from the Nigerian political environment. Economic hardships and religious ideology 
played important roles in the emergency of Boko Haram but local political battles played a 
bigger part in its emergence. This study would like to acknowledge that economic hardships 
created grievances and frustrations which sect leaders framed in a religious light but it still 
needed a political opportunity to express itself as terrorism. Political actors created this 
opportunity as in other previous violent conflicts in Nigeria. The military will only succeed in 
destroying the Boko Haram superstructure but if the economic, ideological and political 
challenges in the Nigerian society remain unchanged, then it is a matter of time before terrorism 
and insurgency recur. 
 
Based on the above, first, it is recommended that terrorism drivers be addressed in Nigeria and 
the efficacy of the Nigerian army be improved. Nigerian security forces need to be reformed. 
For the military to be able to combat Boko Haram effectively, it will have to be properly paid, 
equipped and trained. The military will also need to secure the rural areas instead of 
concentrating on the urban areas only. The military will also need to build a healthy relationship 
with the rural population to regain the legitimacy of the state. 
 
Second, there is a need to deal publicly and harshly with security officers who abuse human 
rights. The local population is unlikely to cooperate and provide the Nigerian government with 
useful information if they are abused by both the Nigerian military and Boko Haram. The 
Nigerian government may defeat Boko Haram in battle but this does not translate to increased 
support and legitimacy from the local population. 
 
Third, power has to be returned to the people by strengthening local government and rebuilding 
state institutions destroyed by Boko Haram rather than managing everything from the capital 
Abuja. The local population has to be trained to manage local governance within the 
constitution, ending the cycle of violence and grievances that allows violence to recur. 
 
Fourth, there is a greater need to prioritise economic development. The appeal for insurgency 
can be reduced by economic development, as individuals will have something to lose. 
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Economic development has to happen on macro and micro levels. On a macro level, it can be 
done by upgrading and repairing infrastructure. On a micro level, it can be done by supplying 
farmers with the necessary tools to resume farming. Efforts should be made to enable farmers 
to move from subsistence farming by expanding access to markets. As a means to develop 
human and regional capital, the state needs to make a big investment in education. The 
investment should not just focus on basic literacy but should provide a curriculum that is 
practical skills-based.   
 
Fifth, the Nigerian state will need to embark on extensive reconciliation, demobilisation, 
disarmament and reintegration program. Former Boko Haram fighters should be returned to 
society and those who are still members should be encouraged to defect without fear.  
 
Finally, to stop insurgency and terrorism from recurring, the issue of bad governance has to be 
addressed. The government must stamp corruption out and those found guilty must be publicly 
shamed and punished. The Nigerian state should also publicly acknowledge its contribution to 
the rise of Boko Haram is due to its poor governance. This would help restore the legitimacy 
of the state. The Nigerian government must be seen as responsive to the needs of its population. 
Local communities should be included on issues of nation-building, by being given a chance 
to make recommendations and be provided with legitimate channels to voice their grievances 
because they are better positioned to understand local issues far better than the central 
government. Citizens need to feel free to voice their grievances without the fear of retribution 
and must be confident that the government will listen and respond to their needs. 
7.3 Main findings and recommendations for Mali  
 
The main findings on Mali are that the capacity of the state to bring about development and 
provide security for its citizens is directly impacted by corruption. Dire consequences that 
result from corruption are illustrated in the 2012 Malian conflict when MUJAO, MNLA, 
AQIM and Ansa Dine easily overran Malian security forces. For ordinary citizens, the Malian 
state lacked legitimacy and did not bring about any meaningful development to its population. 
It can be argued that, underdevelopment is both an issue in itself and a consequence of 
insecurity. Mali lacks the capabilities to promote and foster development. As a result foreign 




There is no clear alternative or obvious answer to Mali’s problems. It is recommended that 
Mali harnesses its two governance asserts that it harbours: Islam and decentralisation. Islam is 
practiced by 90% of Malians and is the pillar of governance in the region. Islam was featured 
centrally in precolonial Malian political traditions. The contemporary secular Malian state 
consigns Islam to civil society despite the majority of Malians referring to Islamic law instead 
of the official legal system which is considered to be corrupt. State institutions may be raised 
and embedded if Islamic principles were incorporated into state institutions. Broadly accepted 
Islamic principles in Mali could bring about the rule of law. Traditional Sufi traditions should 
be harnessed as foundations of governance institutions and institutional legitimacy. Alienation 
produced by the contemporary state could be mitigated by developing a hybrid state system 
that would integrate Muslim principles and institutions (Hüsken & Klute, 2015:3265-3270). 
 
Decentralisation in Mali has not done any justice to the local population as it is forced on them 
from the top to the bottom instead of allowing citizens to build their own institutions from the 
village level. The Malian population is alienated from its local government, hence there is a 
need to construct a local government by the people that will serve their interests. It will be best 
for Mali and other Sahelian states to create state structures that suite them (Hüsken & Klute, 
2015:3265-3270). 
 
From the above narrative, it has become clear that the current Malian situation poses 
multidimensional challenges that range from discrimination of certain groups, historical 
marginalisation, terrorism, organised crime operations and intra-state tensions. Mali has been 
posed a democratic example in Africa and hailed an African success story from the Western 
perception. However, it became clear that the civilian government enjoyed very little civilian 
support and that democratic foundations were indeed very weak after the 2012 
military coup. As a result, many factors have contributed to the Malian crisis: socio-economic 
frustrations, non-state and terrorist organisations presenting themselves as alternatives to 
government, poor governance, spill over effects from and to neighbouring countries and ethnic 
tension. From the above unfortunate perspective, Mali fits perfectly into an escalating 






7.4 Main findings and recommendations for Niger  
  
The main findings on Niger are that Niger has shifted from being a high aid-dependent state to 
a security aid-dependent state since 2011. This has impacted on its Western actors who have 
become increasingly dependent on Niger with the former unable to guarantee their interests in 
the country (counter-terrorism strategies, migration control, uranium) without the help of 
Niger. It is important to note that the latter (one of the poorest countries in the world) cannot 
secure and protect its territorial integrity without external support. In this light, spill over 
conflicts from the Sahel region have been limited so far. As a result, developmental efforts 
have been hampered since the attention has been diverted to short-term humanitarian and 
military responses. While Western donors focus on promoting nation-building and stability, 
human rights abuses continue to increase, particularly in the Diffa region where the state has 
never really had any legitimacy. This has increased the emergence of private security providers 
who hold more legitimacy in the eyes of the poor. Donors are aware of human rights abuses in 
Niger but if they were to withdraw their funding, then Niger would descend into anarchy 
(Hahonou, 2016:9).  
 
Niger is part of the problem in the Sahel because of its inherent state weakness but also part of 
the solution as it aspires to provide development solutions and security. Building a strong state 
will be a long and difficult journey but it remains possible. The issue of incorporating Islamic 
principles into the Nigerien state remains an important issue to consider. Development and 
security priorities should be established in Niger as a matter of urgency. Since 2012, the 
education budget has been reduced while the defence budget has been increased despite 
education being an important pillar in the development of meritocracy and democracy in state-
building. Budget cuts in education are likely to make religious schools more popular as they 
are not within the state education system and are subject to radicalisation. However, efforts to 
improve security may prove to be effective on short term bases but there is a need to invest in 
development (Leboeuf, 2014:50). 
 
Security provision is an important aspect of state-building but it is not the only sector that needs 
the attention of the Niger government in building state legitimacy. In the state-building process, 
there is an intimate relationship between the legitimacy of the state and the state’s capacity to 
provide basic services to its population. The Nigerien state must envision a rational long-term 
112 
 
plan that will identify and address the underlying causes of terrorism, armed conflict and 
insecurity. Niger and its donors should come up with plans to bring about political reforms and 
promote social change that would defuse terrorist activities and recruitment. In this light, Niger 
should focus more on long-term perspectives and state legitimacy issues. With corruption 
pervading in all sectors of the Nigerien public sectors, the state must reform the public sector, 
especially the security sector. Predatory behaviour, human rights abuses, extortion, poor border 
security, insecurity and corruption will weaken the legitimacy of the state and underpin the 
divide between state and its citizens (Hahonou, 2015:37).    
7.5 Recommendations for further study 
 
This discussion concludes the study and focuses on recommendations for further study. It is 
recommended that all forms of terrorism be further explored as it would make a significant 
contribution to the existing literature. There is a need to improve the insights of global citizens 
on issues of all religions. More attention should be paid to the Islamic religion. Global citizens 
should have knowledge of what the Qur’an and Islamic laws are about. This would help 
individuals to understand what the Fourth Wave and Fifth Waves of terrorism are all about. 
There is also a need to further improve the insights into Christian and Islamic backgrounds as 
this would  create a compassionate setting for all and stipulate a platform for remedying 
previous and contemporary disparities.  
 
The threat posed by contemporary terrorism should not be understated  as  modern terrorists 
have manipulated religion to serve their interests. Future researchers are advised to develop a 
type of education system that is fit for the contemporary world that we live in and should be 
the face of counter-terrorism measures and initiatives. This education should be guided by anti-
corruption and tolerance values. Further studies should endeavour to develop mechanisms that 
would increase and equal the enrolment of both boys and girls into school. In retrospect, 
contemporary terrorism relies on exploiting women and children to exist. Educated women and 
children would not attract the attention of terrorist groups looking to recruit new members. As 
such, history should be a compulsory subject in the curriculum from which students should 
learn from  and celebrate. This history should encourage the exchange of cultural programmes 




More time should be dedicated to exploring how to improve the capacity of the weak African 
state. Since this study demonstrated that state weakness is indeed the driver of terrorism, then 
improving state capacity should translate to reduced acts of terrorism. This can be done by 
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